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Summary
The global economy and sustainability issues are driving suppliers to
new operating modes. Smart grids and their smart metering systems can
yield sustainable and profitable operating modes. Thus, smart grids are
important enablers of economic development. However, along with benefits,
smart grids bring drawbacks. Similar to other interconnected technologies,
security and privacy are crucial to smart grids. Neglecting security concerns
might eventually compromise, for instance, the supply of electricity, water,
or gas. Neglecting privacy concerns might cause the violation of the right
to privacy of customers, enable surveillance, and permit manipulation of all
customers. Indeed, smart meters are becoming ubiquitous, and smart grids
face unprecedented threats. Public infrastructures might be jeopardized,
and citizens might be manipulated. Luckily, Privacy-Preserving Protocols
(PPPs) can solve this impasse.
This work advances state-of-the-art PPPs with the development of sev-
eral protocols that preserve customers’ privacy secure in smart grid scenar-
ios. Four of them are revisited and improved in this thesis. Such devel-
opment culminated in the concept of Asymmetric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets)—
from “Dining Cryptographers”—, which are generalizations of additive ho-
momorphic encryption primitives. In addition, we can use such primitives
to construct ADC-Nets, which are cryptographic primitives for encryption,
aggregation, and decryption of aggregated data. ADC-Nets underlie secure,
verifiable, efficient, and scalable protocols with low communication over-
head, which are independent of trusted parties, and resistant to collusion.
Furthermore, smart meters can send the minimum number of required mes-
sages directly to their supplier. Thus, they can sign their messages, and
as consequence, the protocols can ensure non-repudiation and fault toler-
ance. The former ensures that customers cannot deny the messages of their
smart meters were transmitted. The latter ensures that their supplier can
detect smart meters with failure—in themselves or in the communication
channel—and can run the protocols without the compromised smart me-
ters. Moreover, ADC-Nets can enforce customers’ privacy.
Besides the concept and results of ADC-Nets, this thesis presents other
contributions listed as follows.
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• This thesis contextualizes smart metering systems in smart grids
around the world and points out the needed models to have security
and privacy in smart grids scenarios. Furthermore, it reviews the
state of the art of privacy-enhancing technologies for smart metering
systems.
• This thesis presents three scenarios that require remote and frequent
measurements. In addition, it assesses the minimum requirements for
PPPs. Moreover, it is shown how computations can be done over
encrypted measurements.
• An algebraic and a probabilistic analysis show that PPPs cannot keep
customers’ privacy secure using data aggregation with a small number
of customers. Counterintuitively, when the number of measurements
increases, the effectiveness of PPPs also increases. The optimal effec-
tiveness is achieved when the sum of measurements and the number
of smart meters are equal. These results are independent of PPPs.
• The four selected PPPs have different interesting properties. The first
protocol leads to the conjecture that it has the fastest encryption al-
gorithm, because it requires only a “one-way function”. The second
is based on elliptic curves, and further, the encryption algorithm uses
only two scalar multiplications that lead to a fast protocol. The third
uses an ADC-Net and inherits its benefits. When the level of security
is increased, the second and the third protocol become increasingly
faster than typical solutions. The fourth follows the laws of quan-
tum mechanics, which surprisingly implies that the smart meters do
not need to store a key, but they can send messages directly to their
supplier without compromising privacy.
• To compare the protocols’ performance, this thesis presents simula-
tions with millions of real-world measurements that validate the the-
oretical results. It is shown that the raw dataset has inconsistencies
that reinforce the necessity to verify the truthfulness of the transac-
tions. Encrypted measurements are necessary and sufficient to deter-
mine whether the computations and the measurements are correct.
Besides smart grids, several application areas can use the results of this
thesis, for instance, electronic voting, reputation systems, sensor networks,
electronic money, mobile sensing, multi-party computation, image process-
ing. ADC-Nets can be used to create several protocols provided with secu-
rity, privacy, verifiability, scalability, reliability, efficiency, etc.
More important than efficiency, PPPs should enforce the security of cus-
tomers’ privacy by means of cryptography. Considering smart grids, PPPs
are paramount for suppliers, for customers, and for the proper development
of society.
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• This thesis presents limitations for all PPPs with data aggregations.
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Zusammenfassung (Summary
in German)
Die Entwicklung der Weltwirtschaft und Fragen der Nachhaltigkeit ver-
anlassen öffentliche Versorgungsunternehmen, ihre operationalen Modelle zu
verändern und neu aufzustellen. Intelligente Netze – besser bekannt als
Smart-Grids – und deren intelligente Messsysteme können zu nachhalti-
gen und profitablen Versorgungsmodellen führen. Dies macht Smart-Grids
zu wichtigen Faktoren für das Wachstum von Volkswirtschaften. Allerdings
bringen Smart-Grids neben Vorteilen auch Nachteile mit sich. Ähnlich wie
bei anderen vernetzten Technologien sind Sicherheit und Datenschutz ent-
scheidend für Smart-Grids. Eine Vernachlässigung von Sicherheitsaspekten
kann etwa die Versorgung mit Strom, Wasser oder Gas kompromittieren.
Eine Vernachlässigung des Datenschutzes kann zur Verletzung des Rechtes
auf Privatheit der Kunden führen, ihre Überwachung ermöglichen und Ma-
nipulationen erlauben. Tatsächlich sind intelligente Zähler, die Smart-Meter,
zunehmend allgegenwärtig und Smart-Grids stehen bisher beispiellosen Be-
drohungen gegenüber. Die öffentliche Infrastruktur ist hierdurch gefährdet
und Bürger können manipuliert werden. Glücklicherweise bieten Protokol-
le, die die Privatheit erhalten, einen Ausweg aus dieser Problematik. Diese
Protokolle werden Privacy-Preserving-Protocols (PPPs) genannt.
Diese Arbeit schreibt den Stand der Forschung zu PPPs mit der Entwick-
lung verschiedener Protokolle, die die Privatsphäre der Kunden in Smart-
Grid-Szenarien sicherstellen, weiter. Dazu wurden vier PPPs aufgegriffen
und in dieser Arbeit verbessert. Diese Forschungsarbeit gipfelt in das Kon-
zept der asymmetrischen DC-Netze (nach den „Dining Cryptographers“),
die Verallgemeinerungen von additiven homomorphen Verschlüsselungspri-
mitiven sind. Darüber hinaus können diese Primitive zur Konstruktion von
asymmetrischen DC-Netzen verwendet werden, die kryptographische Pri-
mitive für Verschlüsselung, Datenaggregation und Entschlüsselung der ag-
gregierten Daten sind. Asymmetrische DC-Netze unterliegen sicheren, ve-
rifizierbaren, effizienten und skalierbaren Protokollen mit geringem Kom-
munikationsaufwand. Sie sind unabhängig von vertrauenswürdigen Parteien
und resistent gegen Absprachen. Außerdem können Smart-Meter die mini-
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male Anzahl notwendiger Nachrichten direkt an ihren öffentlichen Versorger
senden. So können sie ihre Nachrichten signieren und, als Folge daraus, kön-
nen die Protokolle Nicht-Zurückweisung und Fehlertoleranz gewährleisten.
Ersteres sorgt dafür, dass Kunden nicht die Nachrichten ihrer Smart-Meter
abweisen können. Letzteres sorgt dafür, dass öffentliche Versorger fehler-
hafte Smart-Meter detektieren können, sowohl Fehler am Zähler als auch
im Kommunikationskanal, um die Protokolle ohne die kompromittierten
Smart-Meter ausführen zu können. Darüber hinaus können asymmetrische
DC-Netze die Sicherheit der Privatsphäre von Kunden durchsetzen.
Neben den Ergebnissen zu asymmetrischen DC-Netzen, leistet diese Dis-
sertation auch die im Folgenden aufgelisteten Beiträge:
• Diese Dissertation setzt Smart-Metering in den Kontext der weltwei-
ten Anwendung in Smart-Grids und zeigt die notwendigen Sicherheits-
und Datenschutzmodelle für Smart-Grids-Szenarien auf. Es folgt eine
kritische Diskussion des Stands der Forschung der datenschutzverbes-
sernden Technologien für Smart-Metering.
• Drei Szenarien, die häufige Fernmessungen erfordern, werden vorge-
stellt. Es werden die Mindestanforderungen für PPPs ermittelt. Dar-
über hinaus wird präsentiert, wie Berechnungen mit verschlüsselten
Messungen durchgeführt werden können.
• Eine algebraische und eine probabilistische Analyse zeigen, dass PPPs
die Privatsphäre für eine Datenaggregation einer kleinen Anzahl von
Kunden nicht sicherstellen. Entgegen der Intuition nimmt die Wirk-
samkeit der PPPs mit der Anzahl der Messungen jedoch zu. Die op-
timale Wirksamkeit besteht bei gleicher Anzahl von Messungen und
Smart-Metern. Diese Ergebnisse sind unabhängig von den PPPs.
• Die vier ausgewählten PPPs haben verschiedene interessante Eigen-
schaften. Das erste Protokoll führt zu der Vermutung, dass es den
schnellsten Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus hat, weil es nur eine „Einweg-
funktion“ benötigt. Das Zweite basiert auf elliptischen Kurven und
der Verschlüsselungsalgorithmus verwendet nur zwei skalare Multipli-
kationen, die zu einem schnellen Protokoll führen. Das Dritte nutzt
ein asymmetrisches DC-Netz und erbt seine Vorteile. Wenn die Si-
cherheitsstufe erhöht wird, werden das zweite und dritte Protokoll zu-
nehmend schneller im Vergleich zu typischen Lösungen. Das Vierte
folgt den Gesetzen der Quantenmechanik, was überraschenderweise
impliziert, dass die Smart-Meter keine Schlüssel speichern müssen und
dennoch ohne Einbuße der Privatsphäre Nachrichten direkt an ihre
Versorger senden können.
• Um die Performanz der Protokolle zu vergleichen, werden in dieser
Arbeit Simulationsergebnisse mit Daten aus Millionen realen Messun-
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gen präsentiert, die die theoretischen Ergebnisse validieren. Es wird
gezeigt, dass der Rohdatensatz Inkonsistenzen aufweist, was die Not-
wendigkeit der Verifikation des Wahrheitsgehalts der Transaktionen
verstärkt. Verschlüsselte Messungen sind notwendig und hinreichend,
um zu bestimmen, ob die Berechnungen und Messungen korrekt sind.
Neben den hier behandelten Smart-Grids können verschiedene weitere
Bereiche die Ergebnisse dieser Forschung nutzen. Beispiele sind elektronische
Wahlen, Reputationssysteme, Sensornetzwerke, elektronisches Zahlungssys-
teme, Mobile-Sensing-Systeme, Mehrparteien-Berechnungen, Bildverarbei-
tung. Asymmetrische DC-Netze können Protokollen Eigenschaften wie Si-
cherheit, Datenschutz, Verifizierbarkeit, Skalierbarkeit, Zuverlässigkeit und
Effizienz verleihen.
Wichtiger als Effizient zu sein, sollten PPPs die Sicherheit der Privat-
sphäre der Kunden mit Hilfe der Kryptographie durchzusetzen. Bezüglich
der Smart-Grids sind PPPs von großer Bedeutung für Versorger, für Kunden
und für die Entwicklung der Gesellschaft.
Schlüsselwörter
Schutz der Privatsphäre, Datenschutz, Sicherheit, Kryptographie,
Smart-Grids (Intelligente Netze, Intelligente Stromnetze), Algorithmen, Pro-
tokolle, Performanz, Asymmetrische DC-Netze, Symmetrische DC-Netze,
Homomorphe Verschlüsselung, Elliptische Kurven, Quantenkryptographie,
Simulationen.
Highlights
Folgende Ergebnisse meiner Dissertation sind hervorzuheben:
• Ich präsentiere Einschränkungen für alle PPP mit Datenaggregatio-
nen.
• Ich führe das Konzept asymetrischer DC-Netze ein.
• Diese ADC-Netze haben interessante Eigenschaften, einschließlich der
Verifizierbarkeit.
• Ich stelle ein effizientes ADC-Netz vor.
• ADC-Netze sind Verallgemeinerungen der additiven homomorphen
Verschlüsselung.
• Diese Arbeit kann auf verschiedene andere Anwendungsgebiete über-
tragen werden.
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Resumen (Summary in
Spanish)
La economía mundial y los problemas de sustentabilidad están impul-
sando a los proveedores hacia nuevos modos de funcionamiento. Las redes y
los sistemas de medición inteligente son capaces de crear modos sostenibles
y rentables de funcionamiento. En este contexto, las redes inteligentes son
facilitadoras importantes del desarrollo económico. Sin embargo, por enci-
ma de sus beneficios, las redes inteligentes traen consigo inconvenientes. Al
igual que otras tecnologías interconectadas, la seguridad y la privacidad son
cruciales para las redes inteligentes. Si no se le presta atención a la segu-
ridad se podrían comprometer eventualmente, por ejemplo, los suministros
de electricidad, agua o gas. Si no se le presta atención a la privacidad se
podrían violar los derechos a la privacidad de los clientes, permitiendo su vi-
gilancia y manipulación. Es un hecho que los medidores inteligentes se están
convirtiendo ubicuos y las redes inteligentes se están enfrentando a amena-
zas sin precedentes. Las infraestructuras públicas podrían estar en peligro y
los ciudadanos podrían ser manipulados. Por suerte, los Protocolos para la
Preservación de la Privacidad (PPPs) pueden resolver este impasse.
Este trabajo avanza la vanguardia de los PPPs con el desarrollo de varios
protocolos que preservan y aseguran la privacidad de los clientes en los es-
cenarios de las redes inteligentes. Cuatro de éstos son revisados y mejorados
en esta tesis. Este desarrollo culmina en el concepto de DC-Nets asimétricas
(ADC-Nets) — proveniente de “Dining Cryptographers” —, que son gene-
ralizaciones de primitivas aditivas de la criptografía homomórfica. Además,
estas primitivas pueden ser utilizadas para construir ADC-Nets, que son pri-
mitivas criptográficas para cifrar, agregar y descifrar datos agregados. Las
ADC-Nets son la base de los protocolos seguros, verificables, eficientes y
escalables con bajos costos de comunicación; al mismo tiempo siendo inde-
pendientes de los terceros de confianza y resistentes a la colusión. Asimismo,
los medidores inteligentes pueden enviar el mínimo número de mensajes ne-
cesarios directamente a su proveedor. Por lo tanto, éstos firman sus mensajes
y, como consecuencia de ello, los protocolos pueden garantizar el no repudio
y la tolerancia a fallos. La primera asegura que los clientes no puedan re-
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chazar los mensajes de sus medidores inteligentes. La segunda asegura que
el proveedor pueda detectar medidores inteligentes que hayan fallado por
sí mismos o en su canal de comunicación, y que los protocolos se ejecuten
descartando los medidores comprometidos. Adicionalmente, las ADC-Nets
pueden imponer la seguridad de la privacidad de los clientes.
Además del concepto y los resultados de las ADC-Nets, esta tesis pre-
senta otras contribuciones que se indican a continuación.
• Esta tesis contextualiza sistemas de medición en las redes inteligen-
tes alrededor del mundo y expone los modelos necesarios para obtener
seguridad y privacidad en los escenarios de las redes inteligentes. Sub-
secuentemente se revisa la vanguardia relacionada con las tecnologías
para mejorar la privacidad de los sistemas de medición inteligente.
• Esta tesis presenta tres escenarios que requieren mediciones remotas y
frecuentes. Además, se evalúan los requisitos mínimos para los PPPs.
Por otra parte, se muestra cómo cálculos pueden ser realizados sobre
las medidas encriptadas.
• Un análisis algebraico y otro probabilístico muestran que los PPPs no
pueden asegurar la privacidad cuando se agregan datos pertenecientes
a un número pequeño de clientes. Contrario a la intuición, cuando
el número de mediciones aumenta, la eficacia de los PPPs aumenta
también. La eficacia óptima ocurre cuando el número de medidas y
medidores inteligentes son iguales. Estos resultados son independientes
de los PPPs.
• Los cuatro PPPs seleccionados tienen diferentes propiedades intere-
santes. El primer protocolo lleva a la conjetura de que éste tiene el
algoritmo de cifrado más rápido, ya que sólo requiere una “función
de un solo sentido”. El segundo se basa en curvas elípticas y, además,
el algoritmo de cifrado utiliza sólo dos multiplicaciones escalares que
conducen a un protocolo rápido. El tercero utiliza una ADC-Net y
hereda sus beneficios. Cuando se aumenta el nivel de seguridad, el
segundo y tercer protocolo se vuelven cada vez más rápidos que las
soluciones típicas. El cuarto sigue las leyes de la mecánica cuántica, lo
cual implica, sorprendentemente, que los medidores inteligentes no ne-
cesitan almacenar ninguna llave, pero aun así pueden enviar mensajes
directamente a su proveedor sin comprometer la privacidad.
• Para comparar el rendimiento de los protocolos, esta tesis presenta si-
mulaciones con millones de mediciones del mundo real que validan los
resultados teóricos. Se demuestra que el conjunto de datos en bruto
tiene inconsistencias que refuerzan la necesidad de verificar la veraci-
dad de las transacciones. Las mediciones cifradas se vuelven necesarias
y suficientes para determinar si los cálculos y mediciones son correctos.
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Adicionalmente a las redes inteligentes, varias otras áreas de investiga-
ción pueden utilizar los resultados de esta tesis como, por ejemplo, las áreas
de votación electrónica, sistemas de reputación, redes de sensores, dinero
electrónico, percepción móvil, computación multipartidista, procesamiento
de imágenes. Las ADC-Nets pueden ser utilizadas para crear diversos pro-
tocolos adicionados con seguridad, privacidad, verificabilidad, escalabilidad,
confiabilidad, eficiencia, etc.
Por encima de su eficiencia, los PPPs deben imponer la seguridad de la
privacidad de los clientes mediante la criptografía. Teniendo en cuenta las
redes inteligentes, los PPPs son de suma importancia para los proveedores,
para los clientes y para el correcto desarrollo de la sociedad.
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cas (SDC-Nets), Criptografía Homomórfica, Curvas Elípticas, Criptografía
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Destacados
• Esta tesis presenta limitaciones en los PPPs que agregan datos.
• Este trabajo presenta el concepto de DC-Nets Asimétricas (ADC-
Nets).
• Se muestran propiedades interesantes de las ADC-Nets, incluyendo su
verificación.
• Esta tesis presenta una ADC-Net eficiente.
• Se demuestra que las ADC-Nets son generalizaciones de criptografía
homomórfica aditiva.
• Este trabajo puede ser transferido a varias otras aplicaciones.
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Resumo (Summary in
Portuguese)
A economia global e as questões de sustentabilidade estão conduzindo
os fornecedores para novos modos de operação. As redes e os seus sistemas
de medição inteligente podem produzir modos de operação sustentáveis e
rentáveis. Assim, as redes inteligentes constituem elementos importantes
do desenvolvimento econômico. No entanto, juntamente com os benefícios,
as redes inteligentes trazem inconvenientes. Semelhante a outras tecnolo-
gias interconectadas, segurança e privacidade são cruciais para essas redes.
Negligenciar preocupações com a segurança poderá, eventualmente, compro-
meter o fornecimento de eletricidade, água ou gás, por exemplo. Negligenciar
preocupações com a privacidade poderá causar a violação do direito à pri-
vacidade dos clientes, permitindo a vigilância e a manipulação de todos os
clientes. Na verdade, os medidores inteligentes estão tornando-se ubíquos
e redes inteligentes enfrentam ameaças sem precedentes. Infraestruturas
públicas podem ser ameaçadas e os cidadãos podem ser manipulados. Fe-
lizmente, Protocolos de Preservação da Privacidade (PPPs) podem resolver
este impasse.
Este trabalho avança os PPPs no estado da arte com o desenvolvimento
de vários protocolos que preservam segura a privacidade dos clientes em
cenários de redes inteligentes. Quatro deles são revistos e aprimorados nesta
tese. Tal desenvolvimento culminou com o conceito de DC-Nets Assimétricas
(ADC-Nets) — de “Dining Cryptographers” —, que são generalizações de
primitivas aditivas de criptografia homomórfica. Além disso, podemos usar
essas primitivas para construir ADC-Nets, que são primitivas criptográficas
para cifrar, agregar e decifrar os dados agregados. ADC-Nets fundamentam
protocolos seguros, verificáveis, eficientes e escaláveis com baixa sobrecarga
de comunicação, independentes de partes confiáveis e resistentes a colusão.
Além disso, os medidores inteligentes podem enviar o número mínimo de
mensagens requeridas diretamente ao seu fornecedor. Assim, eles podem
assinar suas mensagens e, como consequência, os protocolos podem assegurar
não-repúdio e tolerância a falhas. Aquela propriedade garante que os clientes
não podem recusar as mensagens de seus medidores inteligentes. Esta última
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garante que o seu fornecedor pode detectar medidores inteligentes com falha,
em si ou no canal de comunicação, e pode executar os protocolos sem os
medidores inteligentes comprometidos. Acima de tudo, ADC-Nets podem
impor a segurança da privacidade dos clientes.
Além do conceito e resultados de ADC-Nets, esta tese apresenta outras
contribuições listadas como se segue.
• Esta tese contextualiza os sistemas de medição inteligente em redes
inteligentes em todo o mundo e apresenta modelos necessários para se
obter segurança e privacidade nos cenários de redes inteligentes. Após
a apresentação, ela revisa o estado da arte das tecnologias de reforço
da privacidade para sistemas de medição inteligente.
• Esta tese apresenta três cenários que requerem medições remotas e
frequentes. Além disso, ela também avalia os requisitos mínimos para
os PPPs. Acima de tudo, mostra-se como cálculos podem ser feitos
através de medições criptografadas.
• Uma análise algébrica e outra probabilística mostram que PPPs não
podem manter segura a privacidade quando se agrega dados de um pe-
queno número de clientes. Contraintuitivamente, quando o número de
medições aumenta, a eficácia dos PPPs também aumenta. A eficácia
ótima ocorre quando o número de medidas e de medidores inteligentes
são iguais. Estes resultados são independentes dos PPPs.
• Os quatro PPPs selecionados têm diferentes propriedades interessan-
tes. O primeiro protocolo leva à conjectura que ele tem o algoritmo
de criptografia mais rápido, porque requer apenas uma “função de
mão única”. O segundo é baseado em curvas elípticas, e ainda mais,
o algoritmo de encriptação utiliza apenas duas multiplicações escala-
res que levam a um protocolo rápido. O terceiro utiliza um protocolo
de ADC-Net e herda seus benefícios. Quando o nível de segurança é
aumentado, o segundo e o terceiro protocolo tornam-se cada vez mais
rápidos do que as soluções típicas. O quarto segue as leis da mecânica
quântica implicando, surpreendentemente, que os medidores inteligen-
tes não precisam armazenar uma chave, mas podem enviar mensagens
diretamente ao seu fornecedor, sem comprometer a privacidade.
• Para comparar o desempenho dos protocolos, esta tese apresenta si-
mulações com milhões de medições do mundo real que validam os
resultados teóricos. Demonstra-se que o conjunto de dados não tra-
tados tem inconsistências que reforçam a necessidade de verificar a
veracidade das transações. Medições criptografadas são necessárias e
suficientes para determinar se as medições e os cálculos estão corretos.
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Além de redes inteligentes, várias áreas de aplicação podem usar os re-
sultados desta tese, por exemplo, votação eletrônica, sistemas de reputação,
redes de sensores, dinheiro eletrônico, sensoriamento móvel, computação em
múltiplas partes, processamento de imagem. ADC-Nets podem ser usados
para criar diversos protocolos munidos com segurança, privacidade, verifi-
cabilidade, escalabilidade, confiabilidade, eficiência etc.
Mais importante do que a eficiência, PPPs devem impor a segurança da
privacidade dos clientes por meio de criptografia. Considerando-se as redes
inteligentes, PPPs são fundamentais para os fornecedores, para os clientes e
para o bom desenvolvimento da sociedade.
Palavras-chave
Privacidade, Segurança, Criptografia, Redes inteligentes, Algoritmos,
Protocolos, Performance, DC-Nets Assimétricas (ADC-Nets), DC-Nets Si-
métricas (SDC-Nets), Criptografia Homomórfica, Curvas Elípticas, Cripto-
grafia Quântica, Simulações.
Destaques
• Esta tese apresenta limitações para todos os PPPs com agregações de
dados.
• Este trabalho introduz o conceito de DC-Nets Assimétricas (ADC-
Nets).
• Mostra-se que ADC-Nets possuem propriedades interessantes, in-
cluindo verificação.
• Esta tese apresenta um protocolo de ADC-Net eficiente.
• Mostra-se que ADC-Nets são generalizações de criptografia homomór-
fica aditiva.
• Este trabalho pode ser transferido para várias outras aplicações.
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Foundations
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become ubiq-
uitous. Particularly, the Internet has become the global supply network
for information and communication in the form of byte streams. Increas-
ingly, ICT is used to control other supply networks, e.g., for electricity, gas,
and heating. The aim is to make networks “smarter”, in particular to pro-
vide more efficiency and flexibility in the demand-supply loop, which would
greatly benefit from “real-time” consumption measurements sent from con-
sumers to suppliers, and from “intelligent” appliances that would adjust
consumption to the tidal waves of energy abundance or scarcity. However,
the introduction of ICTs with fine-grained measurements in particular brings
very serious privacy risks. In present supply networks, risks can be mitigated
only by means of very restrictive legal measures. In this light, the present
thesis aims at providing a high level of privacy while enabling frequent mea-
surements by means of a Privacy-Preserving Protocol (PPP). A PPP along
with its algorithms keeps its users’ privacy secure.
This thesis addresses a threat represented by smart metering systems,
which are able to collect frequent measurements of consumption data.
Specifically, smart meters are the most famous components of smart meter-
ing systems. Suppliers have installed smart meters in customers’ properties
to measure their consumption. Many customers realized that an adversary
could measure remotely at any time. Consequently, the adversary could
infer private information. Indeed, smart meters can reveal detailed informa-
tion about customers’ private life. Fine-grained consumption data collection
can even disclose what customers are watching on their TVs [GJL12]. The
amount of information disclosed depends on the level of granularity [MMS-
FCI10]. If the measurements are collected on a monthly basis, adversaries
can use previous measurements to deduce when a customer usually vaca-
tions. Therefore, they can infer which customers are on vacation this month.
A measurement might have the consumption of multiple appliances in an
interval. The disaggregation of such measurement can be done with a tech-
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4nique called Non-intrusive load monitoring (NILM) [WZ12], which can be
used to infer private information of inhabitants. Nevertheless, NILM has a
wide range of applications, including the shipping industry [DCLPMLG05].
The technique is still in development, but one can already find an open
source toolkit for NILM [BKPDKRSS14]. It is difficult to mask signatures
carried in the fine-grained consumption data as well as it is difficult to hide
private information even for coarse-grained consumption data. One can
use a battery to protect privacy. However, privacy protection is directly
proportional to the volume and price of the battery. Currently, only expen-
sive large-volume batteries can give a very good level of privacy protection.
Therefore, using a battery is still not a solution.
Smart meters measure the consumption of a commodity delivered by
flow. Examples of these are electricity, water, natural gas, and heating.
Thus, a supplier is the intended recipient of measurements. Besides electric-
ity, NILM can be used for other commodities [FLGCRP11]. Among them,
the most interesting privacy issue lies on electricity consumption, because
the storage of large amount of energy is still expensive. Thus, customers
should consume the electricity in the same instant of its generation. In con-
trast, a privacy-aware customer of a water supplier can store water to cancel
the smart meter intrusion. Similarly, a customer can store natural gas and
heating. Since electricity cannot be stored on large quantities, most of the
literature on PPPs addresses problems about power grid. Therefore, this
thesis focuses more on energy suppliers. In general, a smart grid is seen as
the enhancement of a power grid with new technologies. In other words, it
is seen as the evolution [BMM12] of a power grid. Despite its association
with the power grid [BVM15], a smart grid is better defined as a network
of people, computers, and sensors in public infrastructures that monitors
and manages the usage of commodities. In contrast to a first generation
computerized supplier, a smart grid can be constructed to control the flow
of a commodity. Consequently, electric vehicles, smart homes, and even the
Internet can be seen as part of the smart grid.
Although the literature provides many proposals for PPP, few of them
meet the requirements identified in this work.
1.1 Motivation
With the ubiquity of ICTs, companies such as Google and Microsoft
were investing to collect customers’ measurements. However, many cus-
tomers were concerned about privacy issues [AL11]. In fact, information is
power and money, and massive leaks of privacy might eventually lead to a
surveillance society and compromise democracy [Hol09]. Despite the huge
amount of data and information provided by smart meters, Google Power-
Meter was discontinued in 2011 and Microsoft Hohm in 2012. Researchers
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were wondering whether smart meters would be a research topic for future
years. In addition, the requirements for PPPs were unclear. Smart meters
would not be an essential part of a smart grid scenario. Certainly, remote
measurements reduce costs with employees, but such savings would not be
worth due to the increasing concerns regarding security and privacy in smart
grids.
The initial motivation for energy suppliers to deploy smart meters was to
charge customers with dynamic pricing [FP10]. Thus, suppliers would match
consumption with generation to achieve power load balancing by means of
demand response, which is defined as the changes in their customers’ con-
sumption patterns that happen in response to changes in the price. Con-
sequently, society can save construction of expensive power plants that run
only during consumption peaks. In some countries, such peaking power
plants need fuels to burn. Therefore, avoiding them implies a reduction of
CO2. Certainly, renewable energy sources are the key to the reduction of
CO2 emissions. Despite the fact that solar photovoltaic and wind are forms
of renewable energy, they are unstable. To use them, electric vehicles appear
as an opportunity to store the energy in generation peaks and to supply the
power network according to customers’ needs [RFV14]. For example, in the
United States of America (USA), energy suppliers are ready to handle mil-
lions of electric vehicles without changing their generation and transmission
infrastructure [NRN15]. Similarly, the electrified German railway network
could be equipped with batteries to store the excess energy and to act as
supplier during scarcity.
Currently, some energy suppliers need to smooth peaks due to consump-
tion and generation. Smart meters are an option to smooth the peaks.
Imbalances between supply and demand cause high prices. In addition, too
much energy generation leads to negative prices [Nic10]. Therefore, society
could profit from smart meters.
On the one hand, smart meters can yield many benefits for society,
including environmental and economic. On the other hand, they cause
too much privacy intrusion [AL11]. The solution for this dilemma can be
achieved with a PPP. In this case, algorithms run on smart meters and on
supplier computers to protect customers’ privacy when smart meters send
their encrypted measurements to their supplier.
Currently, many suppliers are deploying smart meters and many coun-
tries are requiring their deployment. Smart meters are here to stay, and
researchers are discovering new applications that require them, for instance,
for overload detection in old transformers [MS14]. They will be in the mar-
ket because there are strong economic and ecological reasons. Furthermore,
this thesis presents new reasons for smart meters. Due to privacy issues,
they should be deployed with a PPP, which can safeguard the proper devel-
opment of society.
61.2 Research Questions
This research was initiated to evaluate privacy threats and requirements
in smart grid scenarios for designing PPPs to protect customer privacy.
The privacy threats were quickly identified in the literature. Therefore, the
following research questions were raised:
1. What are the reasons to deploy smart meters?
2. What are the requirements for PPP?
3. How often should the measurements be collected?
4. How many smart meters should compose the aggregation?
5. What are the properties of the protocols?
The privacy issues depend on how often the smart meters send their mea-
surements to their supplier, i.e., the privacy issues are close to minimal with
infrequent measurements. Currently, some countries’ regulations require
that the measurements be annual. If the smart meters send the measure-
ments yearly, the supplier receives the same information that a non-smart
grid provides. The problem appears when someone can request measure-
ments anytime, or when the smart meters send them on a shorter fixed
interval.
The requirements for PPPs depend on the frequency of the measure-
ments. With very few measurements, customers might wish to protect their
measurements only from neighbors. Perhaps, the suppliers can receive the
measurements on a weekly basis without a big problem. In contrast, frequent
measurements represent a threat for customers’ privacy.
Similarly, the number of smart meters influences the selection of the best
PPP. Efficiency in terms of processing time and communication depends on
this number, which influences the scalability of some protocols [BBM14].
If more than one PPPmeets the requirements, the most efficient is better.
Efficiency is one determinant factor for the price of smart meters. Moreover,
small savings in processing time may imply billions of smart meters that have
smaller energy consumption per measurement with cheaper hardware. The
more efficient the PPP, the lower the price for privacy.
Besides these main questions, many others have been raised. For exam-
ple, could we use quantum cryptography or post-quantum cryptography to
construct a PPP?
1.3 Contributions
This thesis has two major contributions. One is the presentation of
state-of-the-art PPPs in a smart grid scenario. The other is the theoretical
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contribution for research on privacy. Specifically, introducing the concept of
Asymmetric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets) and showing the relations between ADC-
Nets, Symmetric DC-Nets (SDC-Nets), and additive homomorphic encryp-
tion primitives (AHEPs).
The first two research questions are addressed in Chapter 4, which
presents scenarios where smart meters should send their measurements as
frequently as possible. It also presents the minimum requirements for PPPs.
The third and fourth research questions are addressed in Chapter 5, which
presents limitations for all PPP based on data aggregation. It also presents
that the number of smart meters in the aggregation should be equal to the
number of customers to maximize the number of possibilities that result
in the sum of the measurements. However, Chapter 5 does not present a
minimum number, which depends on several variables. The fifth research
question is addressed in Chapter 6. As result, PPPs should have the prop-
erties of ADC-Nets.
This work has proposed several PPPs, e.g., [BM14b; BDBBM14;
BVM15]. Some proposals have more than one PPP [BM14a; BSM14]. This
thesis presents four interesting PPPs.
1.3.1 High Level Explanation of the Selected PPPs
Each PPP has a different cryptographic primitive and a discussion about
security, privacy, and performance.
1.3.1.1 PPP1
The first selected PPP uses in-network aggregation with SDC-Net to
behave as AHEP. Hence, each smart meter needs to compute only one
“one-way function” to encrypt the measurements. Therefore, this raises the
conjecture that PPP1 is as fast as possible in the smart meter side. PPP1
uses a hash function as a “one-way function”, but techniques of symmetric
cryptography might be used to speed it up [BPP12]. PPP1 only provides
aggregation and is an improved part of a protocol called iKUP [BM14a].
1.3.1.2 PPP2
PPP2 uses commitment over elliptic curves, which are very famous for
being a fast cryptographic primitive, because the best algorithms to solve the
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) need much more time
than the best algorithms to solve the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP).
Depending on the number of measurements and their size, suppliers can use
brute force to “decrypt” the aggregation. PPP2 uses one scalar multiplica-
tion to “encrypt” and another to encode the measurement. If we assume
that it cannot be done with one scalar multiplication, PPP2 is the fastest
based on the ECDLP. PPP2 has many interesting features. For example,
8to verify billing, suppliers can identify smart meters with communication
problems. In addition, it is free of trusted third party (TTP), etc. However,
PPP2 also has a drawback. It is not scalable on the supplier side. PPP2 is
also an improved part of iKUP [BM14a].
1.3.1.3 PPP3
PPP3 uses an ADC-Net, which is also introduced in the work of this
thesis [BBM14]. PPP3 has all the features that PPP2 has. In addition,
PPP3 is scalable and even faster than PPP2. Indeed, only PPP1 is faster
than PPP3 on the smart meter side. On the supplier side, PPP3 has constant
time with respect to the number of smart meters, while PPP2 increases the
processing time with the number of smart meters. PPP3 is the most suitable
PPP.
1.3.1.4 PPP4
PPP4 is a preliminary PPP based on quantum cryptography. The mea-
surements are hidden in a quantum entanglement with a shift phase opera-
tor. Besides the use of quantum mechanics, PPP4 does not need a quantum
computer. It can use commercially available products, but its deployment
depends on technological developments.
1.3.2 Summary of the Results
Besides the state of the art for privacy in smart grids, this thesis presents
several interesting PPPs. Four of them are improvements of PPPs developed
in this work and already published. The analysis agrees with the simulation,
which is done to cover the majority of the PPPs. The unique selected PPP
that does not have simulation is based on quantum mechanics. One of them
uses the concept of ADC-Nets, which advances the concept of SDC-Nets.
ADC-Nets have many new interesting properties, cf. Section 6.4.1.
Besides the results already published, this thesis presents new results
that were only presented at seminars. The main unpublished results are the
reasons for smart meters to collect frequent measurements, privacy quantifi-
cation of the aggregation size, and the result that each AHEP is a particular
case of an ADC-Net. The last result is a method to transform AHEP in an
ADC-Net.
1.4 Outline
The chapters can be read in any order. The acronyms and symbols are
reintroduced in each new chapter, and at the end of this thesis, there is a
glossary, a list of acronyms, a list of abbreviations, and a list of symbols.
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Thus, one expert can select a PPP in Chapter 3 or Chapter 6 and can read
it without paying attention to the previous protocols or chapters. However,
for anyone to whom this research is new, this thesis is organized in an order
that simplifies understanding. The remainder of this thesis is structured as
follow:
Chapter 2 contextualizes the researches and projects on smart grids
around the world. In addition, it presents the terms used to describe
PPPs, a security model, and a privacy model used in many PPPs for
smart grid scenarios.
Chapter 3 surveys the most relevant privacy-enhancing technologies for
this work. They are split into solutions with a strong disadvantage,
and solutions with strong advantages, which are inspirations for the
four PPPs introduced in this work.
Chapter 4 clarifies the problem showing the new reasons for smart meters
and data aggregation. Moreover, it also shows what scenarios requires
remote measurements to be performed as frequently as possible. Since
there are economic reasons for the requirements, it is believed that
smart meters will be ubiquitous eventually. This is necessary because
the initial motivation for smart meters was to charge customers with
dynamic pricing [FP10], but smart grids can achieve this without fre-
quent remote measurements [JJK11]. Since one protocol in the related
work shows that smart grids can have dynamic pricing without smart
meters sending their measurements to their supplier, this thesis as-
sesses the importance of aggregated data and presents scenarios that
require such data. At the end of the chapter, a section presents the
minimum requirements for PPPs. Specifically, Section 4.2 presents
four requirements that each PPP for smart metering systems should
fulfill. However, the majority of the protocols found in the literature
have addressed only one requirement, namely consolidated consump-
tion by aggregation of measurements [BDBBM14; BM14a].
Chapter 5 quantifies the correspondence between aggregation size and risk
of privacy leakage as a function of several variables. This chapter di-
vides the search for the individual measurements into algebraic and
probabilistic properties derived from all PPPs that provide aggrega-
tion. The former results in an error-correcting code for suppliers and
leads to equations that reveal the number of possibilities for an at-
tacker. Maximum security is achieved when the variables form a per-
fect square. The latter shows that an attacker can always find the
most probable individual measurements in few steps. The difficulty
for the attacker is to define what is more probable. This chapter anal-
ysis is independent of protocol and is valid for all PPPs that satisfy
the minimum requirements.
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Chapter 6 starts with the definition of a function that converts the con-
sumption into a monetary value. The four PPPs use this function.
This technique simplifies the protocols in comparison with their pre-
vious versions already published. The chapter presents the innovative
protocols from the simplest to the most complex based on quantum
cryptography. PPP1 has constant time on the meter side. Excluding
the fastest PPP1, PPP2 and PPP3 are increasingly faster than others
are when the level of security increases. PPP4 has the problem of
keeping and accessing the quantum information that are common to
other algorithms based on quantum mechanics. Currently, PPP3 is
the most recommended for smart grids. It uses an ADC-Net, which is
introduced in Section 6.4.1. In addition, the relation of the ADC-Net
protocol with AHEPs is also presented. As a protocol result, cus-
tomers can keep their private life secure without having to trust any
institution.
Chapter 7 compares different strategies used for the four selected PPPs—
among others—regarding to features in the minimum requirements,
verification property, security, privacy, and performance, which is split
in processing time and communication costs. The comparison is the-
oretical and based on complexity analysis. Its last section compares
SDC-Nets, AHEPs, and ADC-Nets, showing the benefits of ADC-Nets
in comparison with other techniques. The chapter clarifies why ADC-
Nets are more suitable to PPPs and why PPP3 is more suitable to
smart grids than the other selected protocols. Briefly, PPP1 can be
much faster on the smart meter side, but it does not have the features
that PPP3 has.
Chapter 8 validates the theoretical analysis of processing time with sim-
ulation of state-of-the-art PPPs in a parallel computer using as input
more than one hundred million real-world measurements, which were
collected with a fixed interval of 30 minutes by more than six thou-
sand smart meters during one and a half years. The analysis of the raw
dataset detects anomalies, which reinforce the idea that PPPs should
enable verification. The chapter also presents the tools used in the
simulation and the parameters used in the implemented algorithms.
Chapter 9 concludes this thesis in four steps, namely, recapitulating it,
highlighting the main results, presenting new perspectives, and final-
izing the conclusion. The first connects the whole thesis. The second
emphasizes the results. The third prospects new research topics from
the presented results. The fourth synthesizes the importance of this
thesis.
Chapter 2
Background and Models
This chapter contextualizes the role of smart meters in smart grid ini-
tiatives around the world to show that the smart grid concept goes beyond
energy supplier modernization. In addition, this chapter presents the secu-
rity model and the privacy model for Privacy-Preserving Protocols (PPPs).
Privacy is protected by aggregation of encrypted measurements. Chapter 4
presents the reasons for smart meters to send frequent measurements to
their supplier. At the end of this chapter, the requirements for PPPs are
presented in Section 4.2.
2.1 Smart Grids around the World
Figure 2.1: Smart Metering Projects Map - Google Maps.
On the Internet, one can find many projects and governmental sites
about smart grids. Smart Metering Projects Map in Google Maps1 provides
1http://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&oe=UTF8&msa=0
&msid=115519311058367534348.0000011362ac6d7d21187
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a good visualization of the number and distribution of smart grid initiatives
around the world. Figure 2.1 shows a screen-shot of the map2. In addition,
Figure 2.2 gives us a zoomed-in view of smart grid initiatives in the European
Union (EU). A triangle indicates a trial or pilot, and a circle indicates a
project. The colors red, green, and blue represent initiatives for electricity,
gas, and water, respectively. Red is the dominant color, thus indicating
that the majority of the initiatives are directed to electricity. The initiatives
are also classified as automatic meter reading (AMR), advanced metering
infrastructure (AMI), and smart grid. The first aims mainly to collect
measurements and send them to suppliers. The second aims to transform
the metering systems into microcomputers connected in networks. The third
aims to use additional technologies. The AMI is the new terminology and
goes beyond AMR. In terms of technology, the idea of AMR is old [T74].
However, it was renewed with the AMI, which integrates new features like
remote control and two-way communication [LCC13]. A smart grid can
have even more than AMI, for instance, phasor measurement units (PMUs),
distributed generation, and smart inverters. Information about interesting
features of smart inverters can be found in [KSE15].
Figure 2.2: Smart Metering Projects Map in Europe - Google Maps.
2on January 1, 2015
2.1 SMART GRIDS AROUND THE WORLD 13
Currently, many initiatives are taken to create smart grids. The EU aims
to install smart meters in 80% of households by 20203. Figure 2.3 shows a
screen-shot4 of the official map5 generated by European Commission’s in-
house science service. The map is interactive and can show information
about initiatives associated with the EU outside of Europe, for instance, in
the America. The EU also aims to reach at least 80% reduction of green-
house gas emission by 2050 in comparison to 1990 levels6. Particularly,
Germany has made efforts to increase substantially the share of renewable
and private energy production. Such efforts are known as Energiewende.
Figure 2.3: Official Smart Metering Project Map in Europe.
The German Federal Office for Security in Information Technology, the
free translation of Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI), has defined that smart meter gateway has a secure module and may
control many metering devices of different commodities in a neighborhood.
Indeed, it controls the communication and centralizes the intelligence. To
ensure security and privacy, the smart meter gateway has a secure module,
3Directive 2012/27/EU of 25 October 2012 published on the Official Journal L No.315,
25 Oct 2012
4on January 1, 2015
5http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
6Energy roadmap 2050 - EU - doi:10.2833/10759
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like a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), and aggregates the measurements
from many metering devices to ensure privacy, cf. Section 2.2.3. In ad-
dition, the prescription of the German BSI Schutzprofil for smart meters
mitigates the risks by means of very restrictive legal measures.
The Department of Energy (DOE) of the United States of America
(USA) also presents a map of investments in smart grids. Figure 2.4 shows
a screen-shot of the official map7 generated by the DOE8. In the USA,
smart grid is a term applied to the power grid modernization due to its
aging. Electrification is recognized as the greatest achievement of impact on
quality of life and as uniquely critical system [NRN15].
Figure 2.4: Official Smart Metering Project Map in USA.
In contrast to the BSI model that can work with multiple commodities,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has focused its
standards on smart grid scenarios for energy suppliers. The NIST Frame-
work and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards9 presents a
conceptual reference model to describe the interaction between the informa-
tion network and the electric power network. In this standard, 7 domains
are defined as below.
Customers are the electricity consumers in the power network who may
also be small generators for some periods.
Markets are parties involved in the electricity markets.
Service Providers are the organizations that provide services to cus-
tomers and suppliers.
Operations is a domain in which actors manage the electric flow.
Bulk Generation is the set of large-scale electricity generators.
7on January 1, 2015
8https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/project_information
9NIST Special Publication 1108R2
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Transmission indicates the corporations responsible for the transmission
of electricity in high voltage from distant power plants to distribution
networks.
Distribution indicates the corporations responsible for distributing the
electricity between the customers in the distribution power network.
NIST is one of the pioneers in smart grid privacy issues. In 2010, the
guideline for Privacy and the Smart Grid10 drew attention to the fact that
the energy supplier can identify when customers turned on and turned off
their appliances. The USA have made strong investment in smart meters
and aim to have almost 52 million customers equipped with smart meters by
2015 [FP10]. In 201211, suppliers in USA already had more than 43 million
smart meters installed.
2.2 Security and Privacy Models
Security and privacy models for smart grid scenarios require the defini-
tion of some terminology. A PPP should have a usual secure model, but
its privacy model goes further than the secure model. In fact, this chapter
starts with the basis of the security to lay down the bases for a privacy
model.
2.2.1 Terminology in PPPs
This thesis uses some specific terms as listed below. Others may be
found in the Glossary, List of Acronyms, List of Abbreviations, or List of
Symbols at the end of this thesis.
User is an abstraction of a customer with a smart meter running a PPP
with a supplier. The user may buy or sell a commodity.
Supplier is an abstraction of bulk generator, transmission, distribution,
operations, markets, and service providers.
Meter is an abbreviation of smart meter, which lies in a customer’s prop-
erty. Its function is to collect measurements from a commodity flow
and to report them through an information network to a supplier. Me-
ters can communicate in many ways, e.g., using wireless, power line
communication, or Internet Protocol (IP).
10NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 2, Privacy and the
Smart Grid
11http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=108&t=3
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Round (or round of measurement) is a period in which a supplier receives
the encrypted measurements from every meter i. Normally, the me-
ters considered in one round belong to the same neighborhood. The
measurements are collected in a fixed interval or by a request of the
supplier.
Measurement is the measured consumption or generation in watts col-
lected by a meter i in the round j, and it is denoted as mi,j . Normally,
the interval between rounds is assumed to be short.
Consolidated consumption is the sum of the measurements mi,j in the
round j, and it is denoted as cj . Thus, cj is the total of energy con-
sumption or generation reported by all meters during one round j to
their supplier, i.e.,
cj
def.=
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j ,
where ı˜ is the number of meters in the aggregation.
Bill is a monetary consumption value of an invoice with respect to the
electricity consumption or generation in a period, and it is denoted by
b$i , i.e.,
b$i
def.=
˜∑
j=1
mi,j ],
where ˜ is the number of rounds until the billing process and mi,j ] is a
function that transforms the measurements from watts into a monetary
value with a price that floats over the time. Thus, the electricity has
a time-based pricing.
Billed consumption is the balance of the consumption and generation in
watts registered in the invoice of the meter i. This balance is denoted
as bi and given by
bi
def.=
˜∑
j=1
mi,j .
Note that the measurements can be positive or negative depending on
whether there is consumption or generation. In addition, the time-based
pricing might be different in buying or selling. Normally, the measurements
mi,j are in watts, but they may also be in monetary units, if the meter i
knows the current unit price.
2.2.2 Security Model
This section presents Shannon’s security model [Sha49] re-written in the
context of smart grids. In this model, the meter i encrypts its measurement
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mi,j , computes
Mi,j = Enc (mi,j) ,
and sends the encrypted measurement Mi,j to the supplier, which decrypts
as
mi,j = Dec (Mi,j) .
The security model is composed of attack model and trust model. The
former defines the capabilities assumed for the attackers. The latter defines
the trust relationship between meters and their supplier with the corre-
sponding changes to the attack model.
2.2.2.1 Attack Model
The attacker is very limited and can access only the encrypted measure-
ment Mi,j . Note that there is no difference if the cryptographic scheme is
either symmetric or asymmetric. However, Shannon’s security model was
created 27 years before the introduction of asymmetric cryptography [DH76].
Figure 2.5 depicts the attack model.
Enc Dec
Mi,j
Key Source
mi,j mi,j
Attacker
Meter Side
Supplier Side
Figure 2.5: Shannon’s security model in the context of smart grids.
In this model, the attacker knows how the functions Enc and Dec work.
The model does not allow hiding these functions, because security through
obscurity is considered harmful. Hence, the attacker only does not know the
keys and the measurement mi,j . The security lies in the keys, which can be
generated to create certificates with security and privacy without trusted
third party (TTP) [BMBM14]. This work does not consider side-channel
attack, fault attack, etc. A secure source generates the keys, used as input
for the encryption and decryption functions. This source is not a TTP but
a function or protocol as given in [BMBM14].
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2.2.2.2 Trust Model
Usually, the meter i and its supplier are considered trusted. Thus, the
meter measures the consumption correctly, computes Enc correctly, signs
the result correctly, and sends the signed encrypted measurement directly
to its supplier. The communication channel transmits the message without
interruption and the supplier computes Dec correctly. There is no collusion.
Even with all these restrictions in the trust model, the attacker could
infer information about the consumption if the encrypted measurements had
a bijection with the measurements. The attacker could infer the encrypted
measurement of zero watts and deduce when the customer is at home. To
avoid this, the cryptographic function should be probabilistic.
2.2.2.3 Considerations about the Cryptographic Functions
In contrast to the well-known cryptographic functions that have the same
encrypted measurement for the same measurement, we also have probabilis-
tic encryption schemes that enable different encrypted measurements Mi,j
for the same measurement mi,j . This is possible because probabilistic en-
cryption schemes are based on additional parameters chosen by the meter.
Such parameters are not necessary for the decryption function. Paillier
cryptosystem [Pai99] is an example of probabilistic encryption. In fact, if
the meter i has the key k and a secret r the encryption function should be
written as
Mi,j = Enck,r(mi,j),
and the decryption function depends on the key k¯ associated with k, thus
the decryption function should be written as
mi,j = Deck¯(Mi,j).
Moreover, if we have two secrets r1 and r2 such that r1 6= r2, then
Enck,r1(mi,j) 6= Enck,r2(mi,j).
However,
Deck¯ (Enck,r1(mi,j) Enck,r2(mi,j)) = mi,j ⊕mi,j = 2mi,j , (2.1)
for all mi,j . Section 6.4.1 uses this property to show that additive homo-
morphic encryption primitives (AHEPs) are particular cases of Asymmetric
DC-Nets (ADC-Nets). Note that the functions form a bijection between two
groups. Equation (2.1) denotes the operation over the measurements mi,j
and the encrypted measurements Mi,j as ⊕ and , respectively. Note that
encryption and decryption functions of probabilistic encryption schemes are
usually presented without the keys and the random number.
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According to Shannon’s terminology, the encrypted measurement is
called ciphertext and the measurement is called message. In this work,
message has different concepts. Message may refer to other packets sent in
the information network.
Once the security is ensured in a system, we can go to the next challenge.
2.2.3 Privacy Model
Ensuring privacy is more complicated than ensuring security. The pri-
vacy model works under the assumption that the security model and its
components are robust, i.e., if a security assumption fails, privacy is im-
paired.
The privacy model can be constructed using two strategies, namely:
pseudonyms and data aggregation. The latter is adopted in this thesis and
is more efficient than the former, cf. Section 3.1.2 or [BMM12]. The former
requires that the measurements are associated with pseudonyms and sent
through an anonymity network. The latter relies on the idea of a ballot box.
In other words, each meter i encrypts its measurementmi,j and somehow the
encrypted measurementsMi,j from all meters i in the round j are aggregated
generating an encrypted consolidated consumption Cj , s.t.
Cj =
∏
i
Mi,j =
∏
i
Enc (mi,j) .
After the aggregation, the supplier decrypts the encrypted consolidated con-
sumption resulting in the consolidated consumption cj , s.t.
cj = Dec (Cj) =
∑
i
mi,j .
2.2.3.1 Attack Model
The attacker is more powerful in a privacy attack model than in a se-
curity attack model. The attacker has access to the encrypted consolidated
consumptions Cj and all information on the supplier side, including the
cryptographic key to decrypt them. The key source is still secure and dis-
tributes the keys to the meters and the supplier, which can decrypt only the
encrypted consolidated consumption Cj or even an individual measurement
mi,j , depending on the PPP used and if the supplier receives such measure-
ment. Since AHEPs enable the decryption of a single measurement mi,j , the
attacker cannot have access to an individual encrypted measurement Mi,j ,
if the PPP is based on an AHEP. Figure 2.6 depicts a model for privacy and
its data aggregation in the context of smart grids. Figure 2.6 does not have
edges indicating the bill b$i . The supplier already knows b$i for each meter i
in a non-smart grid. More information about bills is presented further.
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Figure 2.6: Privacy model in the context of smart grids.
2.2.3.2 Trust Model
In privacy trust models, we can define meters as trusted, honest-but-
curious, or malicious. The first definition requires that meters behave cor-
rectly. This is a strong assumption because machines might fail. The second
requires that meters also behave correctly, but it will collect accessible in-
formation. In the honest-but-curious model, the attacker has no access to
the communication channel during the aggregation process. However, it
is clear that access to encrypted measurements Mi,j should be denied for
PPPs based on AHEPs. The third requires that meters might behave as an
attacker. This is a safe, secure, and weak assumption because factual or in-
tentional failures can happen in real life. Parallel with these definitions, we
could define meters as non-attackers, passive attackers, and active attackers,
respectively.
For the privacy trust model, the supplier is malicious. This is a safe
assumption for customers and even for the supplier, which do not need
blindly to trust the employees.
Trusted meters measure the consumption correctly, compute Enc cor-
rectly, sign the result correctly and send the signed encrypted measurements
directly to their supplier. They do everything correctly.
Honest-but-curious also known as semi-honest meters behave like trusted
meters, but they read information in the aggregation, if possible.
Malicious meters can fail to measure the correct consumption, can com-
pute Enc wrongly, sign the result wrongly and send the signed encrypted
measurements to their supplier and an attacker. The communication chan-
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nel can transmit the messages with noise and interruption, and the supplier
can compute Dec wrongly. Collusion is considered. Thus, an attacker has
more information.
In contrast to previous work, this work presents PPPs taking in consid-
eration that the meters might be malicious. Moreover, each meter and its
supplier can verify the bill b$i .
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Chapter 3
A Selective Review
This chapter presents the areas in which Privacy-Preserving Protocols
(PPPs) have been developed and aims to highlight the most relevant related
work for PPPs. A survey of PPPs can be found in [ETPLPG13]. Naturally,
there are privacy-enhancing technologies with restrictive results on cost,
efficiency, or privacy. For example, the use of a home battery is the best
solution as discussed in Section 3.1.1. However, it is too expensive. The
areas with promising results are investigated in this thesis. The next two
sections present the restrictive and promising results found.
3.1 Solutions with Restrictive Result
This section presents interesting proposals in the literature that are not
explored in the sequel of this thesis due to restrictions found. These solutions
can be used to reduce the leakage of privacy [YLQQMM12]. For example,
customers can use them to mask the signal patterns generated by their TVs.
However, they cannot hide information from one day. For example, which of
them is never at home on specific days. Even worse, these solutions cannot
hide that some customers work in the middle of the night to achieve the
goal before deadlines.
3.1.1 Solutions based on Storages
Customers in smart grids formed by water suppliers can easily store
water, and they can use it anytime without concern about privacy. Simi-
larly, any kind of battery, i.e., energy storage system is good for the power
load balance in a smart grid formed by energy suppliers, for instance, air-
conditioning [Lu12], water heaters, and electric vehicles [MY12] can be used
as energy storage systems. Such batteries store the energy when the re-
newable sources have high electricity generation and discharge when they
have low generation. Any kind of energy storage system creates a buffer
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between supply and demand in a smart grid. Such a buffer protects privacy
and boosts power load balancing. From the privacy point of view, non-
intrusive load monitoring (NILM) [EE15] can analyze only the behavior of
storage. In contrast to water storage, electricity storage is still too expensive
to supply a house without the energy supplier for a day. Currently, energy
storage is expensive even for energy suppliers, which prefer solutions based
on curtailment or flexible generation [NRN15].
When households are at home, batteries from their electric vehicles can
be used to protect their privacy. Besides electric vehicles bringing new pri-
vacy issues [RFV14], not all dwellers will have an electric vehicle. Many
customers might have one vehicle per family. They can buy small batteries
to enhance their privacy [VK11; MMA11], but such solutions do not solve
the problem. They reduce the problem only by means of creating a trade-
off between the battery size and the leakage of privacy. Therefore, such a
solution is still too expensive for the majority of customers.
3.1.2 Protocols Based on Anonymity
To avoid being profiled by their suppliers, each customer identity should
be dismembered in at least two pseudonyms, one for high-frequency metering
data and other for low-frequency metering data, in accordance with the
nomenclature of Efthymiou and Kalogridis [EK10]. However, an attacker
can easily relate bills to customers’ measurements. Even though many bills
have the same value, it is unlikely that many customers have the same bill
in consecutive invoices. This drawback can be bypassed with the addition
of new identities. The more identities, the more privacy. The best case for
privacy is achieved with one identity per watt consumed, but this is the
worst case for performance [BMM12]. This trade-off suggests that other
solutions are more interesting, because we search for efficient solutions that
provide indistinguishability as additive homomorphic encryption primitives
(AHEPs) do. Once attackers related the pseudonyms of a customer, they
can read all measurements associated with the pseudonyms and apply NILM.
Chapter 5 presents limitations for PPPs with aggregations. Such limitations
are even worse for protocols based on pseudonyms, because the attacker
knows the measurements—completely or partially—to fill the Table 4.1.
3.1.3 Protocols Based on Noise
This class of protocols adds noise to information for the attacker to
receive scrambled data. A Gaussian or Laplacian distribution might insert
noise [Dwo08]. Bohli et al. [BSU10] present a solution based on expectation,
i.e., each meter i adds its measurementmi,j to a random value ri,j generated
for a known distribution with a known finite variance σ2 and expectation µ.
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Thus, the encrypted consolidated consumption Cj is given by
Cj =
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j + ri,j ≈ µ+
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j ≈ µ+ cj .
Thus, if the supplier knows the distribution and the sum, it can compute the
consolidated consumption cj quickly. The expected value µ does not change
per round j and can even be assumed to be zero, i.e., µ = 0. Therefore, the
meters can send their measurements directly to the supplier without extra
communication and with very low processing time. A drawback found was
the high number ı˜ of meters necessary for the series to converge, i.e.,
ı˜∑
i=1
ri,j ≈ µ.
However, Wang et al. [WCQCJCX12] show that ı˜ can be considerably
smaller.
Addition of noise is not suitable for all privacy problems [Dwo08]. Smart
grids present such a problem. Without loss of generality, suppose the mea-
surements are collected every hour. Hence, we have 24 measurements per
day. Thus, the average of the first measurement mi,1 for the meter i is given
by
mi,1 ≈
(
ı˜∑
l=0
Mi,24l+1
)
/ ı˜ , (3.1)
assuming that customers have routines and, therefore, the measurements
in the same hour are close to their average. To find the second expected
measurement mi,2, one just changes the index 24l + 1 in Equation (3.1) to
24l + 2, for the third, 24l + 3, etc. Therefore, an attacker in the supplier
side can create a profile with the expected value for the measurements for
each customer. Later, the attacker can sell information about the customers’
habits to health insurance companies, for instance.
3.2 Solutions Addressed in this Thesis
This section presents protocols that inspired the solutions proposed in
this thesis. The understanding of these protocols simplifies the understand-
ing of the first three protocols presented in Chapter 6. Section 3.2.1 and
Section 3.2.2 present protocols that provide only the consolidated consump-
tion cj , while Section 3.2.3 presents a protocol that provides only bill b$i with
verification. However, there are also protocols in the literature that provide
both cj and b$i cf. [BDBBM14]. Moreover, there are protocols that fulfill
the requirements in Section 4.2, e.g., [BM14b], [BM14a], and [BVM15].
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3.2.1 Protocols Based on Homomorphic Encryption
An AHEP is a cryptographic algorithm based on a function with the
property
ı˜∏
i=1
Enc (mi,j) = Enc
(
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j
)
.
If the PPP requires only this property, it can use any AHEP. This is the
case for [LLL10], [RN13], [JK12]. Due to performance reasons, they chose
the Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99], which is used in many protocols for smart
grid scenarios [BDBBM14]. His encryption function Enc (mi,j) of the mea-
surement mi,j is given by
Enc : Zn × Z∗n 7−→ Zn2
Enc(mi,j , ri,j) 7−→ gmi,j · rni,j mod n2,
(3.2)
where n is the product of two safe primes p and q, and g and ri,j are ran-
dom numbers chosen by the supplier and meter, respectively. To ensure
bijectivity, the n should divide the order of g ∈ Z∗n2 .
Paillier is an AHEP over Zn with the product of the encrypted mea-
surements over Zn2 . For example, the consolidated consumption is given
by
Mi,j = Enc (m1,j , r1,j) · · ·Enc (m ı˜ ,j , r ı˜ ,j) =
ı˜∏
i=1
Enc (mi,j , ri,j)
= gm1,jrn1,j · · · gm ı˜ ,j · rnı˜ ,j mod n2
= g
∑ ı˜
i=1 mi,j
ı˜∏
i=1
rni,j mod n2
= Enc
(
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j , ri,j ,
ı˜∏
i=1
ri,j
)
.
(3.3)
The public key is given by {n, g} and the private key is given by d = L(gλ
mod n2)−1 defined by Carmichael’s function λ = λ(n) = lcm (p− 1, q − 1),
where lcm is the function that returns the least common multiple. His
decryption function Dec is given by
Dec : Zn2 7→ Zn
Dec(Cj) 7→ L(Cjλ mod n2) · d mod n,
(3.4)
where L(u) = (u− 1)/n.
Probabilistic encryption is one requirement for AHEPs, because the en-
cryption function of measurements with the same value should return differ-
ent encrypted measurements. Therefore, the decryption function does not
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depend on the random numbers and we can write
Dec
(
ı˜∏
i=1
Enc (mi,j) mod n2
)
=
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j mod n
without the random number. Algorithm 1 describes the procedures in the
Paillier cryptosystem.
Algorithm 1: Paillier
1 Procedure Encryption
Input: measurements mi,j .
Output: encrypted measurements Mi,j .
2 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
3 Mi,j ← Enc (mi,j)
4 Procedure Aggregation
Input: encrypted measurements Mi,j .
Output: encrypted consolidated consumption Cj .
5 Cj ← 1
6 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
7 Cj ← Cj ·Mi,j
8 Procedure Decryption
Input: encrypted consolidated consumption Cj .
Output: consolidated consumption cj .
9 cj ← Dec (Cj)
Since the supplier has the private key, it can decrypt a single measure-
ment. Thus, it should receive only the encrypted consolidated consumption.
Hence, schemes based on AHEPs need a trusted aggregator, which might be
a trusted third party (TTP) or operations between the meters and their sup-
plier, i.e., a virtual aggregator. Figure 3.1 depicts a communication model
for schemes based on AHEPs.
In [LLL10], Li et al. present a PPP avoiding a TTP with a technique
called in-network aggregation, i.e., the meters send their measurements to
each other until they perform the aggregation. The last meter sends an en-
crypted consolidated consumption Cj to the supplier. This technique should
assume the meters are honest-but-curious and an attacker cannot spoof their
communication. In [RN13], Ruj and Nayak present another kind of virtual
aggregator. They use access control to compute the aggregation in the net-
work devices. However, they need the same assumptions.
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Cj =
ı˜∏
i=1
Enc (mi,j) mod n2
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Figure 3.1: Abstraction of an aggregator for AHEPs.
3.2.2 Protocols Based on DC-Nets
Chaum introduced the DC-Net protocol to provide anonymous commu-
nication. The name comes from Dining Cryptographers. They want to
discover if one of them paid for the dinner, but they do not want to re-
veal the identity of who paid. The DC-Net protocol is symmetric, thus the
number of keys grows quadratically with respect to the number of users.
In [ET12], Erkin and Tsudik present a DC-Net that provides consoli-
dated consumption cj using the Paillier Cryptosystem. In [KDK11], Kur-
sawe et al. present many ways of using DC-Nets resulting in the consolidated
consumption cj . The most efficient way is called Low-Overhead Protocol
(LOP) and is presented in this section. Let us call the DC-Nets introduced
by Chaum as Symmetric DC-Nets (SDC-Nets) to differentiate them from
Asymmetric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets) [BBM14]. The core difference between a
fully connected SDC-Net and the LOP is in the number of bits for integer
representation. LOP uses only integers with 32 bits.
In the set-up phase, a setM of meters agrees on a secure hash function
s.t. it behaves as a one-way function and has collision resistance. They
send a symmetric key to each other, i.e., ki→o. Thereafter, they can encrypt
computing
Mi,j = Enc (mi,j) = mi,j +
∑
o∈M−{i}
(−1)o<iH ( ki→o || j ) , (3.5)
where || denotes string concatenation and H is the hash function.
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The aggregation happens together with the description, namely,
cj = Dec ({Mi,j |i ∈M}) =
ı˜∑
i=1
Mi,j . (3.6)
Algorithm 2 describes the procedures to this protocol—LOP for integers
with 32 bits—, while Figure 3.2 depicts the communication network with
three meters, without loss of generality.
Algorithm 2: LOP - SDC-Net for 32 bits
1 Procedure Encryption
Input: measurements mi,j .
Output: encrypted measurements Mi,j .
2 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
3 Mi,j ← mi,j
4 for o← 1 to ı˜ do
5 if i 6= o then
6 Mi,j ←Mi,j + H (ki,o||j)
7 Mi,j ← Enc (mi,j)
8 Procedure Decryption
Input: encrypted measurements Mi,j .
Output: consolidated consumption cj .
9 cj ← 0
10 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
11 cj ← cj +Mi,j
Supplier
a
b
c
m1j + H(kab||j) + H(kac||j)− H(kba||j)− H(kca||j)
m2j + H(kba||j) + H(kbc||j)− H(kab||j)− H(kcb||j)
m3j + H(kca
||j) + H(kcb||j
)− H(kac||j)−
H(kbc||j)
Figure 3.2: A fully connected SDC-Net.
3.2.3 Protocols Based on Commitment
In [JJK11], Jawurek et al. present a PPP based on Pedersen Com-
mitments [Ped92] to enable billing verification, i.e., the supplier can verify
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whether a meter i sent the correct bill b$i . The protocol requires a Privacy
Component (PCi) between the meter and its supplier. The PCi is a hard-
ware that receives from the meter i the measurements mi,j , random values
ri,j , commitments Commi,j , and digital signature Si,j for the commitments,
which are calculated with Pedersen Commitments as follows
Commi,j = Commit (mi,j , ri,j) = gmi,j · hri,j ,
where g and h are random numbers belonging to Z∗p, i.e., a multiplicative
group of integers Z modulo p, where p is prime. Concurrently, the PCi
receives the electricity tariff T = (t1, t2, . . . , t ˜ ) from the supplier and sends
the signed commitments, P , and r′ given by
b$i =
L∑
j=1
mi,j · tj
and
r′ =
˜∑
j=1
ri,j · tj .
The supplier generates a commitment to the bill b$i computing
COMMTariff =
˜∏
j=1
Commtji,j .
The PCi declares the bill b$i , and the supplier verifies whether b$i is correct,
i.e., if the supplier can open the commitment
Open
(
COMMTariff , b$i , r′
)
⇒ gb$i · hr′ ?= g
∑ ı˜
i=1mi,j · h
∑ ı˜
i=1 ri,j .
Supplier
Meter
PCi
t1, . . . , tj , . . . , t ˜
mi,j , ri,j ,COMMi,j ,Si,j
b$i =
˜∑
j=1
mi,j · tj
r′ =
˜∑
j=1
ri,j · tj
b$i , r
′,COMMi,j ,Si,j
COMMTariff =
˜∏
j=1
COMMtji,j
Figure 3.3: Communication model for the billing verification.
The supplier can verify by the signatures whether the PCi computed the
values correctly. Algorithm 3 describes the procedures of this protocol for
each meter. Note that the PCi could be inside the meter i and, therefore,
the measurements would never leave the meters. Figure 3.3 depicts the
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Algorithm 3: Billing verification
1 Procedure Meter
Output: measurements mi,j , random numbers ri.j , commitments
COMMi,j , and signatures Si,j .
2 for j ← 1 to ˜ do
3 ri,j ← Random number
4 COMMi,j ← Commit (mi,j , ri,j)
5 Si,j ← Sign (COMMi,j)
6 Procedure PCi
Input: measurements mi,j , random numbers ri.j , commitments
COMMi,j , signatures Si,j , the tariffs tj .
Output: commitments COMMi,j , signatures Si,j , and bill b$i in
monetary value.
7 b$i ← 0
8 r′ ← 0
9 for j ← 1 to ˜ do
10 b$i ← b$i +mi,j · tj
11 r′ ← r′ + ri,j · tj
12 Procedure Supplier
Input: commitments COMMi,j , signatures Si,j , and bill b$i in
monetary value.
13 COMMi,j ← 1
14 for j ← 1 to ˜ do
15 if Verify (COMMi,j ,Si,j) then
16 COMMi,j ← COMMi,j ·COMMtji,j
17 else
18 Apply policies
19 if Open
(
COMMTariff , b$i , r′
)
then
20 Bill is correct
21 else
22 Apply policies
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communication between a meter and its supplier. Note that meters work
independently from each other in this protocol.
Researchers are discovering new applications and benefits of smart me-
ters. Specifically, they are discovering new applications that require consol-
idated consumptions. Billing does not require consolidated consumptions,
and therefore, the smart meters do not need to send encrypted measure-
ments for billing. Moreover, no one application justifies the suppliers to
receive individual measurements, and the majority of the PPPs address
only the aggregation for the consolidated consumption [BDBBM14; BM14a;
BM14b].
Part II
Contributions
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Chapter 4
Reasons to Measure
Frequently and their
Requirements
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)1 presents
the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) as a key mechanism to achieve
dynamic pricing and demand response, which are necessary to match genera-
tion and consumption, creating an electric load balancing. Normally, meters
are associated with time-based pricing [FP10] and with frequent measure-
ments that are intrusive, but these two associations are independent of each
other. Time-based pricing can be achieved without the frequent measure-
ments leaving the meters [JJK11], cf. Section 3.2.3. For forecasting, a
phasor measurement unit (PMU) provides more information than the consol-
idated consumption provided by the meters. It provides information about
the electricity quality. A PMU can measure aggregated measurements in a
cell of the power network. Aggregated measurements aj can also be achieved
with smart meters spreading over the power network. Figure 4.1 depicts a
smart grid for an energy supplier with the power network and the informa-
tion network where the PMU provides aggregated measurements aj to the
energy supplier forecasting the energy consumption, and the meters sending
their billed consumptions bi to their energy supplier weekly or monthly. At
this point, we are wondering if there is a reason for meters to send their mea-
surements or their encrypted measurements to their energy supplier. This
chapter presents three reasons raised by the author.
1Publication 1108R2
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energy supplier
aggregated
measurement
PMU
customers with
smart meters
billing information
measured consumption
(encrypted & signed)
Figure 4.1: Scheme of a smart grid.
4.1 Reasons for Frequent Measurements
A previous work [MS14] presents that measurements sent to the supplier
can be used to detect overload in old distribution transformers and to pro-
tect them. This thesis presents three new reasons for meters to send their
frequent measurements to their supplier, namely, to improve detection of
fraud and energy loss, virtualization of the power network, and fair distri-
bution. Indeed, the energy supplier needs the measurementsmi,j to compute
the consolidated consumptions cj . In addition, Chapter 6 presents proto-
cols that compute cj from the encrypted measurementsMi,j . Therefore, the
energy supplier only needs the encrypted measurements Mi,j .
4.1.1 Fraud and Energy Loss
Fraud has been a problem for energy suppliers [SLL13]. If a customer
bypasses a meter, the supplier suffers a fraud with energy loss. Time-based
pricing opens more opportunities for fraud because the amount of electricity
consumed—billed consumption bi—can be correct but its monetary value—
bill b$i—may not. However, fraud and energy loss might also be independent.
Fraud might be financial without energy loss and energy loss might be acci-
dental. Without receiving the consolidated consumption cj per meter i, the
energy supplier can detect only energy loss between the PMU and meters
after comparing the aggregated measurements aj with the billed consump-
tions bi, which is currently collected either on a monthly or on a yearly base
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in the majority of countries. In other words, the supplier can verify only
whether ∑
i
bi
?=
∑
j
aj − j
and ∑
i
b$i
?=
∑
j
Value (aj − j)
hold either monthly or yearly. The monetary value Value returns the mon-
etary value and j is the transmission cost. Certainly, the consolidated
consumption is different to the aggregated measurement, i.e., cj 6= aj due
to the transmission cost, but the values should be close cj ≈ aj and different
by constants j , s.t. cj = aj − j and the values of the sequence j are close
to each other. Note that j depends on the resistance of electrical equipment
in the power network, for instance cables and transformers.
A month or a year is a lot of time to detect if something is going wrong.
With the consolidated consumption, the supplier just verifies whether cj ≈
aj is a good approximation. Thus, the supplier can detect any sort of
fraud and energy loss between a PMU and the meters. The idea relies on
the assumption that the electric current that passes through meters also
passes through a unique PMU, i.e., it is in between a set of meters and
their supplier. Clustering the meters in disjointed sets might sound strange
in a highly connected power network. However, for equivalent systems, the
connection of power sources in series provides higher voltage and in parallel
provides higher current. Whereas the power network has standards ensuring
that all meters should receive the same power with constant voltage, the
supplier should install a transformer for the set of meters with more than
one power source. Therefore, a PMU can be installed and the meters can
be clustered in disjointed sets.
Note that other kinds of suppliers have similar problems with fraud and
loss of commodities. The loss of other commodities might be even worse
than electricity, for instance, water leaking in the pipes causing infiltration.
If no one detects the infiltration after a long time, it might cause erosion or
even a sinkhole.
4.1.2 Virtualization of the Supplier Commodity Network
The virtualization of the supplier commodity network is the creation of
multiple commodity networks over the same physical infrastructure. Thus,
multiple suppliers can share the same infrastructure to distribute their com-
modities between their customers. Specifically, each supplier supplies the
commodity network with the amount necessary for its customers, and then
the commodity is fairly distributed between the customers of all suppli-
ers. Certainly, the commodity from different suppliers should have the same
quality.
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Let us keep the focus on a power network because the electricity price
tends to be more unstable and even can become negative [Nic10], because
wind farms and solar panels are unstable sources of energy, adding incon-
sistency in the pricing. Thus, consider a distribution network with a small
number of meters, so small that it has only one PMU. However, two energy
suppliers share the power network. They should provide the correct amount
of electricity that their respective customers are consuming. A little bit
more or less electricity is too much or too little. If the amount of electricity
crosses some thresholds, the power network has a power outage. In this
scenario, each energy supplier should know the consolidated consumption
from its customers to compute the expected consumption and to keep the
distribution network in equilibrium. Based on the consumptions of previous
rounds, each energy supplier will estimate the consolidated consumption of
the next round. Everyone expects that the virtualized power network will
run without a power outage. Thus, the suppliers should find an estimated
consumption sufficiently close to their customers’ real consumption to keep
the power network running without solutions based on curtailment, which
waste energy. Figure 4.2 depicts multiple energy suppliers virtualizing a
power network and their necessity of frequently consolidated consumption
to compute better-expected consumption. The dashed red represents an en-
ergy supplier with its customers and their expected consumption, its amount
of generated electricity, and their real consumption, the green represents the
others. Since the electricity price changes constantly, the suppliers aim for
more than balancing the power network. They aim to generate for the real
consumption. Thus, the expected consumption should be equal to the real
consumption and the generation should be slightly bigger, but only enough
to cover the transmission cost. If a supplier expects that their customers will
have more consumption than other customers and the electricity generation
is equal for both suppliers, but at the balance, the real consumption of their
customers are inverted in relation to the expected, then the suppliers will
have a dispute and probably a litigation. To solve this problem, they need
to receive the consolidated consumptions with higher frequency to compute
better estimations. The more frequent the measurements, the better the
expected consumption.
There are many advantages for distributed small power sources [LD-
FRSLW02], but without virtualization, the unique supplier can work as a
broker for household generators. At the end, such a supplier is the unique
buyer for the electricity generators and the unique seller for customers that
characterizes a monopoly.
4.1.3 Fair Distribution
In a non-smart grid, the supplier can determine areas to supply with a
commodity and areas without supply. For example, an energy supplier can
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Figure 4.2: Multiple suppliers needing frequent consolidated consumption
cj .
determine areas with electricity and areas without it. In a smart grid, the
supplier has more information and can determine the minimum and maxi-
mum consumption per customer. Moreover, the supplier can have different
prices based on the amount of the consumption. Therefore, a smart grid can
give us a quantity-based pricing with time-based pricing. They are dynam-
ics in two dimensions, i.e., the price floats over time and over the amount
consumed.
For example, the energy supplier can ensure the minimum amount of
electricity for every customer. Its price might be very low. This threshold
can change over time due to the generation. The supplier might set many dif-
ferent prices and even define a continuous price function. Figure 4.3 depicts
an example of quantity-based pricing with four different prices, namely, min-
imum price, price 1, price 2, and maximum for minimal consumption range,
above and below the average, and maximal consumption range, respectively.
The energy supplier can also identify consumption approaching a techni-
cal maximum and request the reduction of consumption before the protective
relays are switched. Similarly, the water supplier can avoid low pressure or
even prevent air from entering the pipes. In this scenario, the supplier could
know the number of meters per range for the supplier to control whether
they are reducing consumption. However, the supplier needs to know the
consolidated consumption per range to balance the price per range over the
time. Therefore, the supplier can control whether meters are approaching
the maximum. In every Privacy-Preserving Protocol (PPP), supplier and
their customers should be able to verify whether the values are correct.
40
However, fair distribution might be an opportunity or misfortune depend-
ing on the law. The customer 4 could buy the quotas from the customer
2 in Figure 4.3. If it is legal, this is a new market. If not, and the meters
are untrusted machines, then the transaction is not detected by comparison
between the aggregated measurement aj with consolidated consumptions cj
per range. Thus, it might blur the detection of consumption approaching a
technical maximum. In contrast, if the meters are trusted, the legislation can
fix quotas per customer. Therefore, independent of PPP, this application
requires trusted meters to work accurately.
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Figure 4.3: Example of quantity-based pricing.
4.2 Requirements
This section presents the requirements for PPPs in a smart grid sce-
nario. Besides security and privacy, PPPs have four minimum require-
ments [BDBBM14].
Recoverability of Bills b$i , i.e., the possibility of invoice recovery. The
billing with time-based pricing is a requirement for smart grids [FP10],
cf. Section 1.1. The billing with predetermined pricing is already
required for a non-smart grid.
Recoverability of Consolidated consumptions cj, i.e., the possibil-
ity of retrieving consolidated consumptions. The total consumption of
all customers in a round is required for detection of overload [MS14],
detections of fraud and energy loss, virtualization of the supplier com-
modity network, and fair distribution, cf. Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.3.
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Verification (auditability), i.e., suppliers and their customers want
to verify whether the computations are done correctly. Verification
should be done to avoid fraud and errors. Verification is also known as
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. It is only effective with digital
signatures to ensure non-repudiation.
Computational efficiency, i.e., the PPPs should demand few computa-
tional resources, both in processing time and in communication. Note
that a PPP might be efficient for a specific number of meters but might
be not scalable. The concept of efficiency depends on several variables.
The bill is already known for a non-smart grid, the old supplier model.
However, the commodities can be very cheap in a short interval. Thus,
if the supplier can apply time-based pricing, customers can benefit from
low prices and the supplier sells more. The consolidated consumption may
be used for fraud and loss detection. In addition, it can be used for the
virtualization of the supplier commodity network. Fair distribution needs
more than consolidated consumptions cj , but it can also be computed from
the encrypted measurementsMi,j and preserve all properties from the PPPs,
if the meters are trusted. Verification is necessary to ensure safety and
security. It can be used to avoid disputes between suppliers in a virtualized
commodity network, or between supplier and its customers regarding the
bill and billed consumption, or even to detect problems in the consolidated
consumption. Note that verifications with digital signatures imply non-
repudiation.
Moreover, the correct values are necessary and sufficient for the equations
that govern the PPPs to hold. It uses the abbreviation iff “if and only
if” representing a condition necessary and sufficient. Thus, the statement
the equations hold iff the values are correct is equivalent to the values are
correct iff the equations hold. Therefore, the equations hold if the values are
correct and the values are correct if the equations hold. Verification as well
as security and privacy should be ensured mathematically, i.e., an attacker
should solve an intractable mathematical problem to change values or to get
information from the system. Whereas the literature has no result whether
a one-way function exists, the properties of the protocols are ensured by
the assumption that a mathematical problem is intractable or infeasible to
solve. Apart from the intractability, all computations in PPPs should be
efficient.
Table 4.1 shows the private measurements in red at its center. The me-
ters i and rounds j are in the first column and lines, respectively, while
the monetary value of the consolidated consumption cj and the billed con-
sumption bi are in the last line and column, respectively. The sum of the
monetary value of consolidated consumptions cj should be equal to the sum
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of the billed consumption bi, i.e.,
ı˜∑
i=1
b$i =
˜∑
j=1
Value (cj) =
˜∑
j=1
Value (aj − j) =
ı˜∑
i=1
˜∑
j=1
Value (mi,j) ,
where the function Value determines the monetary value. Considering only
the consumption in watts, we have
ı˜∑
i=1
bi =
˜∑
j=1
cj =
˜∑
j=1
aj − j =
ı˜∑
i=1
˜∑
j=1
mi,j . (4.1)
Table 4.1: Consolidated consumption cj versus billed consumption bi.
XXXXXXMeter
Round 1 2 · · · j · · · ˜ bi
Meter 1 m1,1 m1,2 · · · m1,j · · · m1, ˜
˜∑
j=1
m1,j
Meter 2 m2,1 m2,2 · · · m2,j · · · m2, ˜
˜∑
j=1
m2,j
...
...
... . . .
... . . .
...
...
Meter i mi,1 mi,2 · · · mi,j · · · mi, ˜
˜∑
j=1
mi,j
...
...
... . . .
... . . .
...
...
Meter ı˜ m ı˜ ,1 m ı˜ ,2 · · · m ı˜ ,j · · · m ı˜ , ˜
˜∑
j=1
m ı˜ ,j
cj
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,1
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,2 · · ·
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j · · ·
ı˜∑
i=1
mi, ˜
The Equation (4.1) holds for correct billed consumptions bi and consoli-
dated consumptions cj . If a meter sent incorrect measurements, its supplier
can determine by means of Equation (4.1) that some values are incorrect or
there is energy loss. However, the supplier cannot determine with the Equa-
tion (4.1) which meter sent incorrect values. However, if a meter sent huge
measurements causing disruption in the communication, the supplier can
detect the faulty meter in the billing process, because the sum of its mea-
surements will also be huge. From the Table 4.1, the supplier can identify
the meters and in which rounds they sent huge values.
PPPs aggregate the measurements but do not determine a secure value
to ı˜ and ˜ . Note that an attacker trying to recover the measurements
from meters knowing only billed consumption bi has the same difficulty
of recovering the measurements from a round knowing only consolidated
consumption cj . However, the difficulty is smaller when the attacker knows
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both bi and cj . Next chapter presents limitations of aggregation approach
in two sections exploring algebraic properties and exploiting probabilistic
properties.
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Chapter 5
Quantifying the Aggregation
Size
Savi et al. [SRV15] presented an analysis on schemes based on noise
to quantify a trade-off between the number of measurements that com-
pound the consolidated consumption cj and the precision on cj . Some pre-
vious work used differential privacy [Dwo08] to analyze a specific Privacy-
Preserving Protocol (PPP), for instance, the work of Jawurek and Ker-
schbaum [JK12]. Bohli et al. [BSU10] presented a model for measuring the
degree of privacy by means of a cryptographic game. However, the game
does not consider all variables involved, cf. Section 3.1.3.
This chapter presents an analysis independent of PPP to quantify
the leakage of information, which depends on aggregation size—cf. Sec-
tion 2.2.3—, i.e., the number of smart meters ı˜ , the number of rounds
˜—cf. Section 4.2—, and the bit-length of consolidated consumptions
cj and billed consumption bi. The analysis is valid for all PPP that has
two aggregations that behaves like b$i , billed consumption, and cj in the
Table 4.1. This analysis results in two kinds of properties, namely algebraic
and probabilistic. The former can be used as an error-correcting code for
the supplier. The latter shows how to approach a valid set of measurements
and how to find all possible solutions. The difficulty for the attacker is
to identify the correct solution. Nevertheless, many possible solutions can
be excluded due to the timestamp of the rounds, the consumption pattern
from a set of customers in previous days, weeks, etc.
This chapter analyzes the possibility for an attacker to recover either
individual measurements or probable individual measurements after the ag-
gregations with any PPP. The relation between the measurements and the
leak of privacy depends on the interval between the rounds j [EE15; MMS-
FCI10; GJL12].
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5.1 Algebraic Properties
Assume that the attacker has three measurements per billed consumption
and the unit of electricity is given by star (?). Thus, the attacker tries to
split up the consolidated consumption cj in three boxes. If cj = 6, one
possible solution is ? ? ? ? ?? . To simplify the formulation, instead of
box, the stars can be split by bars. Thus, ??? |? |?? has the same solution.
With the star bar notation, the possible number of solutions is determined
by the combination of 6 stars plus 2 bar choose 6 stars, which is given by(
6 + 2
6
)
= 8!6!(8− 6)! = 28.
In general, for ˜ rounds and an arbitrary billed consumption bi, the number
of solutions for the attacker is determined by(
bi + ˜ − 1
˜
)
= (bi + ˜ − 1)!(bi − 1)! ˜ ! =
(
bi + ˜ − 1
bi − 1
)
. (5.1)
Similarly, if the attacker has only the number of meters ı˜ and the consoli-
dated consumption cj , the number of solutions is given by(
cj + ı˜ − 1
ı˜
)
= (cj + ı˜ − 1)!(cj − 1)! ı˜ ! =
(
cj + ı˜ − 1
cj − 1
)
. (5.2)
The binomial of Equations (5.1) and (5.2) are known in textbooks as mul-
tichoose, multiset number, composition, and stars and bars.
The behavior of Equation (5.1) is similar to Equation (5.2). The former
says that the attacker should try a number of possibilities in function of
the total number of rounds ˜ and the sum given by billed consumption bi.
Similarly, the latter says that the number of possibilities is the function of the
total number of meters ı˜ and the sum given by consolidated consumption
cj . Figure 5.1 depicts the number of possibilities in relation to the sum,
i.e., bi or cj , and the total, i.e., ı˜ or ˜ with the values going from 0 to 10.
Figure 5.1b depicts the contour plot of Figure 5.1a. Figure 5.2 depicts the
evolution of the possibilities growing with the values going from 0 to 20.
Figure 5.3 depicts the ultimate behavior of Equations (5.1) and (5.2) with
the logarithm of the possibilities to base 2 as a function of the sum (bi or cj)
and the total ( ı˜ or ˜ ) computed with values from 1 to 2 500. Comparing
Figures 5.1 to 5.3 with each other, we can see that their asymptotic growth
only explodes in the last values of their domains. Comparing Figures 5.1b,
5.2b and 5.3b with each other, we can see that the safe high probabilities
are in a narrow range. Moreover, it becomes narrower when the sum (bi or
cj) and the total ( ı˜ or ˜ ) increase. Therefore, the sum (bi or cj) and the
total ( ı˜ or ˜ ) should be as close as possible to maximize the security.
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Figure 5.1: Possibilities in relation to the sum (bi or cj) and the total ( ı˜ or
˜ ) up to 10.
Stirling’s formula gives us an approximation for factorials, i.e., for a
integer number n, we have
ln(n!) = ln(1) + ln(2) + · · ·+ ln(n)
=
n∑
k=1
ln(k)
≈
∫ n
1
ln(x) dx. integrating by parts
= [x ln(x)− x]n1
= n ln(n)− n+ 1
≈ n ln(n)− n.
(5.3)
Thus, we can apply his formula—Equation (5.3)—to understand Equa-
tions (5.1) and (5.2) better. Since they have the same behavior, we can
just choose one. Without loss of generality, let us calculate a logarithm in
the Equation (5.1). The result is given by
ln
(
bi + ˜ − 1
˜
)
= ln (bi + ˜ − 1)!(bi − 1)! ˜ !
= ln((bi + ˜ − 1)!)− ln((bi − 1)!)− ln( ˜ !).
(5.4)
Using Stirling’s formula in the result of the Equation (5.4), we find
ln
(
bi + ˜ − 1
˜
)
= ln((bi + ˜ − 1)!)− ln((bi − 1)!)− ln( ˜ !)
= (bi + ˜ − 1) ln(bi + ˜ − 1) + (bi + ˜ − 1)
− (bi − 1) ln(bi − 1)− (bi − 1)− ˜ ln( ˜ )− ˜
= (bi + ˜ − 1) ln(bi + ˜ − 1)
− (bi − 1) ln(bi − 1)− ˜ ln( ˜ ).
(5.5)
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The Equation (5.5) can provide an approximation for the bit-length of the
number of combinations. Assume that bi − 1 is approx. half of ˜ , then
Equation (5.5) results
1.5 ˜ ln(1.5 ˜ )− 0.5 ˜ ln(0.5 ˜ )− ˜ ln( ˜ )
=1.5 ˜ ln(1.5 ˜ )− ln((0.5 ˜ )0.5 ˜ ˜ ˜ )
= ln
(
1.51.5 ˜ ˜ 1.5 ˜
0.50.5 ˜ ˜ 1.5 ˜
)
= ln
(
1.51.5 ˜
0.50.5 ˜
)
≈ ln
((1.8
0.7
) ˜)
≈ ln(2.6 ˜ )
= ln(2log2(2.6) ˜ ) ≈ ln(21.4 ˜ ).
(5.6)
Differently, assume that bi − 1 is approx. ˜ , then Equation (5.5) results
2 ˜ ln(2 ˜ )− ˜ ln( ˜ )− ˜ ln( ˜ )
=2 ˜ ln(2 ˜ )− 2 ˜ ln( ˜ )
= ln
((2 ˜
˜
)2 ˜)
= ln(22 ˜ ) = ln(4 ˜ ).
(5.7)
Contrarily, assume that bi − 1 is approx. double ˜ , then Equation (5.5)
results
3 ˜ ln(3 ˜ )− 2 ˜ ln(2 ˜ )− ˜ ln( ˜ )
=3 ˜ ln(3 ˜ )− ln((2 ˜ )2 ˜ ˜ ˜ )
= ln
(
33 ˜ ˜ 3 ˜
22 ˜ ˜ 3 ˜
)
= ln
(
33 ˜
22 ˜
)
= ln
((27
4
) ˜)
= ln(6.75 ˜ )
= ln(2log2(6.75) ˜ ) ≈ ln(22.8 ˜ ).
(5.8)
If we divide Equations (5.6) to (5.8) by ln(2), we have 1.4 ˜ , 2 ˜ , and
2.8 ˜ bits, respectively. From half to double, we increased bi − 1 by 4 times
to get the double number of bits. In a limited interval to bi − 1 and j, the
number of bits tends to maximum when bi − 1 tends j. Similarly, when we
calculate ˜ or bi−1 tending to zero, the number of bits tends to zero. Since
the Equation (5.1) is syntactically equal to Equation (5.2), the same results
are valid for cj and ı˜ . These theoretical results are in agreement with the
experimental results presented in Figure 5.3.
In summary, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict that the maximum is achieved
with ı˜ = cj and ˜ = bi, respectively. However, not all possibilities are
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Figure 5.2: Possibilities in relation to the sum (bi or cj) and the total ( ı˜ or
˜ ) up to 20.
solutions of the system of linear equations. Figure 5.3 depicts the curve
with respect to the number of bits. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depict the growing
number of possibilities with a narrow range like a rainbow where the number
of possibilities are bigger, therefore, more interesting. Figure 5.3b depicts
this narrow range with respect to the number of bits.
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Figure 5.3: Possibilities in relation to the sum (bi or cj) and the total ( ı˜ or
˜ ) in logarithmic scale.
The number of combinations necessary for an attacker to discover all
measurements used to compute the billed consumption bi or the consolidated
consumption cj is given by the Equation (5.1), if bi and ˜ are known, and
by the Equation (5.2), if consolidated consumption cj and number of users
ı˜ are known. However, if these values are known, the attacker can speed up
the search for the individual measurements. Firstly, let ı˜ = ˜ = 2. Thus,
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the Table 4.1 gives us the system of linear equations
b1 = m1,1 +m1,2
b2 = m2,1 +m2,2
c1 = m1,1 +m2,1
c2 = m1,2 +m2,2
These equations are linearly dependent, namely c2 = b1 + b2 − c2. Thus,
we can eliminate the last equation from the system and write it in a matrix
form, i.e., ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1
b2
c1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m1,1
m1,2
m2,1
m2,2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ . (5.9)
The system has 3 equations and 4 unknowns. Hence, it has an infinite num-
ber of solutions for the set of the real numbers R. Nevertheless, the number
of solutions for the set of the natural numbers N is finite. Moreover, the sys-
tem has a unique solution if one measurement is known. The Equation (5.9)
shows that if m2,2 is known, the number of equations is equal to the num-
ber of unknowns, and therefore, the system has a unique solution. One can
compute different linear combinations to obtain the solution of the system,
if another measurement is known. An important question is raised and we
wonder how many measurements an attacker needs to know to solve bigger
systems. Before the general case, ı˜ = ˜ = 3. Thus, the new system of
linear equation in matrix notation with dots to simplify the visualization is
given by
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1
b2
b3
c1
c2
c3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m1,1
m1,2
m1,3
m2,1
m2,2
m2,3
m3,1
m3,2
m3,3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (5.10)
The Equation (5.10) shows that c3 = b1 +b2 +b3−c1−c2. Thus, the last line
of the matrix of known values and of the binary matrix can be eliminated.
We cannot eliminate more lines because the rank of the binary matrix is
5, i.e., there is not more dependence. Consequently, an attacker needs to
know 4 measurements to solve the system. However, the knowledge of 3
measurements from the same smart meter reduces the rank of the binary
matrix. In contrast, the knowledge of the measurements that compose c3
does not change the matrix rank. The attacker needs to choose one more
measurement to solve the system algebraically.
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In general, the system of equations is given by
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1
b2
...
b ı˜
c1
c2
...
c ˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 1 1 · · · 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
...
... . . .
... . . .
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 1 · · · 1
1 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0 0 1 · · · 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 0
...
... . . .
...
...
... . . .
... . . .
...
... . . .
...
0 0 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m1,1
m1,2
...
m1, ˜
m2,1
m2,2
...
m ı˜ , ˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (5.11)
One can see that
c ˜ =
ı˜∑
i=1
bi −
˜∑
i=1
cj .
In addition, the matrix rank is ı˜ + ˜ − 1 and the number of unknowns is
ı˜ · ˜ . Therefore, an attacker should know η measurements s.t.
η = ı˜ · ˜ − ı˜ − ˜ + 1 (5.12)
to solve the system. Nevertheless, some measurements might reduce the
rank. The Equation (5.12) shows that the difficulty for solving the Equa-
tion (5.11) grows with ı˜ and ˜ . In particular, the maximum number of
possibilities is achieved with ı˜ = ˜ . The Figure 5.4 depicts the difficulty
growing presented by the Equation (5.12).
20 40 60 80 100
50
100
0
5,000
10,000
ı˜
˜
N
um
be
r
of
m
i,
j
Figure 5.4: Number of measurements mi,j necessary to solve the system.
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For an example with ı˜ > ˜ , consider
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1
b2
b3
c1
c2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m1,1
m1,2
m2,1
m2,2
m3,1
m3,2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (5.13)
Contrarily, for an example with ı˜ < ˜ , consider
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b1
b2
c1
c2
c3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
m1,1
m1,2
m1,3
m2,1
m2,2
m2,3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
. (5.14)
Note that matrices from the Equations (5.13) and (5.14) have the same
dimension, because the former has ı˜ = 3 and ˜ = 2, and the latter has
ı˜ = 2 and ˜ = 3.
If the supplier loses either one billed consumption bi or one consolidated
consumption cj , then it can recover the lost value. The system of equations
works as an error-correcting code, i.e., it can detect and correct errors in
the binary matrix and can recover either one bi or one cj without disclosing
the measurements mi,j .
5.2 Probabilistic Properties
The possible measurements mi,j may be found with probabilities in an
easier and faster way than using algebra. One can create a function that
returns the most probable value of the measurements mi,j based on the last
line and column in the Table 4.1, i.e., in the billed consumption bi and the
consolidated consumption cj . Among other variables, the function might
consider the timestamp to determine hours with less or more electricity
consumption.
For simplicity, let us consider a simplified model based only on averages
where the probable value of the measurement mi,j is given by
mi,j1
def.= bi/ ˜ + cj/ ı˜2 . (5.15)
Using the Equation (5.15), one can reconstruct the Table 4.1. However,
the sum of the measurements might give a different value from the billed
consumption bi and the consolidated consumption cj indicating that the
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measurements found are not a solution for the system of equations. Never-
theless, the probable value mi,j can be used to find a better approximation
with a new probable value until a probable value becomes equal to the mea-
surement that satisfies the system of equations. For even values of k, the
new approximation can be defined by
mi,jk
def.=
mi,jk−1
cj/cj
, (5.16)
where
cjk
def.=
˜∑
j=1
mi,jk−1.
For odd values of k, the new approximation can be defined by
mi,jk
def.=
mi,jk−1
bi/bi
, (5.17)
where
bik
def.=
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,jk−1.
Equations (5.16) and (5.17) can be used recursively to determine a better
approximation until mi,j ≈ mi,jk for all i and all j. Let us see a numerical
example that starts with the Table 5.1. Note that the Equation (5.16)
adjusts the last line, i.e., the consolidated consumptions, while the Equa-
tion (5.17) adjusts the last column, i.e., the billed consumptions.
Table 5.1: Example of hidden measurements.
Round 1 2 3 4 bi
Meter 1 m1,1 m1,2 m1,3 m1,4 10
Meter 2 m2,1 m2,2 m2,3 m2,4 212
Meter 3 m3,1 m3,2 m3,3 m3,4 1106
cj 601 10 503 214 1328
Applying the Equation (5.15) to the values from the Table 5.1 and writ-
ing the result in a matrix, we have
101.42 2.92 85.08 36.92 226.33
126.67 28.17 110.33 62.17 327.33
238.42 139.92 222.08 173.92 774.33
466.50 171 417.50 273 1328
whose coefficients are a rough approximation of a solution. To improve the
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approximation, we can apply Equation (5.15), which results in
130.66 0.17 102.51 28.94 262.27
163.19 1.65 132.93 48.73 346.49
307.16 8.18 267.56 136.33 719.23
601 10 503 214 1328
.
After applying the Equation (5.16), the values from the consolidated con-
sumptions cj are correct. However, we still do not have a solution because
the values from the billed consumptions bi are incorrect. Thus, applying the
Equation (5.17), we have
4.98 0.01 3.91 1.10 10
99.84 1.01 81.33 29.82 212
472.33 12.58 411.45 209.64 1106
577.16 13.60 496.69 240.56 1328
whose last column for bi is correct, but the last line for cj is incorrect again.
Nevertheless, we are approaching a solution that satisfies the Table 5.1.
Thus, applying the Equation (5.16) again, we have
5.19 0.00 3.96 0.98 10.13
103.97 0.74 82.37 26.52 213.60
491.84 9.25 416.68 186.49 1104.27
601 10 503 214 1328
,
which is very close to the next iteration with the Equation (5.17), given by
5.12 0.00 3.91 0.97 10
103.19 0.74 81.75 26.33 212
492.61 9.27 417.33 186.79 1106
600.93 10.01 502.99 214.08 1328
.
After five steps the matrix has converged, i.e., the next step gives an equiv-
alent result. Therefore, the rounding of the coefficients gives us
5 0 4 1 10
103 1 82 26 212
493 9 417 187 1106
601 10 503 214 1328
.
After one finds a solution, it is easy to find the others by computing
operations that preserve the sums, e.g.,
5− 3 0 4 + 3 1 10
103 + 3 1 82− 3 26 212
493 9 417 187 1106
601 10 503 214 1328
.
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An attacker needs to use extra information to determine which solution is
correct. Depending on the level of accuracy, an attacker can join consecutive
consolidated consumptions in the same column and even split them to infer
the correct solution.
For the line where b1 = 10, the number of combinations can be deter-
mined by the Equation (5.1), and it is given by(
10 + 4− 1
4
)
= 750.
Similarly, for the column where c2 = 10, the number of combinations can
be determined by the Equation (5.2), which results(
10 + 3− 1
3
)
= 220.
However, not all combinations fit together and many of them can be ex-
cluded due to the consumption pattern. In addition, algebraic results can
be used with probabilistic results to improve the attack. Moreover, a prob-
able solution can always be quickly found. Therefore, the difficulty for the
attacker is to recognize the most probable solutions.
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Chapter 6
Selected Privacy-Preserving
Protocols
This chapter presents four Privacy-Preserving Protocols (PPPs)—PPP1
to PPP4—based on Symmetric DC-Nets (SDC-Nets), Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC), Asymmetric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets), and quantum cryp-
tography, respectively. Besides efficiency, security, and privacy, the first
protocol provides only the consolidated monetary value c$j while the second
is designed only to provide billing based on dynamic pricing with verification
of each bill b$i . The third gives us the property of the two first protocols. In-
deed, it provides all properties required in Section 4.2, namely: consolidated
consumption, billing based on dynamic pricing, verification of aggregation
and billing, and computational efficiency. Although the last protocol only
provides the consolidated consumption, it pioneers PPPs based on quantum
mechanics, i.e., this work presents the first PPP based on quantum mechan-
ics to smart grids. In addition, quantum cryptography is more promising
than quantum computers, and today, we already can buy devices that pro-
vide quantum cryptography.
The four protocols presented in this chapter use a function to convert the
measurements into monetary values. This function is important to simplify
the protocols separating dynamic pricing from the security layer. Moreover,
the security focus is to obtain the consolidated consumption in monetary
value, i.e., consolidated monetary value. Therefore, the supplier can be
abstracted as a counting agent and the protocols can be applied in other
scenarios that require counting agents. Normally, the communication in
the protocols for smart grid is described as Machine-to-Machine (M2M).
Differently, customers with their smart meters are addressed as users in this
chapter.
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6.1 Monetary Value
The monetary value of a measurementmi,j is just the current price multi-
plied by the consumption. Nevertheless, the supplier has two prices: buying
price p
j
and selling price pj . Hence, the users buy with the selling price pj
and sell with the buying price p
j
. The measurement mi,j might be measured
in watts and can be positive for consumption and negative for generation.
The signs can be inverted, but historically the consumption came first and
it is given by a positive measurement. To transform a measurement to a
monetary value, we can use the sign function. Note that −(sgn(mi,j)− 1)/2
returns 0 or 1 when mi,j is positive or negative, respectively. In contrast,
(sgn(mi,j) + 1)/2 returns 1 or 0 when mi,j is positive or negative, respec-
tively. We can use this observation to construct the function of monetary
value given by
Value (mi,j) = mi,j · pj−(sgn(mi,j)(mi,j)−1)/2pj(sgn(mi,j)(mi,j)+1)/2. (6.1)
Equivalent to Equation (6.1), we can write the Algorithm 4 without the
use of the sign function. Note that in both cases, the mi,j is a multiple of
the result. Thus, we do not need to address the case mi,j = 0.
Algorithm 4: Monetary Value
Input: Measurement mi,j , buying price pj , and selling price pj .
Output: Monetary value of mi,j .
1 if mi,j > 0 then
2 v ← mi,j · pj
3 else
4 v ← mi,j · pj
5 return v
The monetary value is important to simplify the cryptographic algo-
rithms. Certainly, the buying price p
j
and the selling price pj are argu-
ments of the function in Equation (6.32). However, they are omitted to
keep a clean notation. In fact, the measurements are more important than
these arguments in PPP descriptions. The buying price p
j
and the selling
price pj are important to enable time-based pricing. However, the protocols
can run normally without this feature. In other words, making the commod-
ity price equal to 1 with mi,j always positive, we have mi,j = Value (mi,j),
i.e., the protocols transmit the measurements without time-based pricing.
The values of the buying price p
j
and the selling price pj should be public
to avoid attacks. Otherwise, the counting agent could insert many zeros to
get the value of one measurement mi,j .
The function Value (mi,j) can be more complex to satisfy the require-
ments of Section 4.1.3. Nevertheless, they can be implemented with IF
instructions and concatenation of the values per range in a message.
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6.2 PPP1 - The Fastest
The fastest PPP presented in this thesis is PPP1, which is presented in
[BM14a] as part of a PPP to provide consolidated monetary value c$j without
the monetary value. PPP1 is based on SDC-Nets [Cha88] with in-network
aggregation, which generates a spanning tree to include all meters into the
aggregation, i.e., the meters send encrypted measurements to each other
until the last meter sends the encrypted consolidated consumption to their
counting agent, as done in [LLL10], [LL12], and [BDBBM14]. Without loss
of generality, Figure 6.1 presents only three users to depict the communica-
tion model using in-network aggregation.
Counting agent
Aggregated measurements
Enc(m1,j )
Enc(m2,
j)
Enc(m1,j) + Enc(m2,j) + Enc(m3,j) =
= Cj = Enc(m1,j +m2,j +m3,j)
aj
Figure 6.1: In-network aggregation for three users.
With respect to the knowledge of the keys, SDC-Net can be represented
with a graph structure. Instead of using a fully connected SDC-Net as the
protocols in Section 3.2.2 use, PPP1 uses a star SDC-Net as cryptographic
primitive with the counting agent in the center. Figure 6.2 depicts the
key exchange between users and counting agent for a fully SDC-Net in the
Figure 6.2 and for a star SDC-Net in the Figure 6.2b.
Counting agents
(a) Fully connected SDC-Net.
Counting agents
(b) Star SDC-Net.
Figure 6.2: Key exchange between users and their counting agent.
Because of shared keys, the counting agent can decrypt single measure-
ments for the star SDC-Net and PPP1 works under the assumption that
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the users are honest-but-curious, and no attacker can spoof their communi-
cation in the aggregation process. Consequently, the encryption function is
defined by
Mi,j = Enc (mi,j) = Value (mi,j) + H (ki||j) , (6.2)
where mi,j is the measurement of the meter i in the round j, ki is the key of
the meter i known also by the counting agent, || denotes string concatena-
tion, and H is a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as a one-way function
and has collision resistance. The aggregation is given by
Cj =
ı˜∑
i=1
Mi,j , (6.3)
where Mi,j is the encrypted measurement and ı˜ is the number of users.
Thus, the decryption function is given by
c$j = Dec (Cj) = Cj −
ı˜∑
i=1
H (ki||j) , (6.4)
where Cj is the encrypted consolidated consumption computed using in-
network aggregation.
Algorithm 5 describes the three procedures of PPP1. Users calculate
encryption and decryption. Thus, each user runs an iteration of each loop.
The counting agent who runs ı˜ iterations calculates the decryption.
6.2.1 Security Analysis
The attacker model can be simplified by considering that the counting
agent is the attacker whose goal is to get information about the measure-
ments. The counting agent can use all information to recover measurements
or keys but cannot collude with a user. A secure hash function s.t. it behaves
as a one-way function and has collision resistance ensures that each user i
has a pseudo-random number for every round j. Moreover, such numbers
are used only once. PPP1 security relies on a secure hash function. Fast
symmetric encryption algorithms can be used as a hash function H, i.e.,
an algorithm that behaves as a one-way function. The only one that can
decrypt the measurements is the counting agent, and the Algorithm 5 works
similar to the Algorithm 1, i.e., Equation (6.2) works as Equation (3.2) for
encryption functions, Equation (6.3) works as Equation (3.3) for aggrega-
tions, and Equation (6.4) works as Equation (3.4) for decryption functions.
Therefore, the star SDC-Net works as an additive homomorphic encryption
primitive (AHEP).
6.2.2 Privacy Analysis
Maintaining privacy means keeping individual measurements inaccessi-
ble. Thus, no one should be able to recover ki from H (ki||j) with H being
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Algorithm 5: PPP1
1 Procedure Encryption
Input: measurements mi,j .
Output: encrypted measurements Mi,j .
2 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
3 Mi,j ← Value (mi,j) + H (ki||j)
4 Procedure Aggregation
Input: encrypted measurements Mi,j .
Output: encrypted consolidated consumption Cj .
5 Cj ← 0
6 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
7 Cj ← Cj +Mi,j
8 Procedure Decryption
Input: encrypted consolidated consumption Cj .
Output: consolidated monetary value c$j .
9 c$j ← Cj
10 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
11 c$j ← c$j − H (ki||j)
a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as a one-way function and has colli-
sion resistance. Thus, users must not be able to eavesdrop on each other’s
measurements. The counting agent has the keys ki, but only receives the
encrypted consolidated consumption. As an AHEP, the privacy of PPP1 is
ensured by in-network aggregation.
6.2.3 Performance Analysis
In-network aggregation enables users to send the minimum number of
messages and the counting agent receives the minimum number of messages.
Thus, the overhead in the communication network is optimal. However, the
processing time for decryption grows with the number of users. Instead of
the counting agent receives and processes one message from each user, it
needs to process one hash function per user. Differently, AHEPs have their
complexities based on cryptographic trapdoor functions, and their complex-
ities do not depend on the number of users.
Using PPP1, users calculate almost only one hash function H, which is
faster than any asymmetric cryptographic primitive is. Start SDC-Net has
the minimum connectivity. Certainly, one can create a scheme in which
not all messages will be encrypted. However, such a strategy requires more
assumptions.
On the whole, PPP1 requires the computation of 2 ı˜ hash functions while
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protocols based on fully connected SDC-Nets require ı˜ 2 hash functions.
Thus, PPP1 is quadratically faster than protocols using fully connected
SDC-Net, e.g., LOP, cf. Section 3.2.2. Paillier is a fast AHEP and requires
more than 2 ı˜ modular exponentiations whose processing time depends on
the exponent size [LBPN12]. The argument ki||j is much smaller than n
from the Equation (3.2). Indeed, the bit length of ki||j can be less than half
than the bit length of a scalar for ECC, which is well known for having small
keys and, consequently, for being faster than other asymmetric primitives.
As an expected result, PPP1 is faster than protocols based on well-known
asymmetric primitives.
It is not possible to create an SDC-Net less connected than a fully con-
nected SDC-Net without assuming that users trust each other. For this rea-
son, PPP1 assumes the honest-but-curious trust model. Similarly, it is not
possible to create an SDC-Net less connected than a star SDC-Net without
assuming that an attacker cannot eavesdrop on messages in the aggregation.
PPP1 uses the minimum connectivity and computes only a hash function on
the user side. Considering these properties, one can conjecture that on the
user side, no other protocol that encrypts each measurement can be faster,
i.e., the encryption of PPP1 is the fastest possible with a very low lower
bound in comparison with previous protocols.
6.3 PPP2 Based on Commitments and ECC
PPP2 allows users to send their signed commitments directly to the
counting agent who can detect failures in the communication network. PPP2
assumes that the counting agent has an extra information channel to verify
the aggregation. For example, energy suppliers can receive information from
phasor measurement units (PMUs). In general, a supplier should know how
much of a commodity it inserted in its supply network. In like manner, the
number of voters in an election should be equal to the total number of votes
cast for all candidates and the number of ballots. In the supplier scenarios,
this information is called aggregated measurement aj and is used to detect
anomalies in the same round j before the supplier detects them in the billing
process. Figure 6.3 depicts the communication model of PPP2.
PPP2 uses ECC for users to create commitments. Since ECC is known
for providing short keys and for being efficient, it has been used in PPPs,
e.g., [LL12], [MMDFSI12], and [BM14a]. To keep this work as self-contained
as possible, Section 6.3.1 presents a short review of ECC. A description
of its theory is out of scope and may be found in textbooks [HMV03;
CFADLNV12; Kli07]. The motivations to use elliptic curves may be un-
derstood in Section 6.3.5. The aim is to present their benefit and how use
them in PPP2.
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Figure 6.3: Communication model of PPP2
6.3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Miller [Mil86] and Koblitz [Kob87] independently introduced ECC. The
core idea is to use the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) in a group struc-
ture on an elliptic curve over a finite field F.
An elliptic curve Ω over a field F is defined by the Weierstraß equation
Ω : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6, (6.5)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ F and its discriminant ∆ is different from zero, and
∆ = −d22d8 − 8d34 − 27d26 + 9d2d4d6
d2 = a21 + 4a2
d4 = 2a4 + a1a3
d6 = a23 + 4a6
d8 = a21a6 + 4a2a6 − a1a3a4 + a2a23 − a24.
An addition operation together with the set Ω of points that satisfy Sec-
tion 6.3.1 and an identity called point at infinity (∞) form an abelian group
Ω(F), i.e.,
Ω(F) =
{
(x, y) ∈ F× F | y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6
}
∪ {∞}.
This group structure can also be defined geometrically. Figure 6.4 depicts
the geometry of an elliptic curve over R. The addition of two points P and Q
can be found drawing a straight line through P andQ until the line intercepts
another point −(P + Q) whose reflection about the x-axis is P + Q, cf.
Figure 6.4a. If P = Q, we draw the tangent until it intercepts another point
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−2P whose reflection is 2P , cf. Figure 6.4b. We can also see that the identity
is out of the plane, namely P+Q−(P+Q) = 2P−2P = P−P =∞. Thus, if
P is an infection point then P +P = P −P =∞, cf. Figure 6.4c. Excluding
the inflection points, the others can be used as a trapdoor based on scalar
multiplication, cf. Figure 6.4d. Similarly to modular exponentiation, scalar
multiplication can be efficiently computed, cf. Algorithm 16.
x
y
•P
•Q
• −(P +Q)
• P +Q
(a) Addition P +Q over Ω(F).
x
y
• −2P
• 2P
⊙•P
(b) Doubling P + P over Ω(F).
x
y
•
P
•
Q
•
R
(c) Inflection points over Ω(F).
x
y
• −2P
• 2P
⊙•P
•−3P
•3P
•−4P
•4P
(d) Scalar multiplication over Ω(F).
Figure 6.4: Group structure on an elliptic curve.
In cryptography, elliptic curves are used over finite fields, and point ad-
ditions are used to compute the scalar multiplications, e.g., 7P = 2(2P ) +
2P + P . Thus, we can compute R = kP given k and P . However, scalar
multiplication is a cryptographic trapdoor, i.e., given R and P , it is compu-
tationally intractable to find an integer k s.t. R = kP . Finding k is known
as the discrete logarithmic problem over elliptic curves. Note that this thesis
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follows the notation in which uppercase are points in Ω and lowercase are
elements of the field F.
The equations from the group law to compute point addition can be
deduced from the geometry, and they can be simplified with Section 6.3.1
according to the characteristic of the field F.
6.3.2 Proposed Protocol
In the set-up phase, the counting agent and users agree on an elliptic
curve Ω with secure parameter, cf. Section 6.3.3, and on a secure hash
function s.t. it behaves as a one-way function and has collision resistance.
In addition, they also agree on a base point P ∈ Ω with high order, and each
user i chooses a permanent key ki ∈ F. Using a fully connected SDC-Net or
PPP1, the counting agent receives the sum s of the private keys ki, i.e.,
s
def.=
ı˜∑
i=1
ki. (6.6)
The hash function H is used to define a hash function HΩ over Ω(F) as
Rj = (x, y) = HΩ (j) def.=
(
min
({
r|r > H (j) and (r, y) ∈ Ω
})
, y
)
, (6.7)
where Ω is a subset of Ω that contains elements of high order, and x and y
are coordinates of a point in the curve.
For each round j, the users can commit and sign their measurements.
The commitment function is given by
Ci,j
def.= Commit(mi,j) def.= ki ·Rj + Value (mi,j) · P. (6.8)
where Rj = HΩ(j), s.t. || denotes string concatenation. Algorithm 6 de-
scribes the steps followed by the users. PPP2 can use any signature func-
tion.
Algorithm 6: PPP2 - Commitment
Input: Measurement mi,j .
Output: Signed and committed measurement Ci,j .
1 Ci,j ← Commit(v) // v.s. Equation (6.8)
2 Si,j ← Sign (Ci,j)
3 return C1,j ||Si,j
After users compute the commitment function, they sign their measure-
ments and send them directly to the counting agent who can verify the
bill b$i and also whether the consolidated monetary value c$j is equivalent
to the aggregated measurement aj . As the messages arrive, the counting
66
agent verifies the digital signature Si,j and, if they are correct, calculates
the aggregation
Aj =
ı˜∑
i=1
Ci,j .
Thereafter, the counting agent can perform the aggregated measurement
verification as well as PPP1. In addition, PPP3 can detect deceptive users
and enables billing verification.
6.3.2.1 Privacy-unfriendly Individual Measurement Verification
The counting agent can verify an individual measurement mi,j of a user
i who can just present mi,j and V = ki ·HΩ(j) to the counting agent. Thus,
they can compute
Open (Ci,j ,mi,j , V ) def.= (Ci,j ?= V + Value (mi,j) · P ), (6.9)
where Ci,j is the commitment of the measurement mi,j sent by the user i
to the counting agent in the round j. The commitment can be open iff the
Equation (6.9) is correct.
6.3.2.2 Aggregated Measurement Verification
With s, the counting agent opens the consolidated monetary value c$j of
the commitments calculating
Open (Aj , aj , s ·Rj)⇔ Aj ?= s ·Rj + c$j · P. (6.10)
Thus,
Open (Aj , aj , s ·Rj)⇔
ı˜∑
i=1
Ci,j
?=
(
ı˜∑
i=1
ki
)
·Rj + c$j · P (6.11)
but the Equation (6.11) holds when
c$j
?=
ı˜∑
i=1
Value (mi,j) . (6.12)
Therefore, the counting agent knows whether the consolidated consump-
tion cj is correct, because the consolidated monetary value c$j is given by a
function of the consolidated consumption cj that should be approx. the ag-
gregated measurement aj . If loss of energy is detected—v.s. Section 4.1.1—,
the counting agent can search for the proper value of c$j that opens the
commitment in Equation (6.10). If c$j is too high or too low, the consoli-
dated monetary value is wrong, i.e., the supplier defines the accepted losses.
Therefore, if they are correct, the counting agent knows the missing amount.
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Algorithm 7 describes the process of verifying the aggregated measurement
aj . The function Verify (Ci,j ||Si,j) returns true if the Ci,j matches with
its digital signature Si,j . Note that if a counting agent did not receive a
message, the signature is not verified after a period.
Algorithm 7: PPP2 - Aggregated measurement verification
Input: encrypted consolidated consumptions Cj and aggregated
measurement aj .
Output: Either Incorrect or Correct.
1 Aj ←∞
2 c$j ← aj
3 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
4 if Verify (Ci,j ||Si,j) then
5 Aj ← Aj + Ci,j
6 else
7 Apply policies
8 if Open
(
Aj , c
$
j , s ·Rj
)
then
9 return Correct
10 else
11 Apply policies
12 return Incorrect
6.3.2.3 Detecting Deceptive Users
Suppose that a user inserted a huge value to disrupt the communication
in the round j, and that the counting agent does not want to wait for the
bill b$i to detect the deceptive user i, cf. Table 4.1.
The counting agent can detect the source in log2( ı˜ ) steps, where ı˜ is
the number of users. The counting agent groups the users into two sets U1
and U2 and verifies from which set the problem comes. The counting agent
can group the users from the set with problems into two new sets again, and
can repeat the procedure until the counting agent detects the user. In the
first step, users can use a fully connected SDC-Net or PPP1 in order for the
set of users U1 to send
v1 =
∑
i∈U1
Value (mi,j) , (6.13)
and
V1 =
∏
i∈U1
Rkij . (6.14)
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Since the signed commitments Ci,j are known, the counting agent calculates∏
i∈U1
Ci,j
?= v1 · V1. (6.15)
If Equation (6.15) is correct and v1 is not a huge value, the counting agent
requests the other set of users to send
v2 =
∑
i∈U2
Value (mi,j) , (6.16)
and
V2 =
∏
i∈U2
Rkij . (6.17)
Similarly, the counting agent computes∏
i∈U2
Ci,j
?= v2 · V2. (6.18)
and verifies if Equation (6.18) is correct and v2 is not a huge value. Whereas
c$j = v1 + v2,
one of these values should be huge or one of the two equations should not
hold. Therefore, the counting agent knows which set has a problem and can
apply the same strategy recursively over the set with a problem. Certainly,
the counting agent might learn something about the users, for instance,
if a subset has no consumption. To minimize the leakage, users from the
set without a problem can be regrouped in the subsets generated by the
set with a problem. This strategy generates sub-consolidated consumptions
and allows the counting agent to detect the problem source with the same
number of steps. Algorithm 8 describes the process of detecting the set
with anomalous behavior. Recursive iterations of Algorithm 8 lead to the
detection of the deceptive users. For example, in the last interaction of the
search for the user that inserted a huge value, the counting agent knows that
one of two users sent the huge value. To verify without a breach of privacy,
each of them joins with a disjoint set of users. If one set is verified without
the huge value, the user of the other set has inserted it.
6.3.2.4 Billing Verification
Besides verification with the aggregated measurement aj , the counting
agent and a user i can verify the correctness of the bill b$i . The account is
similar to aggregated measurement verification in Section 6.3.2.2. However,
billing verification requires neither in-network aggregation nor an SDC-Net.
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Algorithm 8: PPP2 - Detecting deceptive users
Input: v1 and V1
// v.s. Equations (6.13), (6.14), (6.17) and (6.17)
Output: Set with problem.
1 Q←∞
2 foreach i ∈ U1 do
3 Q← Q+ Ci,j
4 if v1 is expected and Open (Q, v1, V1) then
5 return U2
6 else
7 return U1
To verify, the user i presents
Vi =
˜∑
j=1
ki · HΩ(j), (6.19)
and the counting agent calculates
Bj =
˜∑
j=1
Ci,j
and
Open
(
Bi, b
$
i , Vi
)
⇔ Bi ?= Vi + b$i · P. (6.20)
Thus,
Open
(
Bi, b
$
i , Vi
)
⇔
˜∑
j=1
Ci,j
?= ki ·
 ˜∑
j=1
Rj
+ b$i · P, (6.21)
where Rj = HΩ(j), but the Equation (6.11) holds when
b$i
?=
˜∑
j=1
Value (mi,j) . (6.22)
Therefore, the counting agent and each user i can verify whether the bill b$i
is correct. The Algorithm 9 describes the process of verifying the bill b$i .
6.3.3 Security Analysis
The PPP2’s security depends on elliptic curve parameters and the at-
tacker model, namely, a dishonest user and the information that the counting
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Algorithm 9: PPP2 - Billing verification
Input: Bill b$i and V1.
// v.s. Equation (6.19)
Output: Correctness of bill b$i .
1 Bi ←∞
2 for j ← 1 to ˜ do
3 Bi ← Bi + Ci,j
4 if Open
(
Bi, b
$
i , Vi
)
then
5 return b$i is correct
6 else
7 return b$i is incorrect
agent can get. Thus, the security analysis is divided into two parts, namely,
selection of secure parameters and attacker model.
The parameter selection for ECC is more complicated than for crypto-
graphic schemes based on Integer Factorization Problem (IFP). However, it
is harder to solve the DLP over ECC than to solve the DLP over a finite
group (G,~) of integers Z. Therefore, the size of the elliptic curve group
can be considerably smaller than the size of (G,~), cf. Section 6.3.5.
Menezes et al. [MVO91] presented an algorithm to solve the DLP over
supersingular elliptic curves with complexity sub-exponential and Smart
[Sma99] presented an algorithm to solve the DLP over prime-field anomalous
elliptic curves with polynomial complexity. A curve Ω is supersingular over a
finite field F iff the trace of Frobenius t is zero, i.e., t ≡ 0 mod p. Since t is
defined by Hasse’s theorem #Ω(Fq) = q+1−t, where |t| 6 2√q, then super-
singular curves generate groups with q+1 elements, i.e., #Ω(Fq) = q+1. A
curve Ω is prime-field anomalous iff t = 1, thus #Ω(Fp) = p. Schoof [Sch95]
presented an algorithm that determines the order of an elliptic curve group
#Ω(Fq) with logarithmic time O(log9 q), i.e., polynomial time with respect
to the bit-length of q. Thus, we can determine the group size and, there-
fore, if the curve is a supersingular or a prime-field anomalous elliptic curve.
Another factor that weakens the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (ECDLP) is the group structure. Specifically, if P = (x, y) is a based
point belonging to Ω(Fq) and generating a cyclic subgroup 〈G〉 ⊆ Ω(Fq) s.t.
〈G〉 = {kP : k ∈ Z}, then the security of the ECDLP is determined by
h = #Ω(Fq)# 〈G〉 .
The smaller h is, the better. If h = 1, Ω(Fq) is a cyclic group. For h 6 4,
we say that Ω(Fq) is almost cyclic. Therefore, we have three core factors to
verify, namely:
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• #Ω(Fp) 6= p excludes prime-field anomalous curves;
• t 6≡ 0 (mod p) excludes supersingular curves;
• h 6 4 excludes small subgroups of P .
Since the secure parameters are established, we can discuss what the
attacker can do. The set-up phase depends on the security of PPP1 or an
SDC-Net. In contrast to PPP1, the attacker might intercept the messages
and try to recover ki or mi,j from the commitment function defined in Equa-
tion (6.8). However, this is infeasible for secure parameters. Since messages
are signed, the attacker cannot compromise them and users cannot repudi-
ate them. The open function returns true iff the parameters are correct.
If users signed wrong messages, the counting agent can discover them by
re-aggregating the commitments or by awaiting the bill b$i , which can also
be verified.
Note that the counting agent can search small values of consolidated
monetary value c$j , which are close to aggregated measurement aj , but no
one can search large values like ki. More details can be found in Section 6.3.5
and Chapter 8.
6.3.4 Privacy Analysis
To keep privacy, the individual measurements should be protected. The
counting agent can verify the consolidated consumption cj , consolidated
monetary value c$j , and bill b$i iff equations hold in Algorithms 7 to 9,
respectively.
Measurements from the same user i or the same round j cannot be
related because of the hash function H.
Users might collude, but we should assume that at least 2 users are
honest. Since s in Equation (6.6) is the sum of all keys, ı˜ − 1 users need to
collude to disclose the key of one user. Without disclosing the key ki, users
cannot read an individual measurement mi,j from the user i. Therefore, the
collusion of ı˜ − 2 users is not enough to disclose one key.
Note that PPP2 has much weaker assumptions than PPP1, e.g., the
counting agent could collude with 2 users—2 is enough—to leak individual
encrypted measurements Mi,j with PPP1 from a user i. Moreover, PPP1
requires the honest-but-curious assumption and that the attacker cannot
have access to the aggregation process, whereas PPP2 does not require such
assumptions.
6.3.5 Performance Analysis
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in its FIPS
186-2 recommends some elliptic curves, Appendix B presents one of them.
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Scalar multiplication for ECC is well known to be faster than modular ex-
ponentiation used in schemes based on IFP or DLP. This section presents a
time complexity analysis. Details about processing-time may be found in the
simulation presented in Chapter 8. Molina-Markham et al. [MMDFSI12]
already showed the feasibility of running ECC on smart meters.
Scalar multiplication usually works in smaller numeric sets than modular
exponentiation with the equivalent level of security. Thus, ECC is known
to have smaller keys. Certainly, the set size and the key length depend on
the best algorithms to find the key. In the literature, the fastest algorithm
to solve the IFP [HMV03] asymptotically has complexity
exp
(((64
9
)1/3
+O(1)
)
(lnn)1/3(ln lnn)2/3
)
, (6.23)
where n is the product of two safe primes. Such an algorithm is known as
general number field sieve (GNFS). For integers of the form αβ + γ where α
and γ are small integers, the special number field sieve (SNFS) is faster than
the GNFS. The SNFS reduces the 64 in the numerator of Equation (6.23)
to 32. In contrast, the fastest algorithm found in the literature to solve the
DLP and, thus, ECDLP [HMV03] has complexity√
pio
2 , (6.24)
where o is the order of P . The key can be reduced, because the time com-
plexity of the ECDLP in Equation (6.24) is lower than the time complexity
of the IFP in Equation (6.23). Using (6.23) and (6.24), we can construct the
Table 6.1 to compare the effort of both algorithms with the effort required
by brute force attack. Algorithm 17 in Appendix A shows how to construct
the columns DLP, GNFS, and SNFS. The values in the column NIST are
recommended by NIST in the Special Publication 800-57–Part 1 (Revision
3–July 2012).
Table 6.1: Comparison between brute force and minimum key length.
Brute Force DLP GNFS NIST SNFS
80 160 851 1 024 1 449
112 224 1 853 2 048 3 199
128 256 2 538 3 072 4 403
192 384 6 707 7 680 11 787
256 512 13 547 15 360 24 000
Consequently, we can reduce the key size when its security is based on
the DLP or ECDLP. Moreover, the key size grows much slower for ECDLP
than for IFP. Therefore, protocols based on ECDLP tend to be exponen-
tially faster than PPPs based on IFP. Since PPP1 uses only two scalar
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Figure 6.5: Comparison between brute force and minimum key length.
multiplications to commit in Equation (6.8), PPP1 is not only fast, but also
increasingly faster than many other protocols for smart grid, cf. Chapter 3.
With the Table 6.1, we can plot the point to obtain a better visual-
ization. Moreover, we can use the brute force as reference—i.e., x-axis—
thus, the points generated by IFP can be fitted by the curve y = 2x, but
the points generated by ECDLP can be fitted by the exponential curve
y = 506.526 exp(0.0128886x). Figure 6.5 depicts the points with their fitted
curves.
6.4 PPP3 Based on Asymmetric DC-Nets
PPP3 can provide the same information as PPP1 and PPP2, but its com-
munication model is simpler than PPP1’s communication model. Figure 6.6
depicts the communication model used in PPP1. This is similar to PPP2
but PPP3 returns the decrypted consolidated monetary value c$j instead of
commitment verification. Moreover, PPP3 also provides verification as done
with commitments.
This protocol uses a technique called ADC-Nets [BBM14]. Specifically,
PPP3 uses a fully connected ADC-Net that is equivalent to a complete
graph. Section 6.4.1 presents the concept of ADC-Nets and their properties.
Section 6.4.2 describes the attacker model. Section 6.4.3 introduces the
ADC-Net for smart grids. Section 6.4.4 introduces the verification processes.
Section 6.4.5 discusses the security issues, and Section 6.4.6 talks about
privacy issues. Section 6.4.7 shows that PPP3 is efficient.
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Figure 6.6: Communication model of PPP3.
6.4.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Before the introduction of ADC-Nets [BBM14], the DC-Nets introduced
by Chaum [Cha88] were previously classified as symmetric [BDDKP05].
ADC-Nets are defined by properties and have other derived properties.
6.4.1.1 Properties from the Definition
ADC-Nets can be created with many cryptographic primitives. PPP3
uses an ADC-Net [BBM14], which runs over integers. An ADC-Net protocol
is defined by the following properties:
1 all properties of SDC-Nets, with the exception of unconditional secu-
rity;
2 security based on a cryptographic trapdoor function;
3 users can use permanent keys;
4 processing time has complexity at most polynomial;
5 non-iteration over the number of users, with exception of aggregation;
6 users send the minimum number of messages;
7 users can sign their messages;
8 similar to commitments, users can prove that their messages are sent
correct.
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With this definition, we can see an example of ADC-Net. To construct
an ADC-Net, assume that each user i has a private key ki, a fixed g s.t.
g ∈ Zn2 , and a product of two secret primes n s.t. n is generated by the
users [BF01]. Then, a family of functions that defines the encryption is given
by
Enc : Zn × Zn → Zn2
Enci(mi,j) 7→ (1 + n)mi,j · ghj ·ki mod n2,
(6.25)
where hj = H (j) with H being a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as a
one-way function and has collision resistance. Thus, the decryption function
is given by
Dec : Zn2 → Zn
Dec (Cj) 7→
(
Cj · g−ht·s mod n2
)
− 1
n
,
(6.26)
where s = ∑ ı˜i ki.
Let us verify whether these functions satisfy the properties given in the
definition.
Property 1 is strong but can be verified easily. The properties of SDC-
Nets come from the cancellation of their key, cf. Section 3.2.2. The keys
ki are canceled when their sum is equal to n. Two users 1 and 2 can allow
that the sum of their measurements be decrypted independent of the other
measurements. From the sum, we need the collusion of ı˜ − 1 to leak the
key of one user. Indeed, n in Equations (6.25) and (6.26) works as zero
in Equation (3.5). The process is non-iterative, i.e., users can send only a
broadcast or send their signed messages directly to a counting agent, but
they do not need to rely on a trusted third party (TTP).
Property 2 requires a cryptographic trapdoor function. We can see the
mathematical problem in Equation (6.25), i.e., solve ghj ·ki mod n2. Thus,
the security is based on the assumption that the DLP over Zn2 is intractable.
This assumption has been used in many schemes, e.g., [Pai99].
Property 3 protects the PPP against overhead to exchange new keys. It
is satisfied because the ki for all users i cannot be related in many encrypted
measurement due to the hash function H.
Property 4 enables encrypt and decrypt in the maximum of polynomial
time complexity. The most expensive operation in the process is modular
exponentiation that can be computed with logarithmic time with respect to
its exponent.
Property 5 requires that the encryption and the decryption functions
be free of iteration over the number of users. This is the case for Equa-
tions (6.25) and (6.26). The aggregation is the trivial case, where the mea-
surements of all users should be counted.
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Property 6 ensures communication efficiency, i.e., the minimum number
of messages sent per measurement mi,j is one. Using the encryption and
the decryption functions in Equations (6.25) and (6.26), users can send the
minimum number of messages.
Property 7 introduces non-repudiation, i.e., no user can deny the au-
thorship of any measurement mi,j . Since Property 1 allows a broadcast, the
messages can be signed. In fact, Property 7 is also satisfied in an SDC-Net,
but it is an explicit property of the definition to ensure a secure commitment
in Property 8.
Property 8 ensures verifiability in PPPs. A user i can send v s.t. v =
ghj·ki and the receiver can verify the measurement mi,j without discovery
ki. Verification of individual measurements is a privacy-unfriendly process
in ADC-Net schemes as well as commitment schemes. Users should send v
s.t. v = ∏ ghj ·ki and the sum of many measurements ∑mi,j .
After the verification of the properties, we have an example of an ADC-
Net given by the encryption and the decryption functions in Equations (6.25)
and (6.26). In the following, let us verify more two interesting properties
derived from ADC-Net.
6.4.1.2 Derived Properties
The first statement is: Paillier is a particular case of ADC-Net. To
verify this statement, let us consider a more complicated ADC-Net with the
encryption function given by
Enc : Zn × Zn × Zn 7→ Zn2
Ei(mi,j , ki, ri,j) 7→ (1 + p)mi,j · hkij rn mod n2,
(6.27)
where n is the product of two safe primes, hj ∈ Zn2 s.t. hj > n and
hj = H (j), and H is a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as a one-way
function and has collision resistance. Thus, the decryption function is given
by
Dec : Zn2 7→ Zn
Dec(Cj) 7→ L((Cj · hn−s2 )λ mod n2) · d mod n,
(6.28)
where d = L(gλ mod n2)−1, Cj = Enc (cj), cj is the consolidated consump-
tion, and
s
def.=
ı˜∑
i=1
ki.
Equations (6.27) and (6.28) are similar to Paillier’s equations given by Equa-
tions (3.2) and (3.4).
If we give up some ADC-Net properties and make k1 = 0 for all user
i, the result of Equation (6.27) is equal to Equation (3.2) and the result
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of Equation (6.28) is equal to Equation (3.4). Therefore, Paillier encryp-
tion and decryption functions are particular cases of an ADC-Net. Other
schemes that satisfy the ADC-Net properties can be reduced to Paillier, e.g.,
[BM14b].
The second statement is: all AHEPs are particular cases of ADC-Nets.
To verify this statement, let us only consider AHEPs that are probabilistic
encryption schemes with at most polynomial processing time complexity.
The creation of AHEPs that are not probabilistic encryption enable attacker
to relate the encrypted measurements, cf. Section 2.2.2.3. AHEPs that have
higher complexity are not scalable. Thus, we cannot say that PPP2 has an
AHEP in Equation (6.8). Therefore, PPP2 is not based on an ADC-Net.
From the probabilistic encryption property, we have
Dec(Encr1(mi,j)Encr2(mi,j)) = 2mi,j
but
Encr1(mi,j) 6= Encr2(mi,j).
This happens because there is a special number n that cancels the random
numbers ri, e.g., w = rni mod n2 remembering that
∀ w ∈ Z∗n2 ,
{
wλ ≡ 1 mod n
wnλ ≡ 1 mod n2,
where λ is Carmichael’s function λ = λ(n) = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) [EPS91].
Thus, we can split up n in many keys s.t.
r  n = r  (k1 ⊕ k2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ k ı˜ ).
We can use a hash function H as pseudo-random number generator. Hence,
we can use the hash function H with hj = H (j) and the cryptographic
trapdoor s.t.
v = hj  ki
works as a verifier for a commitment. For security reasons, the round j
must never repeat. Since it is a temporal sequence of events by definition of
round, each round j has a different value of j. After the aggregation in the
round j, we have
hj  k1 ⊗ hj  k2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ hj ⊗ k ı˜ = hj ⊗
ı˜⊕
i=1
ki = hj ⊗ n.
Therefore, splitting up a special number, we can construct an ADC-Net for
each AHEP.
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6.4.1.3 ADC-Nets and their Applications
ADC-Nets are a generalization of AHEPs. However, the former can be
much more efficient than the latter, because a randomized number can be
split. The latter is normally called homomorphic encryption, because the
primitives can be used to derive other operations, for instance, multiplica-
tion. The former can also be used to compute other operations. However,
the operation should be applied to all measurements. Each AHEP is a par-
ticular case of an ADC-Net. In addition, this result might also be true
for fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09], which can compute all circuits
with encrypted measurements. Research in fully homomorphic encryption
is promising but still in development and too expensive for smart meters.
Practical homomorphic encryption schemes have been used in different
levels of applications. Examples of these are protocols for e-voting [CGS97],
reputation systems [Ker09], trust [DKC08], sensor networks [PWC10], multi-
party computation [CDN01], e-cash [CLM07], mobile sensing [LC13], image
processing [ZH13], and smart grids [RN13]. Indeed, AHEPs may be applied
in many other applications that require protection of privacy.
Similar to AHEP, SDC-Nets are applied in many scenarios. However,
SDC-Nets as well as ADC-Nets can enforce privacy. Thus, the respective
PPPs should be adapted to this enforcement, but this is not an obligation,
because a star ADC-Net can be set in a similar way that a star SDC-Net is
used in PPP1 to behave like an AHEP. Indeed, ADC-Nets as well as SDC-
Nets can behave as an AHEP. Therefore, all PPPs that use an AHEP can
be updated with ADC-Nets.
Solutions based on AHEPs neither enforce privacy by means of aggrega-
tion nor security, because the private key might be compromised. In fact,
some institutions—and perhaps, attackers—can decrypt individual measure-
ments. In contrast, SDC-Nets or ADC-Nets can enforce security and privacy,
which can only be kept if the aggregations can only be decrypted with the
participation of all users. Thus, individual measurements cannot be de-
crypted. In addition, they are still fault tolerant, because users send their
measurements directly to their counting agent, which can detect problems in
the communication channel and can re-initialize the protocols for the correct
users. The unique information lost belongs to the fault measurements, but
the protocols continue to work. To maintain security, the leakage of some
keys is not enough to compromise PPPs based on SDC-Nets and ADC-Nets.
They are compromised with the leakage of all keys but one. Theoretically,
SDC-Nets can ensure perfect secrecy using truly random keys only once, as
a Vigenère-Vernam-Shannon scheme, better known as the One-time pad.
It is necessary to highlight that the PPPs should be updated to enforce
privacy. Without enforcement by cryptography, the right to privacy will
likely be violated.
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6.4.2 Attacker Model
PPP3 assumes the possibility that an attacker might access and control
some meters. Equivalently, we can say that many users might have mali-
cious behavior. From the DC-Nets property, the collusion of ı˜ − 1 users
is necessary to disclose data from one user. Thus, if 2 users are honest,
their keys cannot be disclosed. However, their privacy has a high risk of
leakage because the consolidated monetary value only has the aggregation
of two measurements. Therefore, the number of honest users determines the
number of measurements aggregated to protect the customers’ privacy. Re-
garding to the trust model, the users are considered malicious, but a number
of users should behave honestly, cf. Chapter 5.
6.4.3 Proposed Protocol
In the set-up phase, the users and their counting agents agree on a
product of primes n, for instance as given in [BF01]. Each user i chooses a
private key ki, the counting agent chooses a private key k0, and subsequently,
they determine
s
def.=
ı˜∑
i=0
ki
with an SDC-Net in a way that the counting agents know s. They can use
PPP1 or the fully connected SDC-Net. With the initial parameters, users
can compute the encryption function defined by
Enc : Zp × Zn → Zn2
Enci(mi,j) 7→ (1 + n)mi,j + ghj+ki mod n2,
(6.29)
where hj = H (j) with H being a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as a
one-way function and has collision resistance.
Each user i encrypts the measurement mi,j with the Algorithm 10 and
sends the resultMi,j directly to the counting agent. Hence, if a message does
not come on time or the signature does not match, the counting agent knows
whom to request the message to be re-sent. Indeed, the counting agent can
apply any policies. For example, it can send an employee to verify user’s
meter or sets up the protocols again, excluding the user.
After the encryption of the measurements, the aggregation is given by
Cj
def.=
ı˜∏
i=1
Mi,j mod n2, (6.30)
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Algorithm 10: PPP3 - Encryption
Input: Measurement mi,j .
Output: Signed and encrypted measurement Mi,j .
1 hj ← H(j)
2 Mi,j ← Enc (mi,j)
3 Si,j ← Sign (Mi,j)
4 return Mi,j ||Si,j
and the description function is given by
Dec : Zn2 → Zn
Dec (Cj) 7→
(
Cj · g− ı˜ ·ht−s mod n2
)
− 1
n
,
(6.31)
where s = ∑ ı˜i ki.
The counting agent can aggregate with the Algorithm 11 when the mes-
sages are arriving. However, the Algorithm 11 only returns the consolidated
monetary value after all encrypted measurements were aggregated.
Algorithm 11: PPP3 - Aggregation and Decryption
Input: Encrypted measurements Mi,j and their digital signature
Si,j .
Output: Consolidated monetary value c$j .
1 cj ← 1
2 for j ← 1 to ˜ do
3 if Verify (Mi,j ||Si,j) then
4 Cj ← Cj ·Mi,j mod n2
5 else
6 Apply policies
7 c$j ← Dec(Cj)
8 return c$j
Algorithm 11 might be split in two: one for aggregation and another for
description. In this case, the counting agent can outsource the aggregation
process and runs only Line 7 to decrypt the consolidated monetary value.
6.4.4 Verification Property
In contrast to the other PPPs presented in this chapter, PPP3 enables
users and their counting agent to verify the consolidated monetary value and
bill with decryption. PPP3 can compute everything that PPP2 computes.
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In addition, PPP3 can decrypt the consolidated monetary value c$j . In fact,
the verifications work as commitment schemes do [Ped92]. Hence, it is even
possible to verify single measurements, but this is not a privacy-friendly
procedure.
6.4.4.1 Privacy-unfriendly Individual Measurement Verification
ADC-Nets enable verification similar to commitment schemes. Hence,
we can define a process of verifying the values as done in open functions
for commitment schemes and PPP2. For sake of simplicity, the verification
is presented without such open functions. Thus, this section presents the
equations to verify the encrypted measurements.
To verify an individual measurement mi,j , a user i just sends mi,j and
v = ghj+ki mod n2 to the counting agent that computes
Mi,j
?= (1 + n)Value(mi,j) · v mod n2, (6.32)
where Mi,j is the encrypted measurement that was previously sent by the
user. They can verify whether the Equation (6.32) is correct. If it is incor-
rect, then the encrypted measurementMi,j corresponds to the measurement
mi,j and v. Otherwise, the presented measurement does not match the en-
crypted measurement and v. Therefore, Equation (6.32) holds iff its values
are correct.
6.4.4.2 Aggregated Measurement Verification
In case of the virtualization of a supplier—cf. Section 4.1.2—, the count-
ing agent may need to prove that the consolidated monetary value is correct.
Toward this aim, it shows that
Cj
?= c$j · v mod n2, (6.33)
where v = g− ı˜ ·hj−s. Then, anyone can verify whether the values are correct.
Algorithm 12 describes aggregated measurement aj verification for PPP3.
6.4.4.3 Detecting Failures and Deceptive Users
Since the messages are signed, the counting agent knows their sender.
Thus, if the digital signature Si,j is verified and the consolidated monetary
value c$j has an unexpected value, a meter sent a wrong measurement mi,j
due to failures or an exploited vulnerability. For example, an energy supplier
can detect that cj does not match values provided by a PMU. In this case,
the counting agent can discover the respective user during the billing process;
cf. Table 4.1.
Suppose that a user i sent a huge measurement mi,j to disrupt the com-
munication. Hence, the counting agent can detect the sender in log2( ı˜ )
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Algorithm 12: PPP3 - Aggregated measurement verification
Input: encrypted measurements Mi,j with their digital signature
Si,j and aggregated measurement aj .
Output: Either Incorrect or Correct.
1 Cj ← 1
2 for i← 1 to ı˜ do
3 if Verify (Ci,j ||Si,j) then
4 Cj ← Cj ·Mi,j mod n2
5 else
6 Apply policies
7 return Incorrect
8 c$j ← Dec (Cj)
9 if c$j ≈ Value (aj) then
10 return Correct
11 else
12 Apply policies
13 return Incorrect
steps, where ı˜ is the number of users. Similar as in PPP2, the counting
agent groups the users in two sets U1 and U2 and verifies if the user belongs
to U1 or to U2. The set with a problem can be re-grouped in an iterative
process until the counting agent detects the user. Then, using PPP1 or the
fully connected SDC-Net, the first set of users sends
v1 =
∑
i∈U1
Value (mi,j) , (6.34)
and
v2 =
∏
i∈U1
ghj+ki mod n2. (6.35)
With the encrypted measurements Mi,j , the counting agent computes
∏
i∈U1
Mi,j
?= (1 + n)v1 · v2 mod n2. (6.36)
If Equation (6.36) is correct and v1 is an expected value, the deceptive
user belongs to U2, otherwise, to U1. Algorithm 13 describes the process of
detecting if the user belongs to U1 or to U2. The users can be rearranged in
two new sets to reduce the number of users in the subset with a problem.
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Algorithm 13: PPP3 - Detecting deceptive users
Input: U1, U2, v1 and v2
// v.s. Equations (6.34) and (6.35)
Output: Set with problem.
1 r ← 1
2 foreach i ∈M1 do
3 r ← r ·Mi,j mod n2
4 if v1 is expected and r ?= (1 + n)v1 · v2 mod n2 then
5 return U2
6 else
7 return U1
6.4.4.4 Billing Verification
In the billing verification process, the user i sends the bill b$i and v to
the counting agent, where
b$i =
˜∑
j=1
Value (mi,j)
and
vi =
˜∏
j=1
ghj+ki mod n2. (6.37)
The counting agent already has the encrypted measurementsMi,j signed by
the user i, hence it is enough to compute
Bi =
˜∏
j=1
Mi,j mod n2, (6.38)
Bi
?= (1 + n)b$i · vi mod n2, (6.39)
and to verify whether Equation (6.39) is correct or not. Algorithm 14 de-
scribes the billing verification process.
6.4.5 Security Analysis
PPP2 and PPP3 are very similar in their properties and features, but in
contrast to PPP2, PPP3 can decrypt encrypted consolidated consumption
Cj . Moreover, PPP3 is based on an ADC-Net, which ensures several inter-
esting properties, e.g., users might send one signed message directly to their
counting agent, all the computations can be verified, TTP is not necessary,
etc. The ADC-Net used in PPP3 is based on the DLP over integers Zn and
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Algorithm 14: PPP3 - Billing verification
Input: Bill b$i , encrypted measurements Mi,j , and Vi.
// v.s. Equation (6.37)
Output: Correctness of bill b$i .
1 vi ← 1
2 for j ← 1 to ˜ do
3 vi ← vi ·Mi,j mod n2
4 if Bi ?= (1 + n)b
$
i · vi mod n2 then
5 return b$i is correct
6 else
7 return b$i is incorrect
IFP, i.e., its security depends on the assumption that it is intractable to
find a key ki given ghj+ki mod n2, where g ∈ Zn2 , n is a product of hidden
primes [BF01], hj = H (j), and H is a secure hash function s.t. it behaves
as a one-way function and has collision resistance. The assumption that the
DLP over integers Zn is intractable has been used in other cryptographic
schemes, e.g., [Pai99].
Based on the DLP, the Algorithm 10 encrypts the measurement mi,j in
a way that only the owner of ki can decrypt mi,j . Collusion can disclose a
key ki iff ı˜ − 1 users collude. The Algorithm 11 can decrypt the encrypted
measurement Mi,j iff all measurements in the round j were aggregated.
The Algorithm 12 returns “Correct” iff the aggregated measurement aj is
correct. The Algorithm 13 can be used iteratively to determine who sent a
signed encrypted measurement Mi,j with a wrong value. The Algorithm 14
return “bill b$i is correct” iff the bill b$i is correct.
6.4.6 Privacy Analysis
Similar to PPP1 and PPP2, the privacy in PPP3 depends on the neg-
ligible probability that a secure hash function returns the same hj = H (j)
for different rounds j. If H (α) = H (β) for some α and β, then the en-
crypted measurements can be related s.t. Mi,α = Mi,β iff mi,α = mi,β. If
mi,α 6= mi,β, then Mi,α ·M−1i,β = (1 + n)mi,α−mi,β . Thus, an attacker can
know mi,α −mi,β if the hash function returns values with collision. Since
we assume a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as a one-way function and
has collision resistance, it returns different hashes hj = H (j) for different
rounds j.
PPP3 assumes that anyone can decrypt consolidated monetary values c$j ,
and therefore, anyone knows s = ∑ ki. If the decryption is not supposed to
be public, then attackers can eventually disclose s. Thus, they can decrypt
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consolidated monetary values c$j . Attackers can guess or know
c$j0 =
ı˜∑
i=1
mi,j0
for anytime j0. Afterwards, they can compute
gs = g− ı˜ ·hj0 ·
ı˜∏
i
Mi,j0 · (1 + n)−c
$
j0 mod n2,
where c$j0 is the consolidated monetary value for the round j0 and number
of users is the number of users. After that, they can learn
c$j =
ı˜∑
i
mi,j
for arbitrary round j. If s should be secret, users and their counting agent
should use the ADC-Net given by Equation (6.25) instead of the ADC-Net
given by Equation (6.29).
6.4.7 Performance Analysis
PPP3 gives us consolidated monetary values c$j with verifications. PPP1
gives us consolidated monetary values c$j , and PPP2 gives us verifications.
Running PPP1 in parallel with PPP2 to give the consolidated monetary
values c$j with verifications results in two messages per measurement mi,j
instead of one message. Other PPPs also need two messages per measure-
ment mi,j , e.g., [BDBBM14]. PPP3 needs only one.
The size of n is determined by the IFP and the size of the keys ki
is determined by the DLP, cf. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5. The operation
that requires more processing time is modular exponentiation and its time
depends on the exponent size [LBPN12], cf. Algorithm 15.
PPP3 given by Equation (6.29) is faster than the ADC-Net given by
Equation (6.25), because H (j) ·ki has around twice as many bits of H (j)+ki
if H (j) and ki have approx. the same size.
Comparing the exponent sizes, PPP3 tends to have approx. the same
processing time as PPP2. In addition, PPP3 returns consolidated monetary
values c$j when PPP2 needs a brute force to recover consolidated monetary
values c$j . Therefore, PPP3 is the most suitable PPP.
6.5 PPP4 Based on Quantum Mechanics
Einstein et al. [EPR35] drew attention to the fact that quantum mechan-
ics has unusual properties in comparison to classical mechanics. Meanwhile,
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experiments around the world have confirmed quantum theory. Nowadays,
these quantum properties can also be used in cryptography, e.g., a test
bed showed that quantum cryptography could protect PMUs [HNMNPS13].
In fact, quantum mechanics can be used to construct quantum computers,
which are more powerful than classical computers. For example, the for-
mer can solve the IFP and DLP in polynomial time [Sho97], while no such
solution based on the latter can be found in the literature. More counter-
intuitive, quantum computation enables one to find an element in an un-
sorted database with complexity O(
√
n) [Gro96], where n is the number of
elements. A review of search algorithms, quantum computation, and quan-
tum cryptography may be found in [Por13; NC00; BEMRR07], respectively.
PPP4 is presented—without the monetary value—in the literature [BSM14]
along with a PPP based on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). The liter-
ature presents different kinds of QKD used in a smart grid [HNMNPS13;
ZLW12]. PPP4 is a preliminary protocol based on quantum mechanics, i.e.,
it leaves many challenges in engineering [Imr13]. Quantum mechanics can
be used for cryptography independent of quantum computers. Currently,
quantum cryptography is still not used to protect privacy, but it is already
used to provide security [NP13].
6.5.1 Cryptographic Primitives
The Dirac notation is commonly adopted in quantum mechanics. Hence,
a symbol called “ket” is used to denote a vector, i.e., ~ψi = |ψi〉 = |i〉. A
corresponding symbol called “bra” is used to denote the dual vector, i.e.,
~ψi
∗ = 〈ψi| = 〈i|. Thus, the inner product between two vectors |i〉 and |j〉 is
called “braket” and denoted as 〈ψi|ψj〉 = 〈i|j〉. Similarly, the outer product
between |i〉 and |j〉 is denoted as |i〉〈j|, and the tensor product between |i〉
and |j〉 is denoted as |i〉 ⊗ |j〉 = |i〉|j〉 = |i, j〉.
We need to assume four postulates of quantum mechanics.
The first postulate states that a unit vector in a Hilbert space can com-
pletely describe the state of any isolated system. Similar to classical
bits, the smallest unit of quantum information is a quantum bit called
qubit and may be seen as a two-state description. Thus, a qubit is
described by a two-dimensional space, i.e., we can write an arbitrary
qubit as |ψ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉, where α, β ∈ C and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1 = 〈ψ|ψ〉.
Similarly, a qudit is a unit vector in a d-dimensional space.
The second postulate states that a unitary matrix describes the evolu-
tion of a closed quantum system. Often, the matrices are named ei-
ther transformations or operators. Therefore, the steps of PPP4 are
described by the composition of unitary transformations acting on a
vector space.
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The third postulate states that the state space of a composite system
is the tensor product of its components, e.g., the state of two-qubit
composite system |1〉 and |0〉 is described by the tensor product |1〉 ⊗
|0〉 = |1, 0〉. Surprisingly, not all two-qubit state can be decomposed
into the tensor product of two qubits, e.g., the linear combination
given by
1√
2
|1〉 ⊗ |0〉+ 1√
2
|0〉 ⊗ |1〉 = 1√
2
(|1, 0〉+ |0, 1〉)
cannot be decomposed into the tensor product of two qubits. The
impossibility of decomposition of any state is called entanglement, and
we say that the state is entangled.
The fourth postulate states that the process of retrieving the informa-
tion of a state is given by a quantum measurement, and a set {Mm} of
measurement operators describes quantum measurements, where the
index m refers to the possible output from the measurement equip-
ment. Thus, before the quantum measurement, each output is asso-
ciated with a probability, and after the quantum measurement, we
have the state of the system. Therefore, a measurement in quantum
mechanics is probabilistic and irreversible.
With these postulates, PPP4 can be constructed. Its first version was
published in [BSM14]. Briefly, the counting agent creates an entangled state
and sends it to the users who encrypt their measurements mi,j with the
entangled state and send results to the counting agent. To decrypt, the
counting agent makes a quantum measurement and gets the consolidated
monetary value.
6.5.2 Proposed Protocol
In contrast to previous PPPs presented in this chapter, PPP4 does not
have a set-up phase and users do not need to have a key. PPP4 assumes
that the communication is authenticated, but an attacker might try to read
the messages. The counting agent can be curious and try to read individual
measurements mi,j .
The counting agent starts the protocol with N particles s.t. N is equal
to or bigger than the maximum number of users ı˜ and biggest possible con-
solidated monetary value. Then, the counting agent prepares an entangled
state
|E0〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ı˜ (N − n), n, n, . . . , n︸ ︷︷ ︸
ı˜ times
〉
(6.40)
and sends the site Ui to the user meter, where the sites are defined by
|ψ0〉S ⊗ |ψ1〉U1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ ı˜ 〉U ı˜ = |ψ0, ψ1, . . . , ψ ı˜ 〉 and the site S belongs to
the counting agent. Thus, each user accesses only one site.
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After receiving the site, each user i encrypts the measurement mi,j with
the phase shifting operation exp( ı NˆUiδi), where NˆUi |n〉Ui = n|n〉Ui ,
δi =
2piValue (mi,j)
N + 1 , (6.41)
and ı is the imaginary unit. Hereafter, the state of the composite system is
changed. After the first user encrypts, we have
|E1〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
exp( ı nδ1)| ı˜ (N − n), n, n, . . . , n〉.
After the second user, we have
|E2〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
exp( ı n(δ1 + δ2))| ı˜ (N − n), n, n, . . . , n〉, (6.42)
etc. After all ı˜ users encrypt their measurements mi,j , we have
|E ı˜ 〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
n=0
exp( ı n∆)| ı˜ (N − n), n, n, . . . , n〉,
where
∆ =
ı˜∑
i=1
δi. (6.43)
The consolidated monetary value is given by
c$j =
ı˜∑
i=1
Value (mi,j) , (6.44)
Thus, substituting Equations (6.41) and (6.44) into Equation (6.43), we have
∆ =
2pic$j
N + 1 . (6.45)
Before users send their encrypted measurement, the counting agent has ac-
cess only to the mixed state
TrU1···U ı˜ (|E ı˜ 〉〈E ı˜ |) =
1
N + 1
N∑
n=0
(|n〉〈n|)S , (6.46)
because only the site S is accessible. Similarly, the user i has access only to
the site Ui and, therefore, the mixed state
TrSC1···Ui−1Ui+1···U ı˜ (|E ı˜ 〉〈E ı˜ |) =
1
N + 1
N∑
n=0
(|n〉〈n|)Ui . (6.47)
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After the encryption, the users send their site Ui back to the counting agent.
Decrypt means to make a quantum measurement with the following states
|Tn〉 = 1√
N + 1
N∑
k=0
exp( ı kθn)| ı˜ (N − k), k, k, . . . , k〉, (6.48)
where θn = 2pin/(N + 1). Note that 〈Tn|Tm〉 = δnm for all n,m ∈ {0, .., N},
where δnm is the Dirac delta function. Thus, {|Tn〉 : n = 0, ..., N} is an
orthonormal basis. Then, the states |Ei〉 are all eigenvectors of the operator
Tˆ =
N∑
n=0
n|Tn〉〈Tn|, (6.49)
where |Tn〉〈Tn| is the projector onto the eigenspace of Tˆ with eigenvalue n.
Thus, the projective measurement gives us the average value of the measure-
ment that is the expectation value of Tˆ , which can found by 〈Em|Tˆ |Em〉.
Note that
〈E ı˜ |Tn〉 = 1
N + 1
N∑
k=0
exp( ı k(θn −∆))
= 1
N + 1
exp( ı αn(N + 1))− 1
exp( ı αn)− 1 ,
(6.50)
where αn = θn −∆ = 2pi(n− c$j )/(N + 1). From Equation (6.50), we have
〈E ı˜ |Tˆ |E ı˜ 〉 =
N∑
n=0
n 〈E ı˜ |Tn〉 〈Tn|E ı˜ 〉
= 1(N + 1)2
N∑
n=0
n
(1− cos(αn(N + 1))
1− cosαn
)
=
c$j
ı˜
.
(6.51)
Therefore, the counting agent decrypts the encrypted consolidated consump-
tion and gets the c$j by means of a quantum measurement. Figure 6.7 depicts
the communication between the users and their counting agent.
6.5.3 Security Analysis
In contrast to the first three PPPs presented in this chapter, PPP4 is
based on postulates of physics, i.e., it is based on the description of physi-
cal reality given by quantum mechanics instead of mathematical problems.
Equation (6.47) ensures that a user cannot get information from others.
Neither can the counting agent due to Equation (6.46). The counting agent
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Figure 6.7: Quantum communication model for PPP4.
could prepare a non-entangled state and send it to a user. However, the
users can check whether their sites are entangled with each other. If a user
checks, all users will realize that the entangled sites are being checked.
On the one hand, PPP4 as well as PPP1 can only provide the consoli-
dated monetary value c$j . They do not enable verification of the measure-
ments nor bill b$i . Thus, a user i can disrupt the communication by sending
a huge measurement mi,j , and the counting agent cannot detect i. On the
other hand, PPP4 is resistant against quantum computers. PPP1 might also
be resistant depending on the hash function H. In general, SDC-Nets can
provide perfect secrecy under the restriction that the keys be used only once.
Protocols based on IFP or DLP are not resistant against quantum comput-
ers. There is a research area called post-quantum cryptography whose idea
is to develop classical cryptographic algorithms resistant against quantum
attackers [Ber09]. Currently, one of its challenges is reducing the processing
time and key size [BPP12]. Considering Shor’s algorithm [Sho97] and the
threatening construction of a quantum computer [BL07], quantum cryptog-
raphy and post-quantum cryptography are promising research areas.
6.5.4 Privacy Analysis
To decrypt the consolidated monetary value c$j , the counting agent needs
to make a quantum measurement of all sites. Quantum measurements of
individual sites in order for the counting agent to obtain an individual mea-
surement mi,j destroy the other sites, because they are entangled. If the
counting agent colludes with ı˜ − 1 users and they try to make a quantum
measurement in all ı˜ − 1 sites, then the missing site becomes inaccessible.
However, the counting agent can collude with ı˜ − 1 users to get the mea-
surements from 1 user. Nevertheless, the collusion with ı˜ − 2 users is not
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enough. The counting agent can access the consolidated monetary value c$j
only once, because the quantum measurements are irreversible. Since they
are also probabilistic, quantum measurement without all particles reduce
the accuracy of the result. The particles used to create the entangled state
return from the users’ site to the counting agent’s site. Therefore, the count-
ing agent can only access all particles, but if not, only partial information
is accessible.
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Chapter 7
Analytical Comparison
This chapter presents a comparison between Privacy-Preserving Proto-
cols (PPPs) for smart metering systems. Specifically, it compares the PPPs
described in Chapters 3 and 6 with each other. To provide a more general
comparison, the PPPs in Chapter 3 represent a class of protocols. Specifi-
cally, Algorithm 1 [Pai99] is an additive homomorphic encryption primitive
(AHEP) used in many PPPs for smart grids, e.g., [LLL10; RN13]. Instead of
comparing protocols that use Algorithm 1, we can have a class of “AHEP”
to compare. Another class is “homomorphic signature (HS)”, which also
has been used in PPPs for smart grids, e.g., [LL12; YL13]. Symmetric
DC-Nets (SDC-Nets) can be connected in many ways, e.g., star [BM14a]
and randomly connected [AC11]. However, similar to PPP1, they need
a specific trust model with more assumptions than a fully connected SDC-
Net [KDK11; ET12]. To keep the comparison more general, this chapter ad-
dresses the class “SDC-Net” as a fully connected SDC-Net, cf. Algorithm 2.
The class “matching” represents PPPs with a homomorphic commitment
scheme with a matching AHEP, e.g., [BDBBM14]. One can use multiple
protocols together to compose a protocol that can fulfill the requirements in
Section 4.2, for instance, PPP1 running along with PPP2. Another example
is found in [BM14a]. However, the performance of such multi-protocols are
dependent on the sum of the cost of their protocols, and security and pri-
vacy are based on the weakest protocol. In contrast to the classes, Chapter 6
presents the PPPs one after another. Particularly, PPP3 represents Asym-
metric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets). A comparison between individual protocols
can be found in [BDBBM14; BM14b; BVM15].
Sections 7.1 and 7.2 present a discussion about security and privacy, re-
spectively. Section 7.3 distinguishes the PPPs by requirements as described
in Section 4.2, namely recoverability of bill b$i and of consolidated monetary
value, verification, and computational efficiency. The two last requirements
are important. For this reason, Sections 7.4 and 7.5 present a discussion
about verification and performance, respectively. Section 7.6 finalizes this
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chapter with a comparison between SDC-Nets, AHEPs, and ADC-Nets.
7.1 Security
Table 7.1 shows to what extent the protocols have the following proper-
ties: freedom of trusted third party (TTP), anti-collusion, and fault toler-
ance. Considering that only the counting agent has the private key, aggre-
gators are semi-trusted parties. Thus, TTP is any organization used in the
protocol to do more than aggregation. For example, a TTP can set up the
keys. Anti-collusion ensures that the counting agent cannot collude with a
TTP or with the aggregator. Protocols using in-network aggregation have
a virtual aggregator; cf. Section 3.2.1. However, parts of such a virtual
aggregator can collude with the counting agent. Access control can be used
to avoid collusion [RN13], but this is not an intrinsic property of AHEP
neither PPP1. Moreover, one who grants access might also collude. Sim-
ilarly, fault tolerance with respect to the communication can be achieved
with a TTP [JK12], but again it is an intrinsic property of neither AHEP
nor of PPP1. Nevertheless, protocols are fault tolerant when they allow the
counting agent to identify the failures in the communication and to restart
the protocols without the meters with failures in the communication, e.g., a
commitment function with digital signature. Multi-protocols may be fault
tolerant, depending on their parts; for instance, if a multi-protocol uses an
SDC-Net and a commitment function with digital signature, then it can be
fault tolerant. Contrarily, if one part is not fault tolerant, the whole multi-
protocol cannot be, for instance, [BM14a]. Fault tolerance with respect to
processing and storage are not in the scope of PPPs.
In general, the security of PPPs depends on mathematical problems, e.g.,
Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP),
and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Differently, com-
mitments can be unconditionally secure [Ped92] depending on the group
used. Similarly, SDC-Net can be unconditionally secure if the keys are used
only once [Cha88]. In practice, commitment schemes depend on digital sig-
natures, and SDC-Nets depends on a secure hash function s.t. it behaves as
a one-way function and has collision resistance. The security of the four pro-
tocols presented in Chapter 6 depends on a hash function H, a hash function
HΩ with ECDLP, a hash function H with DLP and IFP, and entanglement,
respectively. Instead of breaking the protocols, an attacker might get some
information depending on the communication network as described in Sec-
tion 2.2. Sections 6.2.1, 6.3.3, 6.4.5 and 6.5.3 present a discussion about
security of PPP1 to PPP4, respectively.
In summary, only SDC-Net, Commitments, PPP2, and PPP3 are simul-
taneously free of TTP, anti-collusion, and fault tolerant. The differences
between them can be seen in the next sections.
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Secure.
Protocol TTP Anti-collusion Fault Problem
Free tolerance
AHEP yes no no IFP,DLP, etc.
SDC-Net yes yes yes H
HS yes no no ECDLP
Commitments yes yes yes IFP,DLP, etc.
Matching yes no no IFP,DLP, etc.
PPP1 yes no no H
PPP2 yes yes yes H and ECDLP
PPP3 yes yes yes H, IFP and DLP
PPP4 yes yes no quantum cryptography
7.2 Privacy
The second column of Table 7.2 indicates the protocols that need some
sort of aggregator other than the counting agent. A virtual aggregator
can be done with in-network aggregation, but it is also an aggregator; cf.
Section 3.2.1. The third column shows the number of users required in
collusion to cause a leak of privacy. The fourth column indicates if the
counting agent needs to collude. The last column shows if the counting
agent is able to decrypt individual measurements mi,j .
Although commitments might be unconditionally secure, ı˜ −1 users can
collude to disclose information from one user. PPP4 enables the counting
agent to decrypt individual measurementsmi,j . However, the counting agent
loses the consolidated monetary value c$j . The number ı˜ − 1 for collusion
is the maximum number of users necessary to disclose the measurements
of one user. This is a threshold for all PPPs including SDC-Nets that can
be considered unconditionally secure when the keys are used only once and
there is no collusion. The counting agent can have a key in schemes based
on SDC-Nets and SDC-Nets. In this scenario, the counting agent should
also collude.
In summary, only SDC-Net, Commitments, PPP2, and PPP3 are the
better protocols for privacy. They do not need an external aggregator. In
addition, they only reveal information from a user if all others collude, and
the counting agent needs to collude. Moreover, the counting agent cannot
decrypt individual measurements mi,j .
7.3 Requirements
This section shows the requirements fulfilled by PPP. They are described
in Section 4.2, namely: recoverability of bill b$i , recoverability of consolidated
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Privacy.
Protocol Aggregator Collusion Counting agent mi,j
AHEP yes 1 yes yes
SDC-Net no ı˜ − 1 no no
HS yes 1 yes yes
Commitments no ı˜ − 1 yes no
Matching yes 1 yes yes
PPP1 yes 1 yes yes
PPP2 no ı˜ − 1 yes no
PPP3 no ı˜ − 1 yes no
PPP4 no ı˜ − 1 no yes
consumption, verification, and computational efficiency. The PPPs should
fulfill each requirement in polynomial time. Otherwise, the requirement is
not considered fulfilled. For example, all protocols in Chapter 6 can retrieve
consolidated monetary values c$j . However, PPP2 needs an exponential com-
plexity time to find the correct c$j . Thus, if a user tries to disrupt the com-
munication sending a huge measurement mi,j , the consolidated monetary
value is also huge and the counting agent needs to solve the ECDLP to find
c$j . Therefore, PPP2 does not provide consolidated monetary values c$j in
polynomial time. Note that users would not become attackers because they
can be discovered with PPP2’s verification.
The second column of Table 7.3 indicates the protocols that used aj
to validate consolidated monetary values. Although few of them had used
aj [BDBBM14], all of them can use it. The third column indicates the
protocols that are considered b$i . In particular, Jawurek et al. [JJK11] pre-
sented a commitment scheme in which the measurementsmi,j can stay in the
meters, which only send commitments to the supplier. Afterwards, Molina-
Markham et al. [MMDFSI12] presented the performance of different com-
mitments in low-cost microcontrollers. Despite b$i already being required in
a non-smart grid, the majority of the published papers have only considered
cj . For example, PPPs [LLL10; RN13] based on Paillier [Pai99], HS [LL12;
YL13], SDC-Net as protocols presented in [KDK11; ET12; AC11], and even
protocols based on quantum mechanics [BSM14]. The fourth column in-
dicates the protocols that have provided c$j in polynomial time. The fifth
indicates protocols that have considered verification. Section 7.4 presents a
discussion about verification. The last column provides an overview of the
efficiency, which has a description in Section 7.5.
In summary, only PPP3 has addressed all the requirements.
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Table 7.3: Comparison of requirements between PPP.
Protocol aj b$i c$j Verification Efficiency
AHEP no no yes no no
SDC-Net no no yes no no
HS no no no yes yes
Commitments no yes no yes yes
Matching yes yes yes yes no
PPP1 yes no yes no yes
PPP2 yes yes no yes yes
PPP3 yes yes yes yes yes
PPP4 yes no yes no no
7.4 Verification Property
Users and their counting agent should be able to verify whether the
values of bill b$i and consolidated consumption cj are correct. In addition, the
counting agent should be able to verify whether there are errors in message
transmissions, energy losses or frauds, and if some users are deceptive. In
practice, deceptive users may represent failures in measurement, processing,
or communication. Moreover, PPPs should detect the meters with failures.
Table 7.4 shows these verification capabilities. HS might detect deceptive
users, if the counting agent stores all measurements and searches on them,
resulting in invasion of privacy. In addition, it is possible to enable billing
verification under the same circumstances, but it has not been considered in
the literature. One might say that protocols based on Paillier can have all
properties in the Table 7.4. However, it can be achieved only with a TTP,
similar to PPP1.
Table 7.4: Comparison of Verification Capabilities.
Protocol b$i cj Transmission Error Deceptive Users
AHEP no no no no
SDC-Net no no yes no
HS no yes yes yes
Commitments yes no yes no
Matching yes yes yes yes
PPP1 no no no no
PPP2 yes yes yes yes
PPP3 yes yes yes yes
PPP4 no no no no
To perform the verification, the counting agent needs to store only one
product of encrypted measurements Mi,j per verifiable value [BDBBM14],
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e.g., one product per bill b$i .
In summary, only matching, PPP2, and PPP3 have full capabilities of
verification.
7.5 Performance
Asymptotic complexity analysis gives an overview of the performance.
However, two algorithms can have the same complexity, but one can be
much more efficient than another can. For example, the Paillier scheme
works on a group Zn, where n is the product of two safe primes, and a
matching [BDBBM14] works on a group Z4n+1. Thus, the Paillier scheme is
more efficient, but both have the same time complexity O(log(n)), which is
determined by the modular exponentiation [LBPN12]. Similarly, SDC-Nets
have time complexity O( ı˜ ) for encryption and decryption, but the former
needs to compute ı˜ hash functions and the latter needs to compute ı˜ addi-
tions. The aggregation for SDC-Nets happens together with the decryption
and the processing cannot be split. Thus, Table 7.5 presents this result as
Not Applicable (NA). Besides SDC-Nets, other protocols have time com-
plexity O( ı˜ ) for the aggregation. However, PPP1 needs ı˜ additions, while
PPP2 and HS need ı˜ operations over elliptic curves. Normally, others need
ı˜ modular multiplications over integers. Thus, the processing times are dif-
ferent although the complexities are equal. The Table 7.5 shows the time
complexity for encryption, aggregation, and description for respective pro-
tocols, where ı˜ is the number of users, ˜ is the number of rounds, n has
size of IFP, and p has size of DLP; cf. Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5. PPP4
does not appear because its nature is different from the others. The en-
cryption is done with a unitary transformation and the decryption with a
quantum measurement. Although commercial products have used entan-
gled states [Imr13; BSM14], Almeida et al. [AMMSWRD07] presented a
time limitation for keeping the states entangled, and therefore, a problem
for scalability.
Table 7.5: Comparison of Processing Time.
Protocol Encryption Aggregation Decryption
AHEP O(log(n)) O( ı˜ ) O(log(n))
SDC-Net O( ı˜ ) NA O( ı˜ )
HS O(log(k)) O( ı˜ ) O(k)
Commitments O(log(k)) O( ˜ ) O(k)
Matching O(log(n)) O( ı˜ ) O(log(n))
PPP1 O(1) O( ı˜ ) O( ı˜ )
PPP2 O(log(k)) O( ı˜ ) O(k)
PPP3 O(log(k)) O( ı˜ ) O(log(k))
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There are two more issues for complexity, namely communication and
storage. The Table 7.6 shows the complexity to set up the protocols, the
number of keys per users to protect the privacy, and the number of messages
per measurement. Also, it shows whether users send messages directly to the
counting agent. The set-up phase of all protocols can be done rapidly with a
TTP, but TTP is a single point of failure. Thus, it should be used only when
strict necessary. In the ideal situation, each user has only one key to protect
the privacy and sends only one message per measurement directly to their
counting agent who can detect failures in the communication. Commitment
schemes do not require keys, thus, this is NA. PPP4 does not require a
key stored, but the counting agent should send the particles to each user i
for each round j. Matching requires two messages per measurement mi,j ,
and multi-protocols require at least two. Using in-network aggregation, the
counting agent might receive only one message per round j, instead of the
number of users ı˜ . However, this technique obstructs the counting agent to
detect failures in the communication. The overload of the counting agent
can be minimized using lossless aggregation [BHSSDKB11].
Table 7.6: Comparison of Communication.
Protocol Setup Key Message Direct
AHEP O( ı˜ ) 1 1 no
SDC-Net O( ı˜ 2) O( ı˜ ) 1 no
HS O( ı˜ ) 1 1 no
Commitments O( ı˜ ) NA 1 yes
Matching O( ı˜ ) 1 2 no
PPP1 O( ı˜ ) 1 1 no
PPP2 O( ı˜ ) 1 1 yes
PPP3 O( ı˜ 2) 1 1 yes
In summary, Table 7.5 shows that PPP1 is the most efficient to encrypt,
while SDC-Nets are the least efficient. However, SDC-Nets are faster than
PPP1 in decryption. SDC-Nets does not need aggregation, the others are
equivalent. Excluding PPP1, the best processing time for encryption and
decryption is O(log(k)). Table 7.6 shows that SDC-Net and ADC-Net have
the heaviest setup, but it is the most secure. PPP3 might use PPP1 in
its set-up phase to reduce the communication cost and to have setup O( ı˜ ).
Besides commitment schemes that do not have cryptographic key, the best
protocols are PPP2 and PPP3.
7.6 Summary
Although the literature contains many PPPs, there are few primitives to
protect privacy. HS and commitments do not decrypt in polynomial time. In
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addition, considering matching as AHEPs with a commitment scheme, then
we have only SDC-Nets, AHEPs, and ADC-Nets to encrypt and decrypt
the measurements. Note that PPP1 is a star SDC-Nets and PPP2 has
no decryption as well as other commitment schemes, i.e., the consolidated
monetary value c$j cannot be recovered in polynomial time. The Table 7.7
summarizes the comparison between SDC-Net, AHEP, and ADC-Net.
Table 7.7: Comparison between SDC-Nets, AHEPs, and ADC-Nets.
Properties SDC-Net AHEP ADC-Net
Collusion of O( ı˜ ) X X
Set of trusted users X X
Messages to the counting agent X X
Minimum number of messages X X X
Scalable X X
Permanent keys X X X
Based on trapdoors X X X
Keys stored per user 2( ı˜ − 1) 1 1
Total of keys O( ı˜ 2) 2 O( ı˜ )
Polynomial time X X X
One cannot disrupt X
Verification as commitment X
ADC-Nets have all the benefits of SDC-Nets and AHEPs. The three
primitives enable users to send the minimum number of messages per mea-
surement mi,j , users and their counting agent can use permanent keys, and
the security is based on a trapdoor. Note that a hash function H should be
irreversible and can be considered as a one-way function. Since AHEP and
ADC-Net are asymmetrical, they are also based on a cryptographic trap-
door. Only SDC-Nets and ADC-Nets avoid collusion, because O( ı˜ ) users
should collude to leak information from only one user. Not all users need to
be in the aggregation process, i.e., only the set of trusted users in an SDC-
Net or an ADC-Net. AHEPs can decrypt individual measurements, thus it
does not have the concept of trusted users. They and their counting agent
can set up an SDC-Net or an ADC-Net for users to send messages directly
to their counting agent. Thus, users can sign their messages, and the count-
ing agent can detect failures in the communication. Since the complexity
of the algorithms for AHEPs and ADC-Nets has polynomial time over the
key sizes, they are scalable. In contrast, each user using a fully connected
SDC-Net should iterate over all users, i.e., ı˜ . Thus, SDC-Nets are not scal-
able in relation to the number of users ı˜ . Note that the counting agent
has same problem using PPP1. Nevertheless, PPP1 is ı˜ times faster than a
fully connected SDC-Net—for instance, LOP—; cf. Sections 3.2.2 and 6.2.
Only AHEPs and SDC-Nets require only one key per user to protect pri-
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vacy, i.e., without considering the keys to sign the messages. An AHEP has
only one public-private key pair. Nevertheless, ı˜ is the minimum number
of keys to avoid decryption of individual measurements. In addition, only
ADC-Nets avoid disruption of the communication and have verification like
commitment. The former can prevent malicious users from disrupting the
communication by injecting huge measurements, because they can be discov-
ered. The latter enable users and their counting agent to verify values—for
instance, consolidated consumption cj and bill b$i—similar to commitment
schemes.
The benefit of AHEPs is the key distribution, i.e., one public-private
key pair. Despite that, SDC-Nets and ADC-Nets can replace AHEPs in
PPPs. PPP1 is an example of an SDC-Net that can behave as an AHEP.
Moreover, each AHEP is a particular case of an ADC-Net, i.e., ADC-Nets
are generalizations of AHEPs, cf. Section 6.4.1.
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Chapter 8
Simulation and Validation
Time complexity analysis assesses the behavior of the algorithms asymp-
totically. However, simulation is necessary to assess differences between
Privacy-Preserving Protocols (PPPs) in a realistic scenario. Many values
change the behavior of the algorithms, for instance, measurements mi,j ,
number of users ı˜ , number of rounds ˜ , etc. For this reason, the parame-
ters and dataset used should be as close to real as possible.
Section 8.1 presents the real-world dataset used, its inconsistencies
found, and how it was sanitized. Section 8.2 presents the tools used to
implement the core algorithms of the PPPs. Section 8.3 presents the pa-
rameters used in the algorithms, and Section 8.4 presents the simulation
results that validate the performance analysis.
8.1 Dataset
A total of 6 435 meters located in Irish homes and businesses collected
measurements every 30 minute for one and half year. The first round refers
to the consumption from 00:00:00 to 00:29:59 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)
on Tuesday, July 14, 2009. The last round refers to the consumption from
23:30:00 to 23:59:59 GMT on Friday, December 31, 2010. Thus, the dataset
was composed of 25 726 rounds, namely one and a half years for every half
hour. The number of measurements in the raw dataset is 157 992 996, but
it should be the product of the numbers of meters by rounds.
Section 8.1.1 presents the inconsistencies found in the dataset. Sec-
tion 8.1.2 presents how the dataset was sanitized. Section 8.1.3 presents the
dataset characteristics, i.e., the amount of information in the dataset.
8.1.1 Anomalies
This work detected some inconsistencies in the dataset [BM14b]. They
are the registry of unknown failures or attacks. In general, they register
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anomalies generated in the data collection. Specifically, the meters ad-
dressed as 1208 and 5221 sent two different measurements in the same round
j. The measurementmi,j represents the consumption of a meter i in a round
j. Therefore, for fixed value of i and j, the measurement mi,j has a unique
fixed value. The Table 8.1 shows the 24 duplicated measurements found in
the raw dataset in which 12 are surely wrong.
Table 8.1: Duplicated measurements.
Date Timestamps KW Meter
Sat 24 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29748 0.41 File1.txt:1208
Sat 24 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29748 0.461 File1.txt:1208
Sat 24 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29748 0.388 File5.txt:5221
Sat 24 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29748 0.992 File5.txt:5221
Sun 25 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29848 0.143 File1.txt:1208
Sun 25 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29848 0.415 File1.txt:1208
Sun 25 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29848 0.401 File5.txt:5221
Sun 25 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29848 1.312 File5.txt:5221
Mon 26 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29948 0.201 File1.txt:1208
Mon 26 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29948 1.006 File1.txt:1208
Mon 26 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29948 1.205 File5.txt:5221
Mon 26 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 29948 1.312 File5.txt:5221
Tue 27 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30048 0.212 File1.txt:1208
Tue 27 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30048 1.671 File1.txt:1208
Tue 27 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30048 1.182 File5.txt:5221
Tue 27 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30048 1.38 File5.txt:5221
Wed 28 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30148 0.576 File1.txt:1208
Wed 28 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30148 1.019 File1.txt:1208
Wed 28 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30148 0.522 File5.txt:5221
Wed 28 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30148 0.896 File5.txt:5221
Thu 29 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30248 0.163 File1.txt:1208
Thu 29 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30248 0.456 File1.txt:1208
Thu 29 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30248 0.386 File5.txt:5221
Thu 29 Oct 2009 23:59:59 GMT 30248 0.463 File5.txt:5221
The first three digits of a timestamp represent a date and are called
date address, while the last two digits represent an hour and a minute and
are called time address. Since the meters collected the measurements with
intervals of 30 minutes, there are 48 time addresses per day, namely 1 is the
interval from 00:00:00 to 00:29:59, 2 is the interval from 00:30:00 to 00:59:59,
3 is the interval from 01:00:00 to 01:29:59, etc. However, the raw dataset
has 25 002 messages with time addresses bigger than 48, but none were set
to zero and no entry in the dataset is negative. The great majority of the
time addresses are set with 49 and 50. Table 8.2 shows the quantity of
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messages with time addresses bigger than 48 grouped by the date address.
In addition, Table 8.2 shows the date with respect to the date address.
The dataset description does not specify these values, but 12 568 and 11 874
messages may be in the raw dataset due to daylight saving time on the
last Sunday of October in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Besides daylight
saving time, the raw dataset contains 20 measurements with undocumented
time addresses from 49 to 50. In addition, it contains 540 messages with
undocumented time addresses from 51 to 95. Among them, 90 messages
have date addresses equal to 298, i.e., they were in Sun 25 Oct 2009. Note
that 94× 5 + 90− 20 = 540 and 540 + 20 + 12 568 + 11 874 = 25 002.
Table 8.2: Undocumented timestamps.
Quantity Date Address Date
94 297 Sat 24 Oct 2009
12658 298 Sun 25 Oct 2009
94 299 Mon 26 Oct 2009
94 300 Tue 27 Oct 2009
94 301 Wed 28 Oct 2009
94 302 Thu 29 Oct 2009
11874 669 Sun 31 Oct 2010
These inconsistencies are important to draw attention to the fact that
PPPs should be able to verify whether the bills b$i are correct and whether
the consolidated consumptions cj are in agreement with the aggregated mea-
surements aj .
8.1.2 Sanitized Dataset
Since the PPPs cannot verify and cannot request new measurements,
the inconsistencies were eliminated from the dataset, including the probable
results from daylight savings time. For this performance analysis, such data
are not relevant. However, it has a financial impact, because a total of only
263 messages with time addresses bigger than 48 reported measurements
equal to zero.
The timestamps determine the rounds i. Thus, each meter should have
collected 25 726 measurements. The missing measurements were filled as
zero. For the privacy point of view, it is important that all meters contribute
to consolidated consumption cj . Otherwise, few meters might send their
measurements. As a result, an attacker might get information of a specific
pattern of power consumption. In addition, the verification processes will
not work, because the counting agent cannot decide whether all messages
were received. Moreover, if the meters do not report null measurements
mi,j , attackers know when there is no consumption.
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The raw dataset has 1 557 479 measurements equal to zero. After the
elimination of the anomalies, the number of zeros were 1 557 216. In order
for each meter i to contribute in each round j, the unreported messages
were filled with zeros. Thus, the sanitized dataset has 7 578 840 more zeros
than the raw dataset, resulting in 9 136 056 zeros. Therefore, the sanitized
dataset has 165 546 810 measurements collected by 6 435 meters in 25 726
rounds.
From now on, this chapter uses only the word dataset to refer to the
sanitized dataset.
8.1.3 Dataset Characteristics
This section highlights some variances in the data set and aims to give
a tangible idea of the values in the dataset, because they can change the
performance of PPPs. For example, modular exponentiations of the mea-
surements have performance depending on them [LBPN12]. Some informa-
tion that influence the performance is in the previous section, for instance,
fully connected Symmetric DC-Nets (SDC-Nets) depend on the number of
meters in the encryption algorithm.
(a) Box plot with outliers. (b) Box plot without outliers.
Figure 8.1: Box plot of measurements.
The Figure 8.1 depicts the distribution of measurements. The Fig-
ure 8.1a depicts the box plot of all measurements mi,j for all meters i and
all rounds j. The lower measurement mi,j has zero value and the higher has
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a value of 66 815 Watts. The outliers are expected due to the high differ-
ence between the median given by 256 and the arithmetic mean marked as
a red dot and given by approx. 673.39. Figure 8.1b depicts the box plot
without outliers and we may see the difference between the median and the
mean marked as a red dot. Excluding outliers, the maximum value of mea-
surement is given by 1 469, and the minimum is still zero. The upper and
lower quartiles are given by 653 and 109, respectively. Note that the mean
is bigger than the upper quantile meaning outliers beyond the upper inner
fences.
The biggest arithmetic mean of measurements grouped by meter is ap-
prox. 19 869.38, and the smallest is approx. 0.26. Appendix C presents
Figure C.1 that depicts the bar plot of the arithmetic mean of all measure-
ments collected per each meter. The Figure 8.2 depicts the variations of
the arithmetic means in the Figure C.1. As the measurements in the Fig-
ure 8.1a, the box plot of their arithmetic mean depicted in the Section 8.1.3
has many outliers. Thus, the Figure 8.2b depicts the box plot without out-
liers. Excluding them, its smallest mean is still the same, but its biggest is
approx. 1 277.9. Its lower quartile is approx. 316.2, and its upper quartile
is approx. 703.69. Its median is approx. 488.64, but the arithmetic mean
of the means is approx. 673.39. Different from the Figure 8.1, the mean is
behind the upper quantile in the Figure 8.2.
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(a) Box plot with outliers.
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(b) Box plot without outliers.
Figure 8.2: Box plot of measurement arithmetic means grouped by meter.
The distribution generated by measurements might be different by
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months or days of the week. The Figure 8.3 depicts the mean consumption
by month, while Figure 8.4 depicts the consumption by days of the week.
The Figure 8.3 depicts a bar plot of the arithmetic mean of measurements
grouped by year and month. We can observe that the electricity consump-
tion decreases from the beginning of year to the middle of the year, and it
increases from the middle to the end of the year. Moreover, the reported
consumption in 2009 was bigger than in 2010. The pattern in Figure 8.3
might be correlated with the seasons, especially, with the winter.
The minimum is approx. 558.75 and occurs in December 2009. The lower
quartile given by approx. 591.04 is represented by May of 2010. The means
of June, July, and September of 2010 are between the lower quartile and
minimum. The means of July and August of 2009 and April and October of
2010 are between the lower quartile and the median given by approx. 652.49,
which is close to the mean given by approx. 672.84. The means of September
and October of 2009 and March and November of 2010 are between the
median and the upper quartile given by approx. 767.3 is represented by
November of 2009. The means of January, February, and December of 2010
are between the upper quartile and the maximum given by approx. 832.54
and is represented by December of 2009. Figure 8.3a depicts a bar plot of the
arithmetic means grouped per months and years, and Figure 8.3b depicts a
box plot of them.
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Figure 8.3: Arithmetic mean of the all measurements grouped by month.
The Figure 8.4 depicts the arithmetic mean of the measurements grouped
by days of the week. On weekends, the consumption is smaller than on week-
days. Considering Sundays as an outlier, the minimum is approx. 655.26
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and refers to Saturdays. The median is approx. 682.94 and refers to Fridays,
and the mean is approx. 673.28. The lower quartile is approx. 667.56 and
smaller than Mondays. The upper quartile is approx. 687.39, bigger than
Thursdays and smaller than Wednesdays. The maximum is approx. 692.96
and occurs on Tuesdays. Figures 8.4a and 8.4b depict a bar plot and a box
plot of the means grouped by days of the week, respectively.
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat
500
550
600
650
700
Days of the Week
M
ea
n
(W
at
ts
)
(a) Bar plot.
630 640 650 660 670 680 690
Mean Measurements (Watts)
(b) Box plot.
Figure 8.4: Arithmetic mean of the all measurements grouped by days of
the week.
In general, the size of the measurements mi,j has a small influence on
the processing time of each encryption algorithm and has a smaller influ-
ence on the processing time of the aggregation and decryption algorithms.
Specifically for PPP3, the size of the consolidated consumption cj has a
strong influence in the search for its value. The processing time of PPP3
may define if it can be used as encryption-decryption scheme or only as a
commitment scheme. Figure 8.5 depicts the box plot of the number of bits
used per consolidated consumption cj .
8.2 Implementation of the Core Algorithms
The source codes of the cryptographic algorithms encryption, aggre-
gation, decryption, commit, and open were implemented for the PPPs,
namely, PPP1, PPP2, PPP3, Paillier—that is used in many protocols—,
and EPPP4SMS [BM14b]. The decryption of PPP3 was implemented as an
open function for commitments. The algorithms were implemented without
optimizations, e.g. without precomputation. Thus, the simulation used the
modular exponentiation instead of modular multi-exponentiation given in
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Figure 8.5: Number of bits used per consolidated consumption.
Algorithm 15.
The algorithms were written in the C programming language and com-
piled with GCC version 4.6.1 for GNU/Linux with the Ubuntu distribution.
They were linked with the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library
(GMP), the Open Multi Processing (OpenMP), and the open source toolkit
for SSL/TLS (OpenSSL). GMP was used to manipulate big numbers. OpenMP
was used to parallelize the encryption. OpenSSL was used to run the hash
function.
The simulation ran in a machine with Intelr Xeonr, CPU E5-2660 of
2.20GHz, 32 recognized cores, and 63 Gigabytes of shared memory.
8.3 Simulation Parameters
This simulation ran with the same hash function for all PPPs. Previ-
ous simulations ran with different hash functions to give an advantage to
SDC-Net, but this strategy is not enough to make a fully connected SDC-
Net faster than other PPPs [BM14a]. Simulations of SDC-Net, Pascal, etc.
with the same dataset and with different hash functions were previously
done [BM14b; BM14a]. The hash function chosen for this thesis simulation
was SHA256.
Asymmetric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets) are represented by Low Overhead
protocol (LOP) [KDK11], which only uses 32 bits of the hash function;
cf. Section 3.2.2. Similarly, PPP3 only uses 160 bits of the hash function.
Accordingly, the keys for LOP and PPP3 have 32 and 160 bits, respectively.
PPP1 PPP1 has the same sizes that LOP has, i.e., 32 bits. PPP2 has 160
bit of key-length. EPPP4SMS [BM14b] has two keys of 160 bits.
Only for comparison, the elliptic curve Ω(Zp) selected was the P-192
standardized by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in
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its publication FIPS 186-2. The Appendix B describes the P-192. Given
Ω and the hash function H, then HΩ is defined in the Equation (6.7). The
function HΩ searches for the first x bigger than H (j) that satisfies
x
p+1
2 ≡ 1 mod p,
and it determines
y = x
p+1
4 mod p.
In addition, it computes a scalar multiplication of the point (x, y) by n as
defined in the Appendix B. If the result is different from the point of infinity,
the program returns an error message. Such computation ensures that the
function HΩ returns a safe point, i.e., a point with high order. Nevertheless,
this curve has h = 1—cf. the Appendix B—and such computation is not
necessary for h = 1.
Paillier, EPPP4SMS, and PPP3 require the product of two primes with
512 bits each. In this case, their product has 1024 bits. They are chosen by
the pseudorandom-number generator implemented in the GMP. Using the
same generator, the key size is determined by the smaller security level in
the Table 6.1, which also gives us the smaller difference of processing time
between the protocols.
To speed up the simulation the encryption algorithms were parallelized
in 30 threads.
8.4 Simulation Results
Before presenting the processing time collected per each round of each
algorithm, let us find whether PPP2 can be used as an encryption-decryption
function. The Figure 8.6 depicts the processing time for the number of
threads to search for the consolidated monetary value given the encrypted
consolidated consumption in PPP2.
On the one hand, the supplier runs the most computationally intensive
part of PPP2. In contrast to the meters, the supplier has enough compu-
tational power to search for the consolidated monetary values c$j . On the
other hand, the meters need to run a light computation over an elliptic curve.
With this scenario, we may consider the PPP2 as an encryption-decryption
scheme instead of only a commitment scheme. Note that the supplier can
search with much more than 32 threads. In addition, the supplier can use
the aggregated measurement aj to speed up the search for the consolidated
monetary value c$j . Considering the number of bits necessary for the search
is approx. 22—cf. Figure 8.5—, then the search spends less than 2 sec-
onds for PPP2 to find a c$j , cf. Figure 8.6. The time can be significantly
reduced with information from the phasor measurement units (PMUs), i.e.,
the aggregated measurements aj .
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Figure 8.6: Parallel brute force search for a c$j in PPP2.
8.4.1 Encryption Algorithms
Figure 8.7 depicts the box plot of the time observed per round j for the
running time of the encryption algorithms.
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Figure 8.7: Box plot of encryption algorithms.
As expected, the PPP1 is the fastest with a processing time of approx.
16.9 milliseconds per round. LOP has the same key-length as PPP1, but
it is the most expensive with a mean of more than 10s per meter. PPP1
computes ı˜ hash functions per round, where ı˜ is number of users, while LOP
computes ı˜ 2 hash functions. Surprisingly, LOP ran approx. 10 times faster
than expected, i.e., approx. ı˜ × 0.0169 = 6435× 0.0169 = 108.7515 instead
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of 10.4582s. Probably, LOP was fast due to automatic optimizations for
parallelization and hardware. Although PPP2 and PPP3 have the same key-
length, PPP3 is more than twice as fast as PPP2 on average. As expected,
PPP3 has processing time close to two times faster than EPPP4SMS. Paillier
ran in approx. 1s per round, i.e., 10 times faster than LOP.
Table 8.3: Time observed for encryption algorithms in seconds.
PPP1 PPP2 PPP3 LOP EPPP4SMS Paillier
Min. 0.0117 0.4390 0.1895 10.2162 0.3790 1.0796
Lower Quartile 0.0155 0.4467 0.1941 10.3937 0.3835 1.0843
Mean 0.0169 0.4510 0.1957 10.4582 0.3866 1.0876
Median 0.0168 0.4490 0.1955 10.4482 0.3877 1.0858
Upper Quartile 0.0180 0.4518 0.1972 10.5127 0.3887 1.0875
Max. 0.0219 0.4595 0.2017 10.6912 0.3964 1.0922
Table 8.3 shows the result of the statistical analysis used to plot Fig-
ure 8.7. The maximum and minimum in the Table 8.3 were computed with-
out the outliers.
The collected time for EPPP4SMS does not consider the hash function
for elliptic curves HΩ given in Equation (6.7). The computation of HΩ is
not efficient. PPP3 is feasible only if the meters distributed the task and
compute only one hash for all meters. Figure 8.8 depicts the processing time
to compute HΩ. Section 8.4.1 depicts all collected times, while Figure 8.8b
depicts the observed processing time excluding the outliers. The minimum
time is approx. 1.171ms, the lower quartile is approx. 1.186ms, the median
is approx. 1.205ms and is relatively far from the mean that is approx.
1.219ms, the upper quartile is approx. 1.234ms and the maximum observed
time is approx. 1.306ms.
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Figure 8.8: Box plot of the hash for elliptic curves HΩ.
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8.4.2 Aggregation Algorithms
Figure 8.9 depicts the box plot generated by the time observed for the ag-
gregation algorithms. Note that the spot for LOP is empty because it is the
only protocol that does not need an aggregation algorithm. Precisely, LOP
aggregates the encrypted measurementsMi,j , but its aggregation cannot be
split from the decryption algorithm. Thus, all the cost for aggregations is
in the decryption algorithm.
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Figure 8.9: Box plot of aggregation algorithms.
Excluding LOP, PPP1 is the fastest to aggregate with a mean of approx.
0.028ms. As expected, PPP2, EPPP4SMS, and Paillier have equivalent run-
ning time with mean of 21.9030ms, 24.1553ms, and 24.4537ms, respectively.
They have the same parameter size and use the same code in C language as
follows:
start_clock ();
mpz_set_ui(st ,1); // st = 1
for(i=0;i <6435;i++) {
// commands equivalent to st = st*C[i] % n^2
mpz_mul(s, st , C[i]); // multiplication
mpz_mod(st , s, n2); // modulo
}
end_clock(prod);
However, the primes, the keys, etc. are generated pseudo-randomly.
PPP2 has a different code and works over an elliptic curve resulting in a
running time of approx. 27.4186ms. Although Elliptic Curve Discrete Log-
arithm Problem (ECDLP) works with smaller numbers than Integer Factor-
ization Problem (IFP), the point addition requires subtractions, inversion,
squaring, and multiplication over a field.
Table 8.4 shows the data of running time used to plot Figure 8.9. Since
LOP has no aggregation algorithm, its column in the Table 8.4 contains
Not Applicable (NA). For LOP, the aggregation happens together with the
decryption. The Max. and Min. are given without considering the outliers.
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Table 8.4: Time observed for aggregation algorithms in milliseconds.
PPP1 PPP2 PPP3 LOP EPPP4SMS Paillier
Min. 0.0230 23.2690 18.9830 NA 19.4940 19.4670
Lower Quartile 0.0240 25.3330 20.0950 NA 22.7190 20.5480
Mean 0.0280 27.4186 21.9030 NA 24.1553 24.4537
Median 0.0240 27.0340 21.2580 NA 24.3070 25.3160
Upper Quartile 0.0250 29.1840 23.6170 NA 24.9070 27.3920
Max. 0.0260 34.6080 28.6980 NA 28.1410 30.0810
8.4.3 Decryption Algorithms
Figure 8.10 depicts the box plot of the observed running time in mil-
liseconds for the decryption algorithms per round.
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Figure 8.10: Box plot of decryption algorithms.
PPP1 is approx. 11 times slower than PPP, which is approx. 2 times
slower than PPP3, which is approx. 14 slower than LOP. Excluding the
outliers, LOP is the fastest to decrypt. PPP2 is approx. 7 times faster than
EPPP4SMS and 2.5 times faster than Paillier. Considering that the times
are in milliseconds and that decryption algorithms run on the supplier side,
the differences of running time between the algorithms are not as significant
as for the encryption algorithms, which run on the meter side and their
running time is presented in seconds. Decryption algorithms ran faster than
aggregation algorithms excluding PPP1 and LOP.
Table 8.5 contains the values used to plot Figure 8.10. The outliers are
not considered to be the maximum and the minimum value.
Similar to the collected times for encryption algorithms, the collected
time for decryption or opening the commitment in EPPP4SMS does not
consider the hash function HΩ given in Equation (6.7).
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Table 8.5: Time observed for description algorithms in milliseconds.
PPP1 PPP2 PPP3 LOP EPPP4SMS Paillier
Min. 11.0000 0.9750 0.4760 0.0170 7.4070 2.4600
Lower Quartile 11.0500 1.0060 0.4880 0.0210 7.4190 2.4650
Mean 11.0955 1.0232 0.4922 0.0338 7.4242 2.4686
Median 11.0660 1.0140 0.4920 0.0300 7.4220 2.4680
Upper Quartile 11.0840 1.0380 0.4960 0.0430 7.4270 2.4710
Max. 11.1340 1.0860 0.5080 0.0750 7.4390 2.4800
8.4.4 Overall Performance
In summary, the encryption algorithms have higher impact in the overall
performance than their respective aggregation and decryption algorithms.
Figure 8.11 depicts the box plot of the overall time observed per round j.
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Figure 8.11: Box plot of the overall time observed per round j.
Figure 8.11 depicts the total processing time per round j for each pro-
tocol, i.e., the time observed for encryption, aggregation, and decryption
algorithms. In the case of PPP3, the time for computing one hash function
HΩ is also included. As expected, Figure 8.11 is similar to Figure 8.7, which
depicts the time for encryption algorithms. Table 8.6 shows the values used
to plot Figure 8.11.
Table 8.6: Overall time observed per round j in seconds.
PPP1 PPP2 PPP3 LOP EPPP4SMS Paillier
Min. 0.0226 0.4668 0.2099 10.2163 0.4121 1.0957
Lower Quartile 0.0266 0.4757 0.2149 10.3938 0.4170 1.1080
Mean 0.0281 0.4807 0.2181 10.4582 0.4182 1.1145
Median 0.0279 0.4791 0.2176 10.4482 0.4196 1.1149
Upper Quartile 0.0293 0.4816 0.2213 10.5128 0.4202 1.1163
Max. 0.0334 0.4905 0.2299 10.6913 0.4249 1.1286
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Note that PPP3 is approx. two times faster than PPP2 and EPPP4SMS.
PPP1 uses approx. half of its time in the encryption algorithm, and the other
half in the decryption algorithm. The time for its aggregation algorithms
is insignificant in comparison. Although PPP1 has the biggest difference
between encryption and overall performance, it is still the fastest overall,
but meters and suppliers need to run PPP1 with PPP2 to have the features
of PPP3. Therefore, PPP3 heavily outperforms the others.
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks
After three chapters contextualizing this research followed by five chap-
ters advancing the state of the art, this thesis recapitulates itself, summarizes
the main results, presents an outlook, and synthesizes its importance.
9.1 Recapitulation
On the one hand, smart grids can provide numerous benefits to society,
which, as a result, can be wealthier with energy that is more sustainable
and eco-friendly. On the other hand, they can also enable surveillance and
manipulation of society and private citizens. The solution to this dilemma
is found in Privacy-Preserving Protocols (PPPs), cf. Chapter 1. Despite the
privacy problem, smart grids have been deployed around the world in par-
allel with research in security and privacy, cf. Chapter 2. The majority of
the related work has addressed the consolidated consumption cj , but smart
grids have other primordial requirements, cf. Chapter 3. Addressing the bill
b$i and consolidated consumption cj , any PPP can be attacked by means of
algebra and probability, cf. Chapter 5. To compute safe aggregations, the
protocols need to be efficient. Four interesting PPPs are selected. Besides
these solutions, the concept of Asymmetric DC-Nets (ADC-Nets) is intro-
duced from the concept of Symmetric DC-Nets (SDC-Nets), cf. Chapter 6.
The former needs only a key per smart meter. Thus, the number of keys
grows linearly. The latter needs ı˜ keys per smart meter. Thus, the number
of keys has quadratic growth with respect to the number of smart meters
ı˜ . Each protocol has its advantages and disadvantages. Overall, ADC-Nets
are the most satisfactory and can have desirable properties, including the
benefits from SDC-Nets and additive homomorphic encryption primitives
(AHEPs), cf. Chapter 7. The verification capability is indispensable, and
the real-world dataset used reaffirms the necessity of verification with its
inconsistencies. The simulation agrees with theoretical results and shows
the PPP3—an ADC-Net—that outperforms the others, cf. Chapter 8.
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9.2 Main Results
This thesis contains a variety of results regarding PPPs for smart me-
tering systems, including the improvement of published PPPs. Such devel-
opment culminated in the concept of ADC-Nets, which are generalizations
of AHEPs. In summary:
• Remote and frequent measurements are important.
• Suppliers need only the encrypted measurements.
• PPPs for smart metering systems should provide:
– Consolidated consumptions cj ;
– Bill b$i ;
– Verification (auditability);
– Efficiency.
• PPPs only preserve privacy for large aggregations.
• Optimal aggregation when the number of meters and rounds are equal.
• PPP1 is conjectured to be the fastest on the meter side.
• The speed advantage of PPP2 and PPP3 i comparison with other
PPPs is exponentially higher with increasing key size.
• The concept of ADC-Nets is introduced.
• PPP4 has different properties due to quantum mechanics.
• The analytical comparison shows that ADC-Nets are supreme.
• Inconsistencies lead to verifications.
• The simulation validates the theoretical results.
9.3 Outlook
Besides the relation between fully homomorphic encryption and ADC-
Nets, this thesis provides new perspectives for research in areas such as algo-
rithms, cryptography, security, privacy, and smart grid. As mentioned, many
application scenarios may use the results of this thesis, cf. Section 6.4.1.3.
In summary, new research can be done based on this thesis as follows.
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Chapter 4 presents economic reasons for suppliers to compute consoli-
dated consumptions. New reasons can be identified. Perhaps, some
of them might require more than the minimum requirements in Sec-
tion 4.2. Fair distribution provides a challenge for PPPs with un-
trusted smart meters in Section 4.1.3. The description of the applica-
tion scenario and the identification of the requirements are crucial to
the development of new technologies and PPPs.
Chapter 5 quantifies the risks as a function of several variables. However,
it does not present a minimum number of smart meters to generate
consolidated consumptions with a satisfactory level of privacy. This
problem can be assessed with experimental approaches. Nevertheless,
different populations might have different minimum.
Chapter 6 improves four published protocols. The search for more efficient
PPPs is fundamental. However, it is paramount that the new PPPs
can satisfy the minimum requirements Section 4.2 and can enforce
privacy as ADC-Nets can. PPP1 and PPP3 have exponential gain
in performance. Thus, it is difficult to find algorithms with better
complexity. However, they can be improved with low-level implemen-
tation. ADC-Nets can be used for different proposals, e.g., e-Voting,
Reputation Systems, Trust, Sensor Networks, Multi-party Computa-
tion, e-cash, mobile sensing, Image Processing, etc.
Chapter 7 compares different PPPs. New PPPs should be at least com-
pared with PPP3, i.e., ADC-Nets, which can be compared with PPPs
for other applications. Systematic reviews boost new developments.
Chapter 8 validates the performance of the selected PPPs by means of
processing time. New simulations can include communication costs,
can be done in real smart meters, can use a dataset with all the cus-
tomers of a supplier, etc. An ADC-Net can enforce privacy for subsets
of customers to avoid the need of setting up the whole PPP again if
a smart meter fails. The subsets might also have intersections. De-
termining the optimal configuration is a challenge, which depends on
several variables and may be determined with simulation.
9.4 Final Remarks
Smart grids can leverage society’s resources and enhance its economy.
However, security and privacy in smart grids are fundamental for every
nation. Therefore, PPPs can speed the proper development of society. Many
techniques can be used to keep customers’ privacy secure. Nonetheless, few
techniques enforce privacy in their PPPs. Without the correct enforcement
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by means of cryptography, the right to security and privacy might be violated
eventually.
Appendix A
Algorithms
The variables of the algorithms in this appendix are not related to pre-
defined variables, i.e., they are local variables.
Algorithm 15: Modular Multi-Exponentiation
Input: Integers bi, ei, m, n s.t. ei =
li∑
j=1
2j−1eij , where li is the bit
length of ei and eij ∈ {0, 1}.
Output: ∏ni=1 beii mod m.
1 L← dmax(log2 e1, . . . , log2 en)e
2 a← 1
3 for j=L to 1 do
4 a← a2 mod m
5 for i=1 to n do
6 if eij = 1 then
7 a← abi mod m
8 return a
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Algorithm 16: Scalar Multiplication
Input: An elliptic curve Ω, a point P ∈ Ω, and an integers k, s.t.
ki =
l∑
i=1
2i−1ei, where l is the bit length of k and ei ∈ {0, 1}.
Output: k · P ∈ Ω.
1 Q←∞
2 for j=l to 1 do
3 Q← 2 ·Q
4 if ei = 1 then
5 Q← Q+ P
6 return Q
Algorithm 17: Finding equivalent key lengths
Output: Return a table T with the key lengths in Table 6.1.
1 foreach i ∈ {80, 112, 128, 192, 256} do
2 m← 2i
3 T ← {}
4 r ← solve
(√
(1/2) · pi · o = m, o
)
5 Ti,DLP ← dlog2(r)e
6 r ← solve
(
exp
(
(64/9)1/3 · ln(n)1/3 · ln(ln(n))2/3
)
= m,n
)
7 Ti,GNFS ← dlog2(r)e
8 r ← solve
(
exp
(
(32/9)1/3 · ln(n)1/3 · ln(ln(n))2/3
)
= m,n
)
9 Ti,SNFS ← dlog2(r)e
10 return T
Appendix B
Parameters for ECC
The elliptic curve P-192 is over Zp with p = 2192−264−1, and its points
are defined by
Ω : y2 ≡ x3 − 3x+ b (mod p),
where
b = 0x 64210519 E59C80E7 0FA7E9AB 72243049 FEB8DEEC C146B9B1.
The base point P = (x, y) recommended has
x = 0x 188DA80E B03090F6 7CBF20EB 43A18800 F4FF0AFD 82FF1012,
and
y = 0x 07192B95 FFC8DA78 631011ED 6B24CDD5 73F977A1 1E794811.
Hence, the order of P is
n = 0x FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 99DEF836 146BC9B1 B4D22831.
Thus, the cofactor is
h = |Ω(Zp)|
n
= 1.
This curve is standardized by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in its publication FIPS 186-2 or Recommendation for
Key Management–Part 1: Revision 3 (NIST Special Publication 800-57).
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Appendix C
Mean Measurement by
Meter
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Figure C.1: Bar plot of the mean measurement by user’s meter.
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